Ronald Goodloe v. Warden Lewisburg USP

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 24-1170 __________ RONALD E. GOODLOE, Appellant v. WARDEN LEWISBURG USP On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01247) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 17, 2024 Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 30, 2025) ___________ OPINION * ___________ PER CURIAM Appellant Ronald Goodloe appeals from the District Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

Goodloe, a federal inmate confined at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), is currently serving a 130-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. On March 7, 2023, a search was conducted of the cell Goodloe shares with another inmate. Corrections officers discovered a paper soaked in an unknown substance in the common area of the cell. Three separate field tests were performed on the substance/paper, and each returned a positive result for amphetamines. Goodloe was subsequently charged with Offense Code 113 (Possessing Drugs/Alcohol).

The following day, Goodloe appeared before a Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) and asked for additional testing by “an outside lab.” D.Ct. ECF No. 12-1 at 8.

On March 16, 2023, a hearing was held before a Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”).

Goodloe presented no witnesses or evidence, but asserted that he had “asked for the test to [be] sent to a lab,” and alleged that his “due process rights were violated.” Id. at 14.

Citing the incident report, field test results, and photographs of the substance-soaked paper, the DHO concluded that the greater weight of the evidence supported a finding that Goodloe committed the charged offense. Goodloe was sanctioned with the loss of 41 days of good-conduct time, forfeiture of 148 days of nonvested good-conduct time, 45 days of disciplinary segregation, and the temporary loss of certain privileges. Goodloe’s administrative appeal of the decision was denied.

In July 2023, Goodloe filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asserting, in very general terms, that his due process and privacy rights were violated by the disciplinary proceedings. He attached documents to his petition relating to the proceedings, highlighting portions relating to the denial of his request for further laboratory testing. The District Court broadly construed Goodloe’s filing to state various claims and denied his petition. See D.Ct. ECF No. 14. Goodloe filed a timely notice of appeal.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Goodloe’s due process challenge to the disciplinary hearing was properly brought under § 2241 because it entailed the loss of good-time credits. See Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). We review the District Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013). 1 Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good-conduct time. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 317 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007). A disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of good-conduct time must provide certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his own defense. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.

The sole issue raised by Goodloe on appeal is that the denial of his requests for secondary laboratory testing of the substance laden paper violated his due process rights and prevented him from presenting documentary evidence in his defense. 3d Cir. ECF

No. 11 at 3. 2 However, while Wolff may entitle Goodloe to present documentary evidence in his defense, it does not require the BOP to pay for testing or otherwise conduct an investigation on Goodloe’s behalf. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755- (8th Cir. 1986) (concluding that refusing to allow confirmatory drug testing did not violate due process). 3 To the extent Goodloe also asserts that the field test results were insufficient to support the DHO’s decision, we disagree. A prison disciplinary decision will be upheld if there is “some evidence” to support the finding. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56. We agree with the District Court that the evidence relied upon by the DHO, including the three separate field tests which “repeatedly confirmed the presence of amphetamines,” was sufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” standard. D.Ct. ECF No. at 6-7. 4

Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 5

Further, the articles provide no specific information on rates of reliability, noting instead that “the true error rate of these tests remains unknown.” Id. at 3.