NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1727 ___________

JASON RITCHWOOD, Appellant

v.

ESSEX COUNTY TOWING; TOWNSHIP OF SOUTH ORANGE VILLAGE ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:23-cv-20374) District Judge: Honorable Julien X. Neals ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 26, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 30, 2024) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

New Jersey law permits local police officers to contact tow companies and have unreg-

istered vehicles towed and stored at the vehicle owners’ expense. See N.J.S.A. 39:3-4.

Claiming that his Ford F-150 pickup truck was unlawfully towed and retained, Jason Ritch-

wood filed this pro se civil rights action against Essex County Towing and the municipality

in which he and the tow company both reside (South Orange Village, New Jersey).1 Ritch-

wood alleged without detail that his vehicle qualifies as an “automobile fire engine,” which

is excepted from N.J.S.A. 39:3-4 pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-1.

The District Court granted the defendants’ dispositive motions under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and dismissed Ritchwood’s complaint with prejudice. The Dis-

trict Court determined that the parties were not citizenship diverse for purposes of federal

jurisdiction under

(a)(1), and that Ritchwood failed to either raise or ad-

equately plead a viable civil rights claim under

or 1983, for purposes of

federal jurisdiction under

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

1 Ritchwood filed two other pro se actions related to the towing of his vehicle. See Ritch- wood v. Horten, DC Civ. No. 23-cv-22883 (D.N.J.); Ritchwood v. City of Hoboken, DC Civ. No. 24-cv-02031 (D.N.J.). Those actions remain pending. 2 A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is to be without prejudice. See Figueroa 2 Ritchwood appealed. We have jurisdiction under

. Dismissals under

Rule 12(b)(1), like those under Rule 12(b)(6), are reviewed de novo. See Free Speech

Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S.,

, 529–30 (3d Cir. 2012).

Ritchwood argues that the District Court “should have allowed amendment of [the]

complaint.” Appellant’s Br. 12. To the limited extent that the District Court may have con-

ducted a Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, see DC Op. 3–4; see also supra note 2, Ritchwood would

have a point, see Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2007) (“Our precedent supports the notion that in civil rights cases district

courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a

case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”).3

But even accepting the premise that the District Court conducted (in part) a Rule

12(b)(6) inquiry—and thus should have allowed Ritchwood to amend his complaint or de-

termined that amendment was not warranted—any error was harmless because amendment

plainly would have been futile. Subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1) was indis-

putably lacking (all parties are New Jersey citizens), so Ritchwood needed to go the § 1331

route and plead a viable federal law claim. And that he could not have done in an amended

v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc.,

, 182 (3d Cir. 1999). Dismissing a complaint with prejudice may cloud somewhat the precise Rule 12(b) ground on which the dismissal rests.

3 To be sure, the plausibility standard applies not just in assessing pleadings for which dismissal is sought under Rule 12(b)(6), but also for those facing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Huertas v. Bayer US LLC, No. 23-2178,

, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2024); In re Avena,

, 479 (3d Cir. 2024).

3 complaint. In particular, Ritchwood’s filings to date4 contain no factual matter that would

plausibly support a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, see

Alvin v. Suzuki,

(3d Cir. 2000); cf. Weinrauch v. Park City,

(10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he City need not provide a hearing before requiring that the

owner of an impounded vehicle pay the fees to recover the car.”), or a basis for liability

under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

(1978), see Santiago v.

Warminster Township,

(3d Cir. 2010) (“Under Monell, for municipal

liability to attach, any injury must be inflicted by ‘execution of a government’s policy or

custom.’”) (citation omitted).5

For those reasons, and because Ritchwood’s remaining arguments all are without merit,

the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

4 Including the unauthorized amended complaint Ritchwood filed in the District Court after he initiated this appeal. 5 Ritchwood’s opening brief itemizes the steps he took to try to recover his vehicle. While Ritchwood may have eschewed or simply overlooked seemingly more-appropriate actions, cf. Appellant’s Br. Ex. 8 (Aug. 9, 2023 letter from South Orange Village Police Department to Ritchwood explaining the process for reclamation of the vehicle); N.J.S.A. 56:13-1 to - 23 (Predatory Towing Act) (addressing nonconsensual towing of motor vehicles author- ized by law enforcement; permitting owners and operators of such vehicles to file a dispute with the Division of Consumer Affairs to challenge the towing company’s fees, and giving the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs the authority to determine if a tow- ing company’s fees are reasonable); N.J.S.A. 39:4-56.6 (Abandoned Vehicle Act) (permit- ting vehicle owners to make a claim or challenge removal and storage costs before a vehi- cle is deemed “abandoned” and sold at public auction); N.J.S.A. 2A:44-21 to -26 (Garage Keeper’s Act) (permitting a vehicle owner to “bring an action for possession” in state court if the owner believes the garage keeper’s storing and maintenance fees are “excessive”), a failure to take advantage of available post-deprivation remedies does not translate into a denial of post-deprivation process. Cf. Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia,

(3d Cir. 1991). 4