PRECEDENTIAL

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
              _____________

      No. 23-1590, No. 23-1591, No. 23-3045
                 _____________

  PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION

                        v.

    SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH OF
               PENNSYLVANIA;
JONATHAN M. MARKS, in his official capacity as
 Deputy Secretary for Elections and Commissions;
 BUREAU OF COMMISSIONS ELECTIONS &
                 LEGISLATION

    Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
               Jonathan M. Marks,
                Appellants in 23-1590 & 23-3045

        Public Interest Legal Foundation,
              Appellant in 23-1591
   _____________________________________

  On Appeal from the United States District Court
      for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
        (District Court No.: 1:19-cv-00622)
    District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner
       _____________________________________

                         Argued
                    September 11, 2024

                   (Filed: April 25, 2025)

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH, and RENDELL,
                 Circuit Judges.

Daniel T. Brier
Donna A. Walsh [Argued]
Myers Brier & Kelly
425 Biden Street
Suite 200
Scranton, PA 18503

             Counsel for Appellants

Linda A. Kerns
Suite 200
1420 Locust Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Noel H. Johnson [Argued]
Public Interest Legal Foundation
320 N Meridian Street
Suite 912
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Kaylan L. Phillips
Public Interest Legal Foundation
107 S West Street




                             2
Suite 700
Alexandria, VA 22314

             Counsel for Appellee

Noah Bokat-Lindell [Argued]
United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section
P.O. Box 14403
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

             Counsel for Amicus Appellee – United States of
             America

James F. Peterson
425 Third Street, S.W.
Suite 800
Washington, DC 20024

             Counsel for Amicus Appellee – Judicial Watch
             Inc.

Jonathon P. Hauenschild
4201 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 110-315
Arlington, VA 22203

             Counsel for Amicus Appellee – Lawyers
             Democracy Fund

Brian C. Frontino
Matthew D. Klayman




                              3
John P. Lavelle, Jr.
Morgan Lewis & Bockius
2222 Market Street
12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103

              Counsel for Amicus Appellant – League of
              Women Voters of Pennsylvania
                        __________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
                       _________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

        The Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”) is a self-
described “public interest organization that seeks to promote
the integrity of elections nationwide.” Appx001. It requested
records from the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to which it contended that it was entitled under
the public inspection provision of the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), 

. The
Secretary rejected PILF’s requests, so PILF sued the Secretary,
the Deputy Secretary for Elections and Commissions, and the
Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation
(collectively the “Secretary”) under Section 8 of the NVRA.
PILF alleged that it had “suffer[ed] a clear informational injury
as a direct result of the [Secretary’s] violations of the NVRA
because the [Secretary] denied [it] access to the records to
which it [wa]s entitled under the law.” D.C. CM/ECF No. 1 at
34 (emphasis added). Based on this allegation, the District
Court concluded that PILF had suffered an “informational
injury . . . sufficient to confer Article III standing.” Pub. Int.




                                4
Legal Found. v. Boockvar, 

 (M.D. Pa.
2019). We disagree and, therefore, we will vacate and remand.




                             5
                                I.

       In September 2017, the Secretary disclosed that a
“glitch” in a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
(“PennDOT”) computer system allowed ineligible persons,
including legal permanent residents, also known as green card
holders, to register to vote as part of the process of applying for
or renewing a driver’s license or vehicle registration. D.C.
CM/ECF No. 66 at 4. Various media outlets reported about the
glitch and the Pennsylvania legislature conducted multiple
public investigatory hearings.

       On October 23, 2017, the Indiana-based PILF, 1 having
learned about this glitch, sent a letter to the Secretary
requesting documents under the NVRA, including “all voter
records that were referenced in recent news media reports
regarding . . . a ‘glitch’ in PennDOT’s Motor Vehicle
compliance system.” D.C. CM/ECF No. 66 at 6. PILF
believed the records would show that “non-U.S. citizens have
been registering and voting in Pennsylvania for decades.” D.C.
CM/ECF No. 1 at 1. To support its request, PILF invoked the
“public disclosure” provision of the NVRA, which states:

       (i)    Public disclosure of voter registration
              activities

              (1)     Each State shall maintain for at
                      least 2 years and shall make
                      available for public inspection and,
                      where available, photocopying at a

1
 PILF’s Br. 7. Since then, PILF has moved from Indiana to
Virginia. 

 at 7 n.2.




                                6
                     reasonable cost, all records
                     concerning the implementation of
                     programs and activities conducted
                     for the purpose of ensuring the
                     accuracy and currency of official
                     lists of eligible voters, except to
                     the extent that such records relate
                     to a declination to register to vote
                     or to the identity of a voter
                     registration agency through which
                     any particular voter is registered.

