PRECEDENTIAL

        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

               _______________________

                     No. 23-1836
               _______________________

           UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                    Appellant

                            v.

                REGINALD L. HOPKINS
               _______________________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
            District Court No. 1-21-cr-00177-001
     District Judge: The Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
               __________________________

                Argued February 7, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

                   (Filed: July 9, 2024)
Carlo D. Marchioli [ARGUED]
Office of United States Attorney
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse
1501 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 202
Harrisburg, PA 17102
           Counsel for Appellant

John A. Abom [ARGUED]
Abom & Kutulakis
2 W. High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
           Counsel for Appellee


               __________________________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
               __________________________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

       The Government appeals the District Court’s dismissal
with prejudice of one of two counts set forth in an indictment.
In finding, inter alia, that the Government colluded with state
law enforcement to evade the strictures of the Speedy Trial Act
(“STA” or “the Act”), the District Court invoked a so-called
“ruse exception” to the STA as the basis for granting the
dismissal. The exception is a judicially created carve-out to the
                                 2
Act and has not been previously adopted by this Court. Nor
have any of our sister courts of appeals applied a version of the
ruse exception to dismiss a federal charge for violation of a
time limit established by the STA. As the District Court
conceived of the purported exception, a defendant must prove
two elements: first, that state charges were filed for the sole or
primary purpose of preparing a federal criminal prosecution;
and second, that there was collusion between state and federal
authorities. Because we conclude that—at least as it relates to
a prosecution first initiated in a state court—the STA contains
no implied ruse exception, we will reverse the order of the
District Court and reinstate the dismissed count of the
indictment.

                                I.

                  A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       After Reginald Hopkins was arraigned in the Court of
Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, on, inter
alia, a state firearms offense, and while awaiting his state
preliminary hearing,1 a federal grand jury for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania returned a two-count indictment
against Hopkins. The indictment, which was filed June 23,
2021, charged Hopkins with distributing cocaine base, a
Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 

(a)(1), and for being a felon-in-possession of firearms
and ammunition in violation of 

(g)(1). Hopkins
appeared before a federal magistrate judge for his arraignment

1
  Hopkins’s state preliminary hearing was continued four
times.
                            3
and entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, the state charges were
withdrawn.

        Defense counsel filed numerous unopposed motions to
extend the deadline for filing pretrial motions under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 and to continue jury selection
and trial. Six motions to continue were filed by two different
defense counsel, each of whom also sought and received leave
to withdraw from the case. Before entry of an appearance by a
third defense counsel, Hopkins filed a pro se motion to dismiss
the indictment for violation of the STA. Because Hopkins was
still represented by counsel, the District Court ordered the
motion to dismiss stricken, without prejudice to refiling with
counsel’s assistance.

       Then came a counseled motion to dismiss, arguing that
Hopkins’s rights had been violated under both the STA and the
Sixth Amendment. The District Court scheduled a hearing on
that motion for November 15, 2022. But the day of the hearing,
Hopkins’s attorney—his third—withdrew. That prompted
another continuance. The District Court appointed counsel
number four, but he was granted leave to withdraw after six
days, which resulted in the appointment of yet a fifth defense
counsel. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on the motion to dismiss on February 2, 2023.

       In a memorandum and order filed the following month,
the District Court concluded that no speedy trial violation had
occurred and therefore denied the motion to dismiss. Hopkins
moved for reconsideration, citing new information disclosed
by the Government. The District Court scheduled a second
evidentiary hearing which was held on March 24, 2023. The
                               4
Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the felon-in-
possession count only, denying the motion as to the drug
distribution charge.

       The Government filed this timely appeal pursuant to 

. Simultaneously, it sought to stay Hopkins’s
criminal proceeding pending the resolution of its appeal of the
dismissal of the felon-in-possession count. The District Court
denied the requested stay. Ten days later, at the request of the
Government, the District Court dismissed the § 841(a)(1) drug
distribution charge in Count I of the indictment, thereby
ripening the notice of appeal. See Cape May Greene, Inc. v.
Warren, 

 (3d Cir. 1983).

                       B. BACKGROUND

       Against this procedural backdrop, we turn to the
substantive basis of Hopkins’s motion to dismiss and the
District Court’s disposition thereof.

       In early 2021, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) received information that
Hopkins “was potentially selling narcotics in Harrisburg” and
“may [have] be[en] in possession of firearms.” App. 4. Based
on this information, Darrin Bates, a police officer with the city
of Harrisburg who was cross designated as an ATF task force
agent (“Bates” or “TFO Bates”), opened a federal investigation
into Hopkins. Pursuant to that investigation, Bates procured a
federal search warrant for an address associated with Hopkins.
ATF agents, along with Bates and several of his colleagues
from the Harrisburg Police Department, executed the warrant
and recovered firearms, at least one of which had been reported
                               5
stolen. Hopkins was present during the search and was arrested
on state charges. As set forth above, Hopkins was subsequently
indicted federally, and the state charges against him were
dropped.

