Sara Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford Inc

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 23-2938 ___________ SARA ANN EDMONDSON, Appellant v. LILLISTON FORD INC. ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-07704) District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) November 15, 2024 Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed December 18, 2024) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM

Sara Ann Edmondson appeals from the District Court’s post-judgment order granting defendant Lilliston Ford Inc.’s motion to execute on her real property and denying her motion to dismiss in opposition. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

This case has been litigated for over a decade, and has spawned five appeals. It began with Edmondson’s 2013 complaint, which alleged that Lilliston Ford sold her a defective used car.1 After protracted proceedings which we need not revisit here, an arbitrator issued an award, dismissing Edmondson’s claims and awarding attorneys’ fees and costs. The arbitrator also assessed a $35 storage fee for every day that her trade-in car (“the Lincoln”) remained on Lilliston’s lot and Edmondson failed either to turn over its title or reimburse the $800 trade-in credit. The District Court confirmed the award and attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $10,709.39, and we affirmed. See Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford Inc., 722 F. App’x 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

Since then, Edmondson has thwarted Lilliston’s efforts to collect on its judgment, which has grown considerably as a result. In 2021, Lilliston filed a motion to enforce its judgment and to hold Edmondson in contempt for violating various court orders, including post-judgment discovery orders. The District Court found that Edmondson had “engaged in a pattern of contumacious behavior . . . . making a mockery of the judicial system” by flouting its orders, filing frivolous motions, and taking various appeals. ECF

No. 181 at 3-4. It therefore entered judgment against Edmondson for $144,423.45, which included over $55,000 in additional storage fees and over $88,000 in additional attorneys’ fees. And, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, the District Court imposed a filing injunction, precluding Edmondson from pursuing any further actions related to this case – in either state or federal court – without the Court’s permission.

Eventually, facing contempt of court, Edmondson handed over title to the Lincoln to Lilliston. But the money judgment largely remained unsatisfied. Finally, in October 2023, the District Court granted Lilliston’s motion to execute upon Edmondson’s real property.2 Lilliston appeals from that judgment.3 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion an order granting a writ of execution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). See Lewis v. United Joint Venture, 691 F.3d 835, 839 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing cases). We review de novo the District Court’s interpretation of state law. Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023).

Generally, the execution of a money judgment in federal court “must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). Under New Jersey law, which applies here, Lilliston was first required to make “reasonable efforts to determine whether [Edmondson] had personal assets” which could satisfy the judgment before proceeding to execute on her real property. Pojanowski v. Loscalzo, 603 A.2d 952, 953 (N.J. 1992); see also N.J. Ct. R. 4:59-1; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:17-1 (setting forth the “[s]equence of execution,” which is directed at goods and chattels before real estate). The District Court properly determined that Lilliston made good faith efforts to identify and locate Edmondson’s personalty.4 See Pojanowski, 603 A.2d at 953-54 (recognizing that the plaintiff exerted reasonable efforts in good faith to locate defendant’s personal property by “fil[ing] a motion to compel [her] post-judgment deposition . . . in order to ascertain the extent and location of her assets”); Borromeo v. DiFlorio, 976 A.2d 388, 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (recognizing same where defendant hired an investigator to determine if plaintiff had personal assets, and sent interrogatories to plaintiff inquiring about her assets). Moreover, Edmondson all but confirmed in her deposition testimony that she had no personal assets worth levying, and she did not meaningfully contest the motion to execute.5 See Pojanowski, 603 A.2d at 953 (finding that plaintiff had sufficiently complied with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:17-1, in part because defendant denied having any personal property assets, suggesting that further inquiry by plaintiff would not be fruitful). The record therefore supports the determination that Edmondson’s personal property could not reasonably be located or was insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The District Court therefore properly granted a writ of execution on Edmondson’s real property.

The District Court began its decision aptly invoking the adage “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied.” ECF No. 238 at 1. Edmondson’s endless and frivolous post-judgment litigation has not only precluded Lilliston from collecting its due, it has also resulted in a fifteen-fold judgment against her. We will delay justice no further.6

Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

strike Appellant’s documents docketed at 3d Cir. ECF Nos. 61-66, including “Immediate Injunctive Relief Article III Section 2 Clause 1.11.6 Prima Facie Certified Docket” and “18 USC 241 & 18 USC 242 Article III Section 2 Clause 1.11.6 Certified Question - Rule 19,” is granted. To the extent that the parties request any additional relief, it is denied.