NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2412 ___________

JOSEPH ARUANNO, Appellant

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00786) District Judge: Honorable Evelyn Padin ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 26, 2024

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 31, 2024) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

In 2022, Joseph Aruanno, a frequent pro se litigant, sought to file an in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) complaint against the IRS in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of California (“the California District Court”). Before ruling on Aruanno’s IFP motion,

the California District Court transferred his case to the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey (“the District Court”). Upon the transfer, the District Court directed

Aruanno to show cause why it should not deny his IFP application given his history of

abusive litigation. After Aruanno responded to the show-cause order, the District Court

denied Aruanno’s IFP application. Aruanno appealed, and we affirmed the District Court’s

decision.

After our ruling, the District Court provided Aruanno 30 days in which to submit the

filing fee for his complaint and notified him that his case could be dismissed if he did not

submit it. In response, Aruanno filed another IFP application. The District Court denied his

application and provided him 30 more days in which he could pay the fee, warning him

that the failure to pay the fee would result in the dismissal of his case. When Aruanno did

not submit the required fee, the District Court dismissed his case. Aruanno appeals.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 We have jurisdiction under

. We review the District Court’s order

dismissing Aruanno’s case for abuse of discretion. See Mindek v. Rigatti,

,

1373–74 (3d Cir. 1992).

Dismissal is a harsh sanction, see

, but, under the circumstances, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for Aruanno’s failure to pay the

fee. Instead of paying the fee, Aruanno continued to seek IFP status despite the District

Court’s earlier ruling and our affirmance of that ruling on appeal. Furthermore, in arguing

in favor of the grant of IFP status, he essentially asked the District Court to do something

it may not do, namely, to alter our mandate based on matters that he included (or could

have included) in his earlier appeal. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,

(3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). While we ordinarily require a district court to balance several

factors before dismissing a case for lack of prosecution, see Poulis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co.,

(3d Cir. 1984), that balancing was not necessary in this case,

see Spain v. Gallegos,

(3d Cir. 1994); Guyer v. Beard,

,

1429–30 (3d Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

3