       Hopkins moved to dismiss the federal indictment. As
relevant to this appeal, Hopkins invoked a so-called “ruse
exception” to the STA as the primary basis for dismissal. He
asserted that his rights under 

(b) and (c)(1)
had been violated because he had been federally indicted over
four months after his arrest by state authorities and because he
had not been brought to trial within 70 days of that state arrest.2

2
  Section 3161(b) of the Act requires that the Government file
an information or indictment no more than thirty days after the
defendant is either arrested or served with a summons in
connection with the at-issue charges. 

(b).
Section 3161(c)(1) requires that the defendant’s trial start no
more than seventy days after the later of either the defendant’s
initial appearance or the date on which the information or
indictment is filed and made public. 

(c)(1).
Section 3161(h) lists various periods of delay that are to be
excluded from both clocks.

Section 3162(a)(1) provides the sanction for violations of §
3161(b)’s thirty-day clock, stating, in relevant part, that “[i]f .
. . no indictment or information is filed within the time limit
required by section 3161(b) . . . such charge . . . shall be
dismissed or otherwise dropped.”

Section 3162(a)(2) contains a dismissal sanction for violations
of § 3161(c). It provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a defendant
                                 6
Though he did not dispute that, ordinarily, the provisions of the
STA do not apply to state arrests, Hopkins specifically argued
that his “arrest on state charges brought by ATF TFO Bates,
based upon a federal search warrant applied for and executed
by ATF TFO Bates, began the federal Speedy Trial clock
because the arrest on state charges was merely a ruse to
facilitate federal prosecution.” Dkt. No. 66 at 6 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).3

       The District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which
Bates testified. Bates stated that his contact in the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Johnny Baer (“Baer” or “AUSA Baer”), had
asked him whether he “had enough to charge [Hopkins] in the
state [system]. [Bates] said yes.” App. 104. Bates also
confirmed that Baer “told [him] to go ahead and do the state
charges.” App. 101. And Bates unequivocally denied having
ever “discuss[ed] a charging document” with AUSA Baer.
App. 102.

       In a memorandum explaining its order denying the
counseled motion to dismiss, the District Court concluded that
it would “assume, without deciding, that the ‘ruse exception’
could apply for purposes of resolving [Hopkins’s] motion.”
App. 162-63. The District Court specifically acknowledged in


is not brought to trial within the time limit required by section
3161(c) . . . the information or indictment shall be dismissed
on motion of the defendant.”
3
 Citations preceded by “Dkt.” refer to entries on the District
Court’s docket (1:21-cr-177, M.D. Pa.).

                               7
the memorandum that “the Third Circuit has not yet decided
whether [to adopt] the ‘ruse exception[,]’” but concluded that
because our Court “has considered and discussed it . . . rather
than rejecting its application,” we “[might] be willing to adopt
it” if “the right circumstances arose.” App. 162 (internal
citations omitted). The Court concluded that the facts of
Hopkins’s case made “the argument in favor of applying the
‘ruse exception’ colorable,” App. 165,4 yet acknowledged that
the case “present[ed] . . . a close call,” App. 168.

       Ultimately, the District Court denied the motion
because Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that the exception’s
elements, as the Court understood them, had been satisfied.
The Court first “f[ound] that there [was] sufficient evidence”
to “conclude that state authorities intended to prosecute
Hopkins at the state level[,]” including testimony which
“demonstrate[d] that the state authorities were willing to
pursue the state charges despite the pending federal
indictment” and testimony showing that “Hopkins’[s] case was
handled normally[.]” App. 166-67 (emphasis in original). “In
light of this evidence, the [C]ourt [could not] conclude that

4
  The Court noted that this was not a circumstance “in which a
purely state or local investigation was later adopted by federal
law enforcement officials for federal prosecution.” App. 165.
The Court also pointed to the testimony which indicated that
when “Bates spoke with AUSA Baer over the phone[,]” “Baer
asked . . . Bates whether there was enough to file state
charges[,]” and “advised . . . Bates to do so.” App. 166 (internal
citation omitted). And the Court noted the “significant time
period in which Hopkins’[s] case languished at the state court
level[.]” Id.
                                 8
Hopkins was held in state custody for the sole or primary
purpose of preparing a federal criminal prosecution.” App.
167. The Court also concluded that “Hopkins [did] not ma[ke]
a sufficient showing that the requisite level of collusion was
present.” App. 168. Instead, testimony “demonstrate[d]
[no]thing more than coordination between federal and state
authorities.” Id. Finally, and separate from its analysis of the
ruse exception, the District Court rejected Hopkins’s § 3161(c)
and Sixth Amendment arguments.

