NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2711 ___________

AMIR WILEY, Appellant

v.

SUPPORT MAGISTRATE OF EAST ORANGE, NJ; HEATHER TAYLOR ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-04888) District Judge: Honorable Jamel Semper ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 17, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 20, 2024)

___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Amir Wiley appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint

with prejudice under

(e). We will affirm.

In August 2023, Wiley filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of New

Jersey, in which he alleged that New Jersey state judge Heather Taylor had deprived him

of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of law in viola-

tion of

. Wiley alleged that the judge had unlawfully issued an arrest war-

rant after he failed to appear at a child support hearing for which he had not received notice;

he further alleged that he never received notice of the judge’s order to garnish his wages,

depriving him of due process.

Wiley requested compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief pro-

hibiting the judge “from engaging in similar actions in the future.” ECF No. 8 at 4. Because

Wiley was proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court screened and dismissed his

complaint pursuant to

(e), after determining that Judge Taylor was pro-

tected by judicial immunity. Wiley then timely appealed.1

We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Wiley’s complaint. As the District

Court adequately explained, “[a] judicial officer in the performance of his duties has abso-

lute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.’” Wiley v. Support Mag-

istrate, No. 23-04888,

, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2024) (quoting

Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct.,

(3d Cir. 2009)). Judicial immunity extends to

all actions undertaken pursuant to the judicial function, even if those acts are “done

1 We have jurisdiction under

and exercise plenary review. See Allah v. Seiverling,

(3d Cir. 2000). 2 maliciously,” so long as they are not undertaken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”

Gallas v. Sup. Ct.,

(3d Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Azubuko v. Royal,

(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing

Stump v. Sparkman,

(1978)). Wiley has not alleged anything to suggest

that, in issuing warrants and garnishing his wages, Judge Taylor acted “in the clear absence

of all jurisdiction.”

Nor is Wiley eligible for injunctive relief. Although “absolute judicial immunity ex-

tends only to claims for damages,” Larsen v. Senate of Commonwealth of Pa.,

(3d Cir. 1998), “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omis-

sion taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

.

Wiley has not asserted facts to show that either of these exceptions applies. See Azubuko,

443 F.3d at 303–04 (holding that injunctive relief is available in this context only if a de-

claratory decree was violated, or if declaratory relief is unavailable).

On appeal, Wiley reiterates his claim that the judge’s actions deprived him of due pro-

cess under color of law in violation of

. Even if Wiley’s recycled arguments

were availing, he cannot recover under § 242, as it is a criminal statute without a private

right of action. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,

(1994); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia,

(3d

Cir. 1980); Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp.,

, 511 (2d Cir. 1994).

3 Further, given the plain bar of judicial immunity, we are satisfied that amendment

would have been futile. See generally Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

(3d Cir. 2002).

4