United States v. Edwin Pawlowski

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 23-1078 __________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDWIN PAWLOWSKI, Appellant ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 5:17-cr-00390-001) District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 14, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 26, 2024) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM Appellant Edwin Pawlowski, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion for a new trial. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

Pawlowski, the former mayor of the City of Allentown, was convicted of 38 corruption-related offenses in 2018. He was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment.

We affirmed that sentence on direct appeal. See United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897 (3d Cir. 2022).

In 2020, Pawlowski filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that an investigating law enforcement agent’s comments on a 2019 podcast suggested that the Government withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).1 The District Court construed it as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and denied it. Pawlowski filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where, as here, a motion for a new trial is based on questions of law as well as fact, we conduct a de novo review of the District Court’s legal conclusions and a “clearly erroneous” review of any fact findings.2

United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005). Where a Rule 33 motion is based on newly discovered evidence, the movant shoulders a “heavy burden,” see United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010), of proving five elements: the evidence must be (1) newly and (2) diligently discovered; (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) material; and (5) capable of “probably” producing an acquittal on a new trial,3 see United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2015). “If just one of the requirements is not satisfied, a defendant’s Rule 33 motion must fail.” United States v. Kelly, 539 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 2008) Despite Pawlowski’s general assertions otherwise, most of the evidence discussed on the podcast was produced during discovery, so it was not “newly discovered” as

Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the appellant forfeited claims by failing to raise them in the opening brief). Among other issues, Pawlowski has not challenged the District Court’s conclusion that it had already resolved his claims regarding two categories of allegedly withheld evidence, and therefore we need not address that conclusion or remand for further proceedings as to it.

Pawlowski asserts on appeal that the Government failed to prove all the elements required to support his fraud and bribery convictions, and that his wire and mail fraud conviction should be reversed in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, but he failed to raise those arguments to the District Court, and we will not address them for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134, 146 (3d Cir. 2023). required by Rule 33. See United States v. Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 461 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “the evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the trial”). Before trial, the Government provided the content of conversations between a confidential source or undercover agent and a public official,4 information about its use of an undercover agent posing as a potential developer to gain access to Pawlowski’s associates,5 and data from Pawlowski’s campaign manager’s phone and devices belonging to an employee of the campaign manager. Further, Pawlowski has not established that any of this evidence was material. See generally Lesko v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 34 F.4th 211, 233 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that, under Brady, “pure speculation” is “not enough to show materiality”). The District Court thus properly concluded that Pawlowski failed to meet his burden under Rule 33.

Pawlowski also argues that his rights under Brady were violated because the Government failed to disclose that it seized his assets for the purpose of restricting his ability to acquire counsel of his choice.6 To the extent Pawlowski can raise this claim through a Rule 33 motion, cf. United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining § 2255 motion was proper vehicle to bring Sixth Amendment claim, not Rule 33 motion), it fails under the relevant standard because Pawlowski has not shown that the reason for seizing his assets is material. See United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 188 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). The District Court also correctly concluded that it was permissible for the Government to seize tainted assets, even if they were intended for the payment of an attorney. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989) (explaining that “the Government may—without offending the Fifth or Sixth Amendment—obtain forfeiture of property that a defendant might have wished to use to pay his attorney”).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing, especially after the Government produced documentation of its prior discovery disclosures. See United States v. Noel, 905 F.3d 258, 275 n.10 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that a district court may forgo a hearing on a Rule 33 motion “where the motion is capable of resolution on the existing record”).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7