       Hopkins then filed a motion for reconsideration based
on newly disclosed information. That information included a
bail recommendation which Bates had made to the state
magisterial district justice before Hopkins had been arraigned
on state charges.5 In its entirety, the recommendation stated:

       Affiant requests high bail on defendant due to the
       nature of the charges and the defendant is being
       federally indicted. If convicted would be looking
       at a 15[-]year mandatory sentence. The




5
  Bates’ recommendation had not been mentioned during the
first hearing on Hopkins’s motion to dismiss. Bates apparently
“located [it] . . . 20 days after the first evidentiary hearing[,]”
and it “was produced to defense counsel on . . . the same day
the [District C]ourt filed the original memorandum and order
denying Hopkins’[s] motion.” App. 7 (internal citation
omitted).

                                9
       defendant does have knowledge of this and does
       put him at a flight risk.6

Dkt. No. 106, at 9 (emphasis added). The District Court re-
opened the record to consider the additional evidence in
support of Hopkins’s renewed motion to dismiss the
indictment.

        The District Court held a second evidentiary hearing, at
which Bates again testified. Although, during the first hearing,
Bates had denied having had “any communication” with
“anybody” from the US Attorney’s office “about indicting
[Hopkins,]” App. 102, he now testified that he had spoken with
the U.S. Attorney’s office about a federal indictment before
making the state bail recommendation. Bates specifically
testified that he “wouldn’t tell a judge that [Hopkins was] being
federally indicted on [his] own without talking to the
[Assistant] United States Attorney.” App. 223-24. He also
confirmed that “it was only after [he] had the conversation with
the Assistant United States Attorney that [he] then related to
[the state judge] . . . that [Hopkins] would be federally
indicted.” App. 224.

      The District Court granted in part and denied in part
Hopkins’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Court first
addressed Hopkins’s argument as to section 3161(b). The
Court reiterated its awareness that “[t]he Third Circuit ha[d]

6
   Testimony at the subsequent evidentiary hearing
demonstrated that Bates was mistaken in his belief that, at the
time of the bail recommendation, Hopkins would, if convicted,
face a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence.
                             10
not yet decided whether to adopt the ‘ruse exception.’” App.
10. But because “[the Third Circuit had] considered and
discussed it repeatedly rather than rejecting its application,” the
Court “believe[d] that the Third Circuit [would] likely . . .
adopt [it] if the factual circumstances of a case compel[led]
such a determination.” App. 10-11 (internal citations omitted).
The Court then went on to predict that “it is reasonably clear
that the Third Circuit would adopt this exception under the
right circumstances[.]” App. 11 (emphasis added). Because the
Court “perceive[d] that the right circumstances exist[ed]
here[,]” it decided to “apply the ‘ruse exception’ [to Hopkins’s]
case.” Id. The Court conceded that “[i]t is unclear whether
there are two elements that both need to be proved” for the ruse
exception to apply, or “whether a defendant can succeed by
proving . . . only one element.” App. 12 (internal citations
omitted). But it decided to “treat the ‘ruse exception’ as having
two separate elements, both of which need to be proven in
order for Hopkins to succeed.” App. 13.

      In highlighting the differences in testimony between the
two evidentiary hearings,7 the District Court concluded that

7
   In particular, the Court pointed out that “Bates’
contemporaneous bail recommendation and testimony during
the second hearing starkly contradicted his prior testimony[,]”
App. 21, such that “[t]he court [was] unable to reconcile the
conflicting testimony TFO Bates provided during the two
evidentiary hearings[,]” App. 23. The contradictions, in the
Court’s eyes, constituted “diametrically-opposed answers”
which “fatally undermin[ed] [Bates’] credibility[.]” Id. Since
Bates’ “attempt to reconcile the conflicting testimony upon
questioning by the court was not convincing,” id., “the court
                              11
“the state charges were filed for the primary or sole purpose of
preparing a federal criminal prosecution against Hopkins[.]”
App. 24. Then, considering the evidence and testimony from
both evidentiary hearings, and “having received no evidence to
the contrary,” the Court “f[ound] collusion between TFO Bates
and AUSA Baer.” App. 26. Finally, as a “result of applying the
‘ruse exception’ and finding a violation of § 3161(b),” the
Court dismissed the firearms charge in Hopkins’s indictment.
App. 28.

        The Court also addressed Hopkins’s argument as to
section 3161(c). Again applying the ruse exception, the Court
concluded that the STA’s seventy-day clock began to run on
the day Hopkins was arraigned in state court. The Court
examined various continuances at the state court level, totaling
sixty-six days, and determined that they were not excludable.
And the Court noted that the Government conceded that
another period of twenty days was not excludable. Considering
all these factors, the Court concluded that “it [was] apparent
when applying the ‘ruse exception’ that more than seventy
days elapsed between Hopkins being charged [on firearms
offenses] and seen by a judicial officer in state court and his
trial.” App. 32. Hopkins had thus “demonstrated that
§ 3161(c)(1) was violated” and that “dismissal of Count 2 [was
similarly] required[.]” Id.




