NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2514 __________

AARON J. BRESSI, Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD; MS. LEIGEY, Pre-Parole SCI- Rockview; MS. LINDA ROSENBERG, Board Member; MR. GABRNAY, Hearing Examiner ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-00440) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 2, 2024 Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 4, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Aaron J. Bressi appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). For the following reasons, we will

affirm.

In March 2023, Bressi, who is currently serving an eight-year prison sentence,

initiated a pro se civil rights action pursuant to

against the Pennsylvania

Parole Board and three state employees associated with the Board. Bressi’s complaint

alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated

when he was denied parole. The District Court dismissed the complaint without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. Bressi thereafter filed an amended complaint and subsequently

moved for the appointment of counsel and summary judgment. On August 11, 2023, the

District Court entered an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice pursuant to §

1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and because the

complaint was legally frivolous. It also denied or dismissed his other filings. Bressi

appeals.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to

. “We review a district court’s

dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint at the § 1915A screening stage under a plenary

standard.” Durham v. Kelley,

(3d Cir. 2023).

In his brief, Bressi argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his case

before the defendants were served. Bressi is incorrect. The District Court screened the

complaint pursuant to the screening mechanism for pro se prisoner complaints found in §

1915A and sua sponte dismissed it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

2 granted. Section 1915A requires courts to screen prisoner complaints for possible

dismissal “before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after

docketing.” 1915A(a). This statute, therefore, authorizes pre-service screening of

complaints “in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity.” Id. The statute further mandates dismissal of a

complaint at screening if it fails to state a claim. § 1915A(b)(1).

We discern no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Bressi’s amended

complaint. In his amended complaint, Bressi alleged that his substantive due process

rights were violated because he was denied parole on “constitutionally impermissible

grounds,” including race or retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights. Dkt No.

26, at 4. He further alleged that he was “way past [his] max sentence date, due to

multiple legal documents tampered by the state.” Id. 1

The District Court correctly concluded that Bressi’s allegation that the Parole

Board denied him parole on impermissible grounds (to the extent he made such an

allegation) was merely a legal conclusion without any supporting facts and therefore

should be disregarded. See James v. City of Wilkes-Barre,

(3d Cir.

2012). Further, we agree with the District Court that, after reviewing the Parole Board

1 Challenges to parole denials are generally cognizable in a habeas petition. See Coady v. Vaughn,

(3d Cir. 2001). Here, however, Bressi appears to allege that the Parole Board relied on impermissible factors in its determination and does not seek immediate release; instead, he seeks damages and for removal of all defendants from their jobs. Dkt No. 26, at 5. Regardless of the relief sought, success on his claim would result in a new hearing, not his release. Therefore, Bressi’s claim was properly asserted under § 1983. See Benchoff v. Colleran,

, 815 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005). 3 decisions, “[n]either decision by the Parole Board was arbitrary or conscience-shocking.”

Dkt No. 31, at 6–7. The Parole Board’s reasons for its denials included Bressi’s “risk and

needs assessment indicating [his] level of risk to the community”; his “prior

unsatisfactory probation supervision history”; “[r]eports, evaluations and

assessments/level of risk indicat[ing] [his] risk to the community”; his

“minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed”; his

“refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed”; and his “lack of remorse

for the offense(s) committed.” Dkt No. 26-4, at 1; Dkt No. 26-7, at 1. Because the

decisions were not arbitrary or conscience-shocking, they do not reflect a substantive due

process violation. See Holmes v. Christie,

(3d Cir. 2021); Newman v.

Beard,

(3d Cir. 2010).

To the extent that Bressi alleged that he was confined past his “max sentence

date,” he has failed to allege any supporting facts regarding his contention that “multiple

legal documents [were] tampered with by the state.” Dkt No. 26, at 4. As the District

Court concluded, this allegation alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009). Finally, because the District Court previously provided

Bressi the opportunity to amend, it did not err in concluding that further amendment

would be futile. 2

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

2 To the extent that Bressi argues on appeal that the District Court abused its discretion in its analysis of the Poulis factors, we reject this argument because the District Court did not dismiss the case for failure to prosecute and Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

(3d Cir. 1984), is not otherwise implicated here. 4