. PILF followed up on its initial request by
letter in December 2017. On December 20, 2017, the Secretary
rejected PILF’s request explaining that the Secretary “d[id] not
agree that the NVRA entitle[d] [PILF] to access the records.”
D.C. CM/ECF No. 1-11.

       PILF sued the Secretary under 

(b),
which provides that a “person who is aggrieved” by a violation
of Chapter 205 of the NVRA, “may bring a civil action in an
appropriate district court for declaratory or injunctive relief
with respect to the violation.” In response, the Secretary filed
a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that PILF
did not have Article III standing to pursue a claim under the
NVRA as it had not suffered an injury in fact, and separately
because PILF failed to provide the Secretary with a notice of
violation, which is a prerequisite to filing suit.

       In February 2019, the District Court dismissed the suit,
agreeing that PILF had not provided the Secretary with the
required statutory notice, but otherwise concluding that PILF




                               7
had standing. In reaching its decision regarding PILF’s
standing, the District Court wrote:

       When Congress “elevates intangible harms into
       concrete injuries,” a plaintiff need not allege
       “any additional harm beyond the one Congress
       has identified.” However, “mere technical
       violation of a procedural requirement of a
       statute” that results in no concrete harm is
       insufficient to establish Article III injury in fact.
       The Supreme Court has held that “a plaintiff
       suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails
       to obtain information which must be publicly
       disclosed pursuant to a statute.”

Boockvar, 

 (citations omitted). As PILF
alleged that it was denied records that were purportedly subject
to public disclosure under the NVRA, the District Court
reasoned that “this denial constitutes an informational injury”
and PILF had standing. 

 (emphasis added).

        Following dismissal of its first suit, PILF served the
Secretary with the appropriate notice, and then filed this suit
after the Secretary again denied PILF’s records requests. Over
the course of the proceedings before the District Court, the
Secretary turned over some records to PILF, but not all.
Ultimately, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. By this time, the Supreme Court had decided
TransUnion v. Ramirez, 

 (2021), which
“provid[ed] additional guidance regarding the concreteness
requirement” to establish Article III standing. Kelly v.
RealPage Inc., 

, 211 (3d Cir. 2022).




                                8
        To resolve the parties’ cross motions, the District Court
conducted an exacting and rigorous analysis of every category
of records at issue and issued a mixed opinion granting and
denying both motions in part. In resolving the motions,
however, it did not expressly address PILF’s standing other
than by citing its earlier pre-TransUnion opinion in which it
concluded that “PILF falls within [the] NVRA’s ‘zone of
interests’ and had standing.” Appx030. By citing its earlier
opinion, the District Court appeared to reaffirm its view that
PILF had informational injury standing simply because it
failed to receive the information that it requested from the
Secretary. Boockvar, 

. The District
Court otherwise made no mention of TransUnion nor its effect,
if any, on its standing analysis. As for the merits, it held that
PILF was entitled to some records it had requested, other
records were not subject to disclosure, still others were
protected by privacy concerns or otherwise protected under
other statutes, and another category of documents was
disclosable but only if redacted. Later, the District Court
entered an order awarding fees and costs to PILF as the
substantially prevailing party in the litigation.

       Both parties appealed the District Court’s order granting
and denying summary judgment in part. The Secretary
appealed the District Court’s order awarding fees and costs.
Because we conclude that PILF lacks standing, we need not
reach the merits of the District Court’s ruling.

                               II.

       The District Court had putative jurisdiction under 

. We generally have jurisdiction to review final
orders under 

, and “we ‘always [have]




                               9
jurisdiction to determine [our] own jurisdiction.’” George v.
Rushmore Serv. Ctr., 

, 234 (3d Cir. 2024)
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 

 (2002)).

                               III.

                               A.

       Questions of law underlying a standing determination
are reviewed de novo, while factual determinations are
reviewed for clear error. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 

 (3d Cir. 2013). A plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the facts establishing standing. See
GBForefront, L.P. v. Forefront Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 

 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing standard of proof for factual
disputes regarding subject matter jurisdiction); see also Blunt
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 

 (3d Cir. 2014)
(the “plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they have
standing in the action that they have brought”); Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 

 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing” his standing). This case presents only questions
of law and, therefore, we review the District Court’s standing
determination de novo. 2

2
  While the District Court rendered its decision regarding
standing at the pleadings stage and, thus, based its conclusion
solely on the allegations contained in PILF’s complaint, we
will consider the record in its entirety as this case comes to us
on appeal from the District Court’s order granting in part and
denying in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. See Const. Party of Penn. v. Aichele, 

,




                               10
        Standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue. See Huber
v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 

, 144 (3d Cir. 2023). To
have standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury
in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo v. Robins, 

,
338 (2016). An injury in fact exists if a plaintiff has suffered
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical.” Lujan, 

 (cleaned up). Plaintiff
urges that the District Court was correct that the denial of the
right to the information, without more, is enough for standing.
It relies on the “decades old” precedent in Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice, 

 (1989) and
FEC v. Akins, 

 (1998), which it urges stands for the
proposition that it “need [not] show more than that [it] sought
and w[as] denied specific agency records.” PILF’s Br. 20
(quoting Public Citizen, 

).