[could] no longer rely on . . . Bates’ testimony from the first
hearing about the conversation with AUSA Baer or his
description of his intention in filing the state charges,” App.
24.
                               12
        To determine whether to dismiss Count 2 with or
without prejudice, the Court went on to balance the factors set
forth in 

(a)(1)-(2), including the “seriousness
of the offense[,]” “facts and circumstances of the case which
led to the dismissal[,]” and “the impact of a reprosecution on
the administration . . . of justice.” App. 32 (citing these
subsections). The Court ultimately concluded that the majority
of the factors weighed in favor of Hopkins and thus dismissed
Count 2 of the indictment with prejudice.

                              II.

        The Government appeals the District Court’s dismissal
of Hopkins’s § 922(g)(1) charge. First, it argues flatly that no
ruse exception to the STA exists. Alternatively, the
Government contends that even assuming such an exception
exists, the District Court erred by applying it in this case.
Hopkins disagrees. He argues that the ruse exception is a
“necessary corollary” to the STA and that the District Court
correctly applied it to Hopkins’s case. Hopkins’s Br. 10, 12.
We agree with the Government that the STA contains no ruse




                              13
exception premised on a state arrest.8 We will therefore
reverse.9

      A. THE STA AND THE LIMITED USE OF THE RUSE
                       EXCEPTION

       The STA serves twin purposes. It “reduc[es] crime and
the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials[.]”10 It also
“give[s] effect” to a defendant’s “[S]ixth [A]mendment right
to a speedy trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 

, 7
n.7 (1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1021, at 1 (1974)).11 To

8
  Given the facts of the case before us, it is unnecessary to
consider whether a ruse exception exists in circumstances
wherein an individual has first been subject to civil arrest by
federal immigration officials. Cf. United States v. Guevara-
Umana, 

 (2d Cir. 2008) (“recogniz[ing the]
exception” in the “civil detention” context as “appropriate” but
concluding that an application of the exception was “not
necessary to decide th[e] case”).
9
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 

. The Government timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 

 and 

. Our review
of the District Court’s interpretation of the STA is plenary.
United States v. Dyer, 

 (3d Cir. 2003). We
review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error. 

10
     

(Jan. 3, 1975), 

.
11
   See also Bloate v. United States, 

 (2010)
(“[T]he Act serves not only to protect defendants, but also to
                              14
effectuate those purposes, the STA requires that the
government adhere to several time limits in connection with
criminal prosecutions.

       Section 3161(b) provides that “[a]ny information or
indictment charging an individual with the commission of an
offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which
such individual was arrested or served with a summons in
connection with such charges.” 

(b). “If the
government fails to comply with this time limit, the [STA]
requires the dismissal of charges in the complaint, with or
without prejudice.” Dyer, 

 (citing 

(a)(1)).

      Section 3161(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n
any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a
defendant charged in an information or indictment with the
commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days
from” either “the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment,” or “the date the defendant has
appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 

(c)(1).12


vindicate the public interest in the swift administration of
justice.”).
12
   Section 3161(h) sets forth several categories of delay that are
to be excluded from the calculation of the thirty- and seventy-
day time frames. These include—as relevant here—when a
delay results from a continuance granted upon a judge’s
finding “that the ends of justice served by taking such action
                                15
       Ordinarily, the time limits of the STA have not been
triggered by an event other than the commencement of a
federal prosecution. However, beginning with the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 

 (9th Cir. 1993), some courts have recognized that the
STA’s time limits can be triggered by civil detention or a state
arrest under a “ruse” exception to the STA, 

. And
different courts have articulated elements of a so-called ruse
exception with slight variations. Courts that have recognized a
ruse exception have generally understood it to require
collusion between federal law enforcement authorities and
state or civil officials for the sole or primary purpose of
detaining a defendant for later federal criminal prosecution.13
Yet no such exception is found anywhere in the text of the Act.

       Since Cepeda-Luna, courts of appeals which have
considered the exception have usually done so in the
immigration context, i.e., where an individual has first been
subject to civil arrest by federal immigration officials and is




outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial.” 

(h)(7)(A).
13
  See, e.g., United States v. Pasillas-Castanon, 

 (10th Cir. 2008) (“While civil arrests and detentions do not
ordinarily trigger the Speedy Trial Act, they may activate it
when law enforcement authorities collude with state or civil
officials to detain a defendant as a mere ruse for later
prosecution.”) (internal citation omitted).
                                16
later criminally charged.14 Some, though, have done so in the
state context, i.e., where an individual has first been subject to

14
   See United States v. Saucedo, 

 (8th Cir.
2020) (“[W]e decline to reach” whether we “recognize[] the
ruse exception” because, even “assuming, without deciding,
that there is a ruse exception to the [STA], it would not apply
in this case.”); Guevara-Umana, 

