Jeffrey Bello v. United Pan Am Financial Corp

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 24-2052 ___________ JEFFREY M. BELLO, Appellant v. UNITED PAN AM FINANCIAL CORPORATION, DBA United Auto Credit Corporation ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.N.J. Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-09118) District Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 17, 2025 Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 23, 2025) ____________________________________ ___________ OPINION * ___________ PER CURIAM Pro se appellant Jeffrey Bello appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for his former employer, United PanAm Financial Corporation, d/b/a United Auto Credit Corporation (“UACC”), on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

In January 2016, UACC hired Bello as an Area Manager for its Philadelphia region. 1 Bello’s work consisted of providing customer service to car dealerships and developing business in his region. In August 2016, Bello sent a frustrated email to a co-worker and copied other employees and his supervisor, David Cevasco; Cevasco advised him that he should have handled the situation differently. In October 2016, Bello sent a chain of sar- castic, angry emails regarding travel expenses to several employees and Cevasco. Bello sent another harsh email in November 2016 to a co-worker, after which Cevasco again counseled him that his tone was unwarranted and noting that they had had repeated con- versations about Bello’s communications.

Bello sent several more emails in December 2016 that were hostile, sarcastic, or dis- paraging to his co-workers. Around this time, Bruce Newmark, the Acting Director of Hu- man Resources at the time, began reviewing Bello’s performance and expressed concern to Cevasco about whether Bello was making enough visits to dealers, based on GPS track- ing data.

On December 27, 2016, Bello wrote to the human resources manager that he was not getting on the road by 10AM because chemicals emissions in his vehicle in March and June 2016 had made him feel ill, particularly in the morning. He requested an accommo- dation to be able to continue to work. On December 30, 2016, Bello had a meeting with Newmark, Cevasco, and the human resources director. During the meeting, Bello requested a later, flexible start time as an accommodation, which Newmark granted. Newmark also told Bello to stop his confrontational emails and instead communicate professionally, which Bello stated that he would do. However, in late January 2017, Bello sent another sarcastic email, as well as several more hostile emails in February 2017.

Bello was terminated in March 2017. He was told that the reason for his termination was his abrasive communications with company staff, despite repeated counseling and warnings about the issue. Bello maintains that he was terminated because of medical issues he was experiencing.

In 2019, Bello filed a case in New Jersey state court, bringing NJLAD claims against UACC. UACC removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After Bello amended his complaint and discovery was complete, the parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of UACC. Bello timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment to UACC. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III.

After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment for UACC was properly granted. 2 Claims of disparate treat- ment raised under the NJLAD are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 833 (N.J. 2002). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimina- tion, the burden shifts to the defendant “to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.” See Fowler v. AT & T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2021). If it does, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence that this reason was pretext for discrimination, such that a factfinder could either “(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons[,] or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Bello claimed retaliatory discharge for requesting an accommodation, he also had to show that UACC’s “articulated reason [was] a pretext for . . . retaliation.” See Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 577 A.2d 177, 182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).

Even assuming, without deciding, that Bello could establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation, he failed to rebut UACC’s proffered reason for his termina- tion. The record demonstrates that Bello repeatedly sent harshly worded emails to his co- workers and superiors at UACC. These communication issues predated his request for an accommodation to his schedule, which was granted three days after the request was made.

Despite being repeatedly counseled to change the way he communicated and agreeing to do so, Bello continued to send harsh emails until his employment was terminated.

This record does not support a finding that UACC was motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent in firing Bello, rather than its stated reason. Bello’s belief that he was fired for some other reason is not sufficient to survive summary judgment. 3 See Fuentes v.

Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring plaintiffs to “demonstrate such weak- nesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence’”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). Under these circum- stances, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that discriminatory or retaliatory intent was the reason for Bello’s termination. 4 Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Bello’s motion to strike. Bello’s disa- greement with portions of certain filings was not a basis to strike those documents. 5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any feedback on how to improve in the way he was communicating at that time—an issue that predated his accommodation request. He was not fired until months later, after he contin- ued to send harshly worded emails. redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.