       In Public Citizen, the plaintiffs, the Washington Legal
Foundation and Public Citizen, sued the Department of Justice
under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) seeking
information and documents produced by the American Bar
Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary
relating to the nominations of federal judges under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”). 

.
While the Department of Justice contested the plaintiffs’
standing to sue, the Supreme Court disagreed. 

.




358 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that courts consider matters outside
the pleadings in evaluating factual attacks to standing).




                               11
        Faced with a dearth of precedent interpreting FACA, the
Supreme Court began its analysis by looking for guidance in
its “decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act[,
which] never suggested that those requesting information
under [FOIA] need show more than that they sought and were
denied specific agency records.” 

. It continued
explaining that “[t]he fact that other citizens or groups . . .
might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully
demanding disclosure under FACA does not lessen appellants’
asserted injury, any more than the fact that numerous citizens
might request the same information under [FOIA] entails that
those who have been denied access do not possess a sufficient
basis to sue.” 

. Instead, the Supreme Court noted
that the plaintiffs “might gain significant relief if they prevail
in their suit,” 

, as the information and documents they
requested were necessary to their direct and effective
participation in the “judicial selection process,” 

.

       Likewise, in Akins, the Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiffs, a group of voters, had standing to sue under the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 against the Federal
Election Commission seeking documents related to the activity
of a purported political committee. 

. In so
concluding, the Supreme Court noted that “the informational
injury at issue . . . directly related to [the plaintiffs’] voting, the
most basic of political rights.” 

 (emphasis added).

       But much has happened in standing jurisprudence since
Public Citizen and Akins were decided, including attempts by
various courts to read these cases as requiring more than just
the denial of information to have standing. See, e.g., Trichell
v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 

, 1004 (11th Cir.
2020) (“[T]he plaintiffs in Public Citizen and Akins identified




                                  12
consequential harms from the failure to disclose the contested
information.”); Laufer v. Looper, 

, 880-81, 881 n.6
(10th Cir. 2022) (“In Public Citizen and Akins, the plaintiffs
identified . . . adverse effects.”); Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott,

, 938 (5th Cir. 2022) (same and citing Looper with
approval); Grae v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 

, 570 (6th
Cir. 2023) (“The plaintiffs in Akins and Public Citizen had
suffered adverse effects.”); but see Laufer v. Naranda Hotels,
LLC, 

, 169-70 (4th Cir. 2023) (concluding that
TransUnion “does not extend to the type of informational
injury presented in Public Citizen and Akins”). But whether or
not we accept these courts’ views of the nature of harm
suffered by the plaintiffs in Akins and Public Citizen as
accurate, the real issue here is whether the plaintiff’s injury is
sufficiently concrete under the Supreme Court’s opinion in
TransUnion and this Court’s cases decided since. As noted
above, the District Court did not consider TransUnion in ruling
that Plaintiff had standing.

        One can dispute whether TransUnion raised the bar in
terms of the adverse consequences that must be alleged to
satisfy the standing requirements in different statutory settings.
See generally Huber, 84 F.4th at 158-66 (Rendell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). But it set the standard
we must follow. And under the Supreme Court’s standard,
statutory context is important. Here, as in TransUnion, we are
presented with a statute with a purpose that goes farther than
government transparency such as FOIA. The required
disclosure of certain records is merely one aspect of the
statutory scheme in service of a greater purpose—that is, as we
explain below, the expansion of voter participation in federal
elections.




                               13
        In TransUnion, a purported class of consumers alleged
that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) by improperly flagging the consumers as possible
terrorists. 594 U.S. at 432. Some of the consumers’ allegedly
improper credit reports had been disseminated to third parties,
while other consumers’ reports had not. Id. at 417. After a
jury trial, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
and an award of more than $60 million in damages,
TransUnion appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 421-22. On
appeal, TransUnion argued that the verdict should be set aside
because not all the plaintiffs in the class had Article III
standing. Id.; Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 

,
1022 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit broadly rejected this
argument, but the Supreme Court disagreed because at least
some of the plaintiffs’ claimed injuries were not sufficiently
concrete to establish standing. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at
418.

        In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified
that “[c]entral to assessing concreteness is whether the asserted
harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American
courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various
intangible harms . . . .” Id. at 414 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at
341). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that those plaintiffs
whose credit records were disseminated to third parties and
contained inaccurate information had standing because their
harms bore a close relationship to “the reputational harm
associated with the tort of defamation.” Id. at 432. By contrast,
those plaintiffs whose credit records were not disseminated to
third parties had no standing despite containing inaccurate
information. Id. at 438.