(“recogniz[ing the] exception” in the “civil detention” context
as “appropriate” but concluding that an application of the
exception was “not necessary to decide th[e] case”); United
States v. Rodriguez-Amaya, 

 (4th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the STA “includes a ruse exception in the context
of civil detention,” but concluding “that the . . . exception [did]
not apply” to the “case at bar”); Pasillas-Castanon, 

 (noting that “civil arrests and detentions . . . may
activate [the STA] when law enforcement authorities collude
with state or civil officials to detain a defendant as a mere ruse
for later prosecution[,]” agreeing that the STA “cannot be
evaded through sham civil proceedings[,]” but warning that
“[t]he ruse exception is not easily triggered” and concluding
that the exception did not apply here); United States v. Garcia-
Echaverria, 

 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“assum[ing] that [the ruse exception] applies to persons held
in detention and awaiting removal, when there is evidence of
collusion between deportation and prosecution authorities[,]”
“[a]ssuming without deciding that [the underlying] events
demonstrate[d] collusion,” but affirming the denial of
defendant’s motion to dismiss because he failed to show that
“his detention . . . was a criminal arrest”); United States v.
Tejada, 

 (1st Cir. 2001) (addressing the
immigration context, acknowledging in passing that the ruse
                                  17
exception may be applicable in certain circumstances, but
finding “no evidence” of detention “for any reason other than
routine inquiry into . . . suspicious immigration status”); United
States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 

 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“agree[ing] . . . that civil detention should not be used as a
delay tactic . . . view[ing] the ‘ruse exception’ as an effective
way of protecting against the possibility of collusion between
federal criminal authorities and civil or state officials,”
emphasizing that it would “only apply this exception where the
defendant demonstrates that the primary or exclusive purpose
of the civil detention was to hold him for future criminal
prosecution[,]” but concluding that “[t]here is insufficient
evidence in the record to” apply the exception to this case)
(internal citations omitted); United States v. Noel, 

 (11th Cir. 2000) (though the STA may be
triggered “when detentions are used by the government, not to
effectuate deportation, but rather as ‘mere ruses to detain a
defendant for later criminal prosecution[,]’” defendant
“presented no evidence that his detention was a ruse”) (internal
citations omitted); United States v. Grajales-Montoya, 

 (8th Cir. 1997) (seeming to acknowledge
the existence of the ruse exception, but concluding that the
initial detention here “was for reasons other than” preparing a
federal prosecution, that there was no “evidence that [detention
was] a ruse to evade the” STA, and that the “requisite
collusion” was not present).
                                  18
criminal arrest by state officials and is later federally charged.15
The D.C. Circuit appears to have rejected the exception
outright.16

15
   See United States v. Mearis, 

 (5th Cir.
2022) (recognizing the exception and defining the appropriate
standard, and holding that the Court “appl[ies] the same
standard to a state criminal arrest”); United States v. Faison,

 (2d Cir. 2014) (“collusion between state
and federal authorities can create [such] an exception”); United
States v. Woolfolk, 

 (4th Cir. 2005) (in the
state context, and only “in limited circumstances,” “an
individual being held by state authorities” could be considered
“under ‘federal arrest’ or in ‘federal custody’” if “the
Government has knowledge that an individual is held by state
authorities only to answer to federal charges”; remanding for
consideration by the District Court); United States v. Benitez,

 (9th Cir. 1994) (Though STA “time
periods may be triggered by state detentions that are merely a
ruse to detain the defendant solely for the purpose of bypassing
the requirements of the Act[,]” and though the case presented
a “very close” call, the Court did not “conclude that the district
court’s finding that the state prosecution was brought in good
faith was clearly erroneous.”) (internal citations omitted).

At least one court, albeit not precedentially, has apparently
limited the ruse exception to the immigration context. See
United States v. Alvarado-Linares, 

(11th Cir. 2017) (“limit[ing]” the ruse exception “to a situation
in which federal immigration officials detain an immigrant
ostensibly to remove him from the country, while in reality
they actually hold him solely for the purpose of bringing
                               19
      No court of appeals has ever applied the ruse exception
to conclude that an STA violation had occurred and that
dismissal of federal charges was therefore warranted.

       Since our 2003 decision in Dyer, this Court has left open
the question of whether to adopt a ruse exception to the STA.
In Dyer, the defendant was detained by agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) for illegally
reentering the United States after he was deported. 

. There, the Special Agent handling the case contacted the
United States Attorney’s Office, and Dyer was criminally
indicted approximately forty days following his initial
detention by INS. 

 Dyer moved to dismiss, alleging a
violation of the STA and invoking a ruse exception. 

 at 465-
66. The District Court denied the motion and Dyer entered a
conditional guilty plea. 

