Anthony Parker v. Lehigh County Court Domestic Relation

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 23-2920 __________ ANTHONY PARKER, Appellant v. LEHIGH COUNTY OFFICE OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS; TAMMY E. STEPHEN; MICHELLEE L. PAVLACK; RICHARD (DICK) BETZ; HALA T. KHOURLY; CATHERINE M. ROSEBERRY; JULIA GREENWOOD ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 5-23-cv-03263) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) February 20, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: February 21, 2024) ___________ OPINION * PER CURIAM In August 2023, pro se appellant Anthony Parker filed a civil rights complaint in the District Court claiming that his rights had been violated during child-support proceedings in Lehigh County. 1 He named as defendants the Domestic Relations section of the Family Division of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (LCDRS), a Court of Common Pleas judge, and several LCDRS employees.

In the complaint, Parker alleged that the defendants had abused their authority and conspired to violate his constitutional and statutory rights in numerous respects, including by ordering him to pay arrears for now-terminated child-support orders; garnishing his income to satisfy an Indiana support order; issuing two support orders for the same child; and obstructing his appeal rights by, among other things, failing to submit a docket statement to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and failing to provide him copies of prior “three-year review” orders. Parker sought monetary and punitive damages, as well as a declaration that his rights had been violated. He also asked the District Court to “extinguish terminated child support orders garnished as costs and arrears.” Compl. 8, ECF No. 2. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because, among other reasons, the defendants were immune from suit. Parker appealed. 2 We will affirm. We agree with the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion and will not fully repeat its analysis here. First, as the District Court has advised Parker several times, the LCDRS is immune from suits filed in federal court. See Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239–41 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that courts in Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system are state entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Second, we agree with the District Court that Melissa T. Pavlack, a judge of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, is entitled to judicial immunity for the alleged wrongful actions she took in her judicial capacity. 3 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (explaining that a judge is immune from suit for monetary damages arising from her judicial actions, even corrupt or malicious ones, unless she “has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction”). Third, for the reasons the District Court explained, LCDRS staff attorneys and hearing officers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for implementing and enforcing the child-support orders. See Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 2000). And, to the extent that Parker objects to a defendant’s alleged failure to submit a docket statement to the Superior Court, we have previously concluded that this fails to state a claim, see Parker, 2022 WL 17411380, at *2, and Parker has provided no basis for us to revisit that decision. Lastly, the District Court correctly noted that it could not grant the injunctive relief Parker requested because, among federal courts, only the Supreme Court may directly review and reverse the LCDRS’s decisions, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005), and the District Court lacked jurisdiction to compel the state court or its officers to disclose documents to Parker, see Parker, 621 F. App’x at 130 (so holding in prior appeal). 4 We have reviewed Parker’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are meritless. In particular, to the extent that he argues that the LCDRS lacked personal jurisdiction over him and his ex-wife, he must raise this issue in the child-support proceedings. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291–92.