Justin De La Cruz Martinez v. Christopher Feliciani

CLD-142 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 24-1430 ___________ JUSTIN JUAN DE LA CRUZ MARTINEZ, Appellant v. JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. FELICIANI ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-00435) District Judge: Honorable Robert J. Colville ____________________________________ Submitted on the Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 20, 2024 Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: June 27, 2024) _________ OPINION * _________ PER CURIAM Justin Martinez sued Judge Christopher Feliciani, who presided over two of his prosecutions in the Court of Common Pleas for Westmoreland County (Docket Nos. CP-

65-CR-005559-2019 and CP-65-CR-0000231-2020). Claiming a conspiracy against him, Martinez challenged statements and decisions that Judge Feliciani made during the proceedings. He further asserted that Judge Feliciani violated his right to a speedy trial, tampered with transcripts, and interfered with his appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by filing opinions that included unfavorable information. Martinez sought several forms of relief, seemingly encompassing compensation for his “financial distress” from the alleged wrongs as well as declaratory, injunctive, and “other” relief. ECF No. 5 at 36, 40-41. Judge Feliciani filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted. Martinez appeals. 1 Judge Feliciani has filed a motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment, which Martinez opposes.

As a preliminary matter, we must dismiss this appeal as moot to the extent that Martinez sought relief that is no longer available. 2 See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the course of adjudication that . . . prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”).

To the extent that Martinez presents a live controversy over which we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. See St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2020). Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s ruling because no substantial issue is presented on appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Because the acts that Martinez described were acts taken in Judge Feliciano’s judicial capacity, the District Court was correct to conclude that Judge Feliciano was entitled to judicial immunity to the extent that Martinez sought damages or injunctive relief against him. 3 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978) (explaining that judges are not civilly liable for judicial acts); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “because [a plaintiff] has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief is unavailable, and because the injunctive relief sought by [the plaintiff] does not address the actions of [the judge] other than in his judicial capacity, [the plaintiff’s] claim for injunctive relief is barred”).

And to the extent that Martinez sought declarations (that are not now moot) related to his then-ongoing criminal cases, the District Court properly abstained from ruling under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 4 See Coruzzi v. State of New Jersey, 705 F.2d 688, 690 (3d Cir. 1983) (explaining that “except in carefully circumscribed situations, the federal courts should not disrupt an ongoing state judicial process, either by preempting the adjudication of claims that could be brought to the state forum, by directing the state court to stay its proceedings, or by directly interfering in other ways with the natural course of state adjudication”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Although the application of Younger is limited when there is “a showing that the charges that general allegations of conspiracy not based on facts are conclusions of law that are insufficient to state a claim); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing as insufficient a complaint that “contains conclusory allegations of concerted action but is devoid of facts actually reflecting joint action”). had been brought in bad faith or with an intent to harass,” ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014), there is no such showing here. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (“‘[B]ad faith’ in this context generally means that a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.”) (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).

Lastly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

For these reasons, we grant Judge Feliciani’s motion and will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 5 Martinez’s motion to transfer is denied.