. On appeal, Dyer argued that
“the [STA]’s time limit began to run when the INS took him
into custody under the ‘ruse exception’ recognized by some


federal criminal charges” and emphasizing that “[j]oint state
and federal investigations are the norm” and that “state
authorities . . . h[o]ld sovereign discretion”) (emphasis in
original). Another has assumed without deciding that the
exception could apply to state arrests. See United States v.
Asfour, 

, 825-26 (10th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished).
16
  United States v. Knight, 

 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (Kavanaugh, J.) (noting that “the Court ha[d] previously
declined to create such an exception to the” STA) (citing
United States v. Mills, 

 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (en banc)).
                              20
[courts].” Id. at 468 (internal citations omitted). Yet we
declined “to decide whether to recognize the ruse exception.”
Id. Further, “[e]ven if we [had] conclude[d] that the exception
[was] a valid one,” we determined that “Dyer ha[d] not shown
that he would be entitled to invoke it[.]” Id. (internal citation
omitted). Since Dyer, we have treated attempts to invoke the
ruse exception in the same manner―and, even then, in only
non-precedential decisions.17

     B. WE REJECT A RUSE EXCEPTION PREMISED ON
                    A STATE ARREST

       The Government argues that there is no ruse exception
to the STA because such an exception “conflicts with the
unambiguous text of the [STA]” and that an examination of the
“text should end the inquiry.” Govt Br. 18, 19 (internal citation
omitted). The Government also asserts that “[c]ase law
[similarly] does not support” an exception because statements

17
   See United States v. Costello, 

, 123 (3d Cir.
2018) (“We again need not decide whether there exists a ‘ruse’
exception to the . . . [STA] . . . because there simply is no
evidence of collusion . . . or . . . det[ention] . . . for the purpose
of preparing a federal prosecution.”); United States v. Crews,

 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting the recognition
of the ruse exception among other courts of appeals, but
deciding “not [to] consider [it] here since there is no evidence
to support the application of such an exception”) (internal
citations omitted); United States v. Brown, 

 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Our Circuit has yet to recognize [the]
‘ruse exception’ . . . [but] even if such an exception exists, we
will [not] apply it” here.).
                                  21
by those “circuits [which] have [concluded] that the ruse
exception exists . . . all amount to dicta.” Id. at 23, 24. Hopkins
counters that the ruse exception is a “necessary corollary” to
the Act. Hopkins’s Br. 10, 12. We agree with the Government
and conclude that a ruse exception is inconsistent with the text
of the STA and that there are sound policy rationales for
declining to adopt a ruse exception.

      i.     The exception is inconsistent with the text of the
                                  STA.

        When “interpreting a statute[,] a court should always
turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others[:] . . . that
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means[,] and means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l
Bank v. Germain, 

 (1992) (internal
citations omitted). And “[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous . . . this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry
is complete.” 

 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).

        The STA contains no explicit provision establishing a
ruse exception. As a starting point, the STA defines the term
“offense” as “a[] Federal criminal offense.” 

(2) (emphasis added). Such offenses include only those
which “violat[e] . . . any Act of Congress and [which are]
triable by any court established by Act of Congress.” 

 State
courts, by definition, do not fall into that category. Further, it
is only after an individual is “arrested or served with a
summons in connection with such charges”—i.e., federal
charges—that the STA’s protections come into play. 

 §
3161(b) (emphasis added). The statute requires that these
                                 22
charges be contained within one of two documents: either an
“information” or “indictment.” Id. § 3161(b), (c). These terms
refer to charging documents that must be filed in the federal
criminal system in order for the government to proceed to trial
on felony charges. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 7.18 Finally, the STA
defines “judge” and “judicial officer” as “any United States
magistrate” or “Federal district judge[.]” Id. § 3172(1)
(emphasis added). Plainly, state judicial officers do not fall into
this category.

       Even courts of appeals which have read a ruse exception
into the STA concede that the STA’s plain language does not
expressly apply to civil or state detentions. See Cepeda-Luna,

 (“The language of the [STA] compels the
conclusion that its provisions do not apply to civil
detentions[,]” and offense means “any Federal criminal
offense.”) (cleaned up); Woolfolk, 

 (“[F]or the
[STA] to apply, the defendant must be under federal arrest or
be in federal custody.”) (cleaned up). Those in search of
statutory text within the STA that might support even the


18
   While a federal felony may initially be charged by
complaint, Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 3, an indictment or information
must be filed within 30 days of the arrest on such complaint in
order for the felony charges to proceed, even when a
preliminary hearing is held. 

(b); Fed. R. Crim.
Proc. 5.1 and 7. States, by contrast, often charge and proceed
on felony offenses only by filing a criminal complaint and
proceeding to a preliminary hearing. See, e.g., Pennsylvania’s
Rule of Criminal Procedure 503; 

 (2001).

