AMENDED DLD-022                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                      No. 24-2570
                                      ___________

                          JERRY JERON DANIELS, Appellant

                                             v.

           DAUPHIN COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, ET AL;
                 HARRISBURG BUREAU OF POLICE, ET AL.
                   ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-23-cv-01909)
                        District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
                      ____________________________________

       Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 

(e)(2)(B) or
         Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                                  October 31, 2024

           Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

                           (Opinion filed: December 18, 2024)
                                       _________

                                        OPINION *
                                        _________

PER CURIAM




*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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       Jerry Jeron Daniels appeals pro se the District Court’s order granting appellee’s

motion to dismiss. He has also filed a motion in this Court requesting appointment of

counsel. Because his appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily

affirm the District Court’s order, and deny his motion for appointment of counsel as

moot. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

       As we write primarily for the litigants who are familiar with both the facts and

procedural posture of this case, we recount only the facts necessary to understand the

appeal. In August 2023, appellant Daniels filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania

Commonwealth Court, in which he alleged that he was wrongfully arrested and

maliciously prosecuted by the named defendants. ECF No. 1-1. After the case was

transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, the Dauphin

County District Attorney’s Office filed a notice of removal to federal court under federal

question jurisdiction. 

 & 1441(a). See also ECF No. 1.

       The District Attorney of Dauphin County then filed a motion to dismiss Daniels’

complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Daniels failed to assert any facts to

support his claims, and that, even if he had, Daniels’ cause of action was barred by the

favorable termination rule set in Heck v. Humphrey, 

 (1994). ECF No. 2.

The District Court assigned review of the motion to a magistrate judge, who, based on

public record legal documents generated by Daniels’ probation status and plea agreement,

filed a report which recommended granting the motion for substantially the same reasons




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as set forth in the District Attorney’s motion. 1 ECF No. 19. Daniels filed an objection to

the report, in which he baldly asserted that the documents relied on by the Report were

the product of fraud. ECF No. 20 at 1-3. The District Court overrode Daniels’ objections,

adopted the magistrate judge’s report, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. ECF

No. 23. This timely appeal followed. CA ECF No. 1.

       This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 

 and exercises de novo

review over both the grant of a motion to dismiss and dismissal of a complaint on

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 

 (3d Cir. 2018); Dooley v. Wetzel, 

, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020). To

survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In coming to this determination, a court may also consider extrinsic documents

which are “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 

 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), as well as

undisputedly authentic documents attached to a motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 

 (3d Cir. 1993). We construe




1
  At this point in the proceedings, only the Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office
had responded to the action, as it appears the Harrisburg Bureau of Police had never been
served. ECF No. 1 at 4; see also ECF No. 19 at 2 (“Harrisburg City has not entered
its appearance in this matter, and it does not appear to have been served with
original process.”) As a result, the District Court relied on its screening authority,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A when dismissing the claims against the Bureau of Police.
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Daniels’ pro se pleadings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

 (2007) (per

curiam).

       We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order on its own reasoning. As the

Report and Recommendation correctly concluded, all of Daniels’ claims are barred on

their face by the favorable termination rule provided by Heck v. Humphrey. 

(1994). ECF No. 19 at 9-11. This rule requires that a suit for monetary damages brought

under 

 be dismissed when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” See Heck, 

; see also Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 

 (3d Cir. 2012).

       We agree with the District Court’s determination that the Heck rule requires

dismissal of Daniels’ action. Daniels’ complaint asserts malicious prosecution and alleges

that his arrest and subsequent prosecution were the result of a conspiracy between the

named defendants, and seeks damages “in excess of $500,000.” ECF No. 1-1. If Daniels’

claims were successful, they would necessarily impugn the validity of his criminal

conviction, as they would require a court to hold that Daniels’ arrest and conviction were

the product of illegal activity. To proceed, therefore, Daniels must show that his

conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated. Because he cannot make this

showing, see Commonwealth v. Daniels, 

, *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 25,

2023), and his suit seeks monetary damages, see ECF No 1-1, Daniels’ claims are barred

by Heck. 

.



                                              4
       However, the District Court’s order dismissed Daniels’ action with prejudice.

Because Daniels’ wrongful conviction and malicious prosecution claims were dismissed

as Heck-barred, the District Court’s July 31, 2024 order must be modified to reflect that

the dismissal of those claims is without prejudice. See Curry v. Yachera, 

 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

       Accordingly, we will modify the District Court’s July 31, 2024 order in the

manner described above, and will summarily affirm the order as modified. 3d Cir. L.A.R.

27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. Daniels’ motions for appointment of counsel and to compel the

Bureau of Prisons are denied as moot.




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