                                23
implication of a ruse exception inevitably come up empty-
handed.19

       Congress knows how to create exceptions within
statutes, and routinely does so. See, e.g., 

(c)
(providing that a “court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed” unless one of several
exceptions applies); 

(b)(2) (providing that a
state may not remove a voter from its registration list for failure
to vote unless specified exceptions apply); 

(a)(1), (2) (delegating to state attorneys general the
authority to bring federal civil enforcement actions, but
generally excepting actions against certain entities from such
authority unless certain conditions are met). But it did not do
so when it enacted the STA, nor at any time since.

        It is not the role of the courts to make policy choices
which are traditionally within the realm of legislative decision-
making. See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 

(2022) (“evaluat[ing] a range of policy considerations” is truly
a “legislative endeavor” and an “unenviable task[,]” “Congress
is far more competent than the Judiciary to weigh such policy
considerations,” and “the Judiciary’s authority to do so at all
is, at best, uncertain”) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up).
Courts which have recognized a ruse exception have, in
essence, implied substantive rights from a statutory text that is
silent on the subject. The Supreme Court has, in recent years,

19
   See also Mills, 

 (“Under the most natural
reading . . . an arrest starts the [STA’s] clock only if it is in
connection with federal charges.”) (emphasis in original)
(cleaned up).
                                 24
cautioned against such judicial overreach and emphasized the
importance of respect for the separation of powers. Consider,
for example, the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to, on
Congress’s behalf, expand liability of both law enforcement
officers and those who work in prisons. See, e.g., id. at 1802
(“Now long past the heady days in which [courts] assumed
common-law powers to create causes of action . . . we have
come to appreciate more fully the tension between judicially
created causes of action and the Constitution’s separation of
legislative and judicial power”; “creating a cause of action is a
legislative endeavor.”) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned
up); id. at 1809 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our
Constitution’s separation of powers prohibits federal courts
from assuming legislative authority.”); see also Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 

 (2017) (“It is a significant step
under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine
that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and
enforce a cause of action” because creating a new cause of
action “is . . . a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”) (internal citation
omitted). In our view, creating exceptions to a statutory scheme
is similarly “a legislative endeavor.” Egbert, 

.
A judge’s role is to apply statutes and to interpret them. We do
not enact them, nor do we amend them. Congress could have
included a ruse exception in the STA but did not do so. Because
it is not our role to search for ways to ostensibly improve an
Act of Congress, we decline to engraft a ruse exception onto
the plain text of the STA.

       We further agree with the Government’s assertion that
statements by those “circuits [which] have [concluded] that the
ruse exception exists . . . all amount to dicta.” Govt Br. 24. As
the Government persuasively explains, “[t]he [D]istrict [C]ourt
                                  25
did not identify . . . a precedential appellate decision approving
the dismissal of charges based on the exception.” 

 Nor have
we been able to do so. Hopkins’s counsel conceded as much at
oral argument. See ECF No. 36 at 17 (Though various “circuits
have discussed it[,]” none have “applied it” and it has “never
been used . . . to actually grant dismissal of charges.”). So we
are not persuaded by the out-of-circuit authority on which
Hopkins relies in support of his contention that a ruse
exception is “a necessary corollary” to the Act. Hopkins’s Br.
12.20

      ii.    Policy rationales for declining to adopt a ruse
                               exception.

        There are also sound policy reasons supporting our
refusal to recognize a ruse exception. First, doing so would be
inconsistent with principles of federalism and dual
sovereignty. Recognizing a ruse exception risks binding the
federal government to the actions taken by state authorities in
criminal investigations and prosecutions. As the Government
persuasively argues, “Cepeda-Luna . . . did not grapple with
significant federalism concerns created by the ruse exception
when state officials are involved.” Govt Br. 27. States “are

20
  The Government also notes that Hopkins “does [not] identify
any support for [a ruse] exception in the Act’s legislative
history.” Reply Br. 3. See also Govt Br. 26 n.6. Whether or not
one agrees that such a cross-check is useful, the legislative
history of the STA is devoid of references to support the
implication of a ruse exception. See A. Partridge, Legislative
History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Fed. Judicial
Center 1980).
                               26
independent actors[,] . . . do not answer to the federal
government in their enforcement of state criminal law[, a]nd .
. . have their own procedures to protect defendants from
unlawful or overlong state incarceration.” 

 (internal citation
omitted). A ruse exception “undermines state sovereignty” and
would “invite[] burdensome federal discovery into the minds
of state investigators and prosecutors[.]” Id. at 29. See also
Reply Br. 3-4.

       As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “an arrest or
indictment by one sovereign [does] not cause the speedy trial
guarantees to become engaged as to possible subsequent
indictments by another sovereign.” MacDonald, 

n.11. Indeed, it is precisely because “the states and the federal
government are distinct sovereigns . . . [that] the speedy trial
protections of the [STA] apply only to arrests made for federal
charges.” United States v. Clark, 

 (7th Cir.
2014). Accordingly, courts have relied on similar reasoning to
reject the argument that the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right attaches at the time of an earlier state charge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lara, 

 (1st Cir. 2020).21

        Second, recognizing a ruse exception premised on a
state arrest would severely hinder prosecutorial discretion. The
Government argues that “[t]he exception also presents negative

21
   See also United States v. Rose, 

 (3d
Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“The state arrest and state
prosecution do not control the speedy trial analysis because the
state and federal governments are separate sovereign entities,
and the actions of one cannot typically bind the other.”) (citing
MacDonald, 

 n.11).
                               27
incentives for prosecutors, potentially inducing state
prosecutors to continue to press state charges even after federal
charges are brought,” or alternatively “to shield the likelihood
of federal charges from state courts making bail determinations
even though that likelihood would undoubtedly provide
motivation for a defendant to abscond.” Govt Br. 27. And the
Government warns of an additional incentive that could
disadvantage both the prosecution and the accused: “federal
prosecutors may be encouraged to hastily file federal charges
after a state arrest, short-circuiting needed additional
investigation.” 

 We do not take that point lightly. As one
District Judge observed in rejecting a defendant’s assertion that
the STA clock was triggered by his state arrest, “[i]f the Speedy
Trial Act ‘clock’ were to start ticking at the time of the initial
state arrest,” federal authorities “would be forced to indict
within thirty days . . . in order to preclude the possibility of a
dismissal with prejudice . . . [and would be] compelled to
arraign and try the defendant within seventy days of [the]
indictment.” United States v. Ferrs, 

(E.D. Pa. 1980) (internal citations omitted), aff’d, 

(3d Cir. 1982). Thus, federal authorities would be “forced to
try the defendant even though [they] initially preferred to wait
for the state to prosecute.” Id.; see also United States v. Mejias,

 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 

(2d Cir. 1977), cert denied sub nom. Padilla-Martinez v.
United States, 

 (1977) (Triggering the STA’s
protections as of the date of the state indictment would “require
that the [federal] government rush headlong into a . . .
prosecution whenever a defendant had been arrested on state
charges as the result of federal participation in an ongoing
investigation.”).


                                28
        Finally, the Government warns that “[t]he exception . .
. penalizes much-needed and expected coordination between
state and federal law enforcement.” Govt Br. 26 (internal
citation omitted). See also Reply Br. 3 (“Hopkins does not . . .
address countervailing policy considerations [like] the ruse
exception’s effect of disincentivizing essential coordination
between state and federal law enforcement[.]”). We agree.
Such coordination—often achieved using joint task forces—
can be a valuable way to “avoid duplication of effort and
resources.” Mearis, 

.22 The work of just such a
task force is at the heart of the instant appeal. Indeed, both
counsel acknowledged at oral argument the importance of such
coordination. See ECF No. 36 at 8 (counsel for the
Government) (“Even just the idea that the exception might
exist can chill desired coordination between federal and state
actors.”); id. at 26 (Hopkins’s counsel) (Federal and state
authorities “should work together and cooperate and
coordinate”). Taken together, the aforementioned policy
“considerations dictate . . . that should a ruse exception exist,
it should be a creation of Congress.” Govt Br. 29. As we have
emphasized, “judge-made equitable rules cannot claim
supremacy over statutory text.” Williams v. Superintendent
Mahanoy SCI, 

 (3d Cir. 2022).




22
   See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 

 (1959)
(federal-state “cooperation . . . is the conventional practice . . .
throughout the country”); Alvarado-Linares, 

 (“[j]oint state and federal investigations are the norm, and
extensive discussion back and forth between state and federal
authorities is not uncommon”).
                                29
       Hopkins claims that a ruse exception is “a necessary
corollary” to the STA. Hopkins’s Br. 10, 12. If that were so,
how could Congress have failed to notice? As there is no
textual support in the STA for recognizing a ruse exception,
and given the strong policy reasons for rejecting such an
exception, we decline to recognize a ruse exception premised
on a state arrest.

                             III.

       We need not reach whether TFO Bates and AUSA Baer
colluded to evade the limitations of the STA. We acknowledge,
as the Cepeda-Luna Court did, that substantial unfairness may
potentially result if state and federal authorities collude to
detain individuals in the state system for the sole purpose of
preparing a federal prosecution. Nothing in this opinion should
be read as sanctioning such collusion or delay. In fact, we
acknowledge―as did then-Judge Kavanaugh―that an
alternative remedy under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment may be available. See Knight, 

.
Counsel for the Government agreed at oral argument that such
a remedy might be appropriate. And jurisprudence supports
such a conclusion. See Mills, 

 (“If a defendant
showed that the U.S. Attorney deliberately arrested him on
D.C. charges and secured a Superior Court indictment in order
to gain time to gather additional evidence for a federal
prosecution, he might have a valid due process claim for pre-
indictment delay”). Though we do not have occasion here to
set forth the parameters of such a remedy, we leave further
judicial consideration of one to an appropriate, future case.

                       CONCLUSION
                              30
       For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District
Court’s Order and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.




                             31