                               14
        The Supreme Court proceeded to reject an alternative
argument in favor of plaintiffs’ standing—the same argument
advance by PILF in this case—“that the plaintiffs suffered a
concrete ‘informational injury’ [that was sufficient] under
several of th[e] Court’s precedents,” namely Public Citizen and
Akins. Id. at 441. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning
that “[t]he plaintiffs did not allege that they failed to receive
any required information,” and therefore, had not suffered an
informational injury. Id. The Court further observed that
Public Citizen and Akins were distinguishable because those
cases involved “information subject to public-disclosure or
sunshine laws,” id., whereas the FCRA was not such a public-
disclosure or sunshine law. Moreover, it noted that “the
plaintiffs [in TransUnion] . . . identified no ‘downstream
consequences’ from failing to receive [any] required
information.” Id. at 442 (citing Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1004).
“An asserted informational injury that causes no adverse
effects cannot satisfy Article III.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). We take this to mean that if disclosure of information
is the essence of a statute, as it is in FOIA, 3 standing would
easily be met because public availability of information is itself
the interest that Congress seeks to protect under such statutes.
See Kelly, 47 F.4th at 213 (discussing the relationship or nexus
requirement between a purported adverse effect and the

3
  See generally McDonnell v. United States, 

(3d Cir. 1993) (“FOIA ‘is fundamentally designed to inform
the public about [federal] agency action . . . .”) (quoting Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

,
144 n.10 (1975)) (emphasis added); Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Cent.
Intel. Agency, 

, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (discussing
the objective of the FOIA as providing access to government
records).




                               15
interest protected by the statute). Here, all parties agree that
Congress’s purpose in enacting the NVRA targets an objective
much broader and more expansive than access to records.
Thus, we will proceed to consider TransUnion’s impact on
PILF’s alleged injury in fact.

        The year after the Supreme Court’s decision in
TransUnion, we had occasion in Kelly to consider its effect on
the “informational injury doctrine.” 47 F.4th at 211. We
observed that “the Court did not amend the . . . doctrine . . . ;
rather, it simply applied its prior precedent [to the case before
it] and determined that two critical requirements for
establishing an informational injury were lacking: (1) the
denial of information and (2) some consequence caused by that
omission.” Id. at 213 (emphasis added). “In the wake of
TransUnion, other Courts of Appeals have . . . concluded that
‘depriv[ation] of information to which [one] is legally entitled’
constitutes a sufficiently concrete informational injury when
that omission causes ‘adverse effects’ and the information has
‘some relevance’ to an interest of the litigant that the statute
was intended to protect.” Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Looper, 22 F.4th at 880-81 n.6); see also
Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc., 

, 308 (2d Cir.
2024) (requiring a “causal connection” between a purported
violation of a statute and a “downstream harm”); Trichell, 964
F.3d at 1004 (collecting cases and agreeing that “an asserted
informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot
satisfy Article III”). Thus, we said that “the Supreme Court in
TransUnion simply reiterated the lessons of its prior cases:
namely, to state a cognizable informational injury a plaintiff
must allege that they failed to receive . . . required information,
and that the omission led to adverse effects or other
downstream consequences, and such consequences have a




                                16
nexus to the interest Congress sought to protect.” Kelly, 47
F.4th at 214 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); George, 114 F.4th at 235, 236 (same);
Huber, 84 F.4th at 145 n.2 (same).

        We explained that “[w]hether framed as ‘adverse
effects’ or a ‘downstream consequence[],’ the upshot is the
same: a plaintiff seeking to assert an informational injury must
establish a nexus among the omitted information to which she
has entitlement, the purported harm actually caused by the
specific violation, and the ‘concrete interest’ that Congress
identified as ‘deserving of protection’ when it created the
disclosure requirement.” Kelly, 47 F.4th at 213 (alteration in
original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Tailford
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 

, 1100 (9th Cir.
2022)). That is, it is insufficient for Article III standing
purposes for a plaintiff asserting an informational injury from
a violation of a statute that contains a public disclosure aspect
as part of its overall scheme to allege only that he has been
denied information. 4 Rather, he must establish a nexus among
a downstream consequence, his alleged harm, and the interest
Congress sought to protect. Without such a nexus, a plaintiff
can claim no informational injury standing.

       The Secretary urges that the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Scott should be our guide because, in that case, the denial of
disclosure of documents to which the plaintiffs—a group of
civic engagement organizations—were arguably entitled under

4
  As noted above, we do not read TransUnion to impose this
requirement in cases involving “sunshine laws” statutes aimed
solely at disclosure of information. See TransUnion, 141 S.
Ct. at 2215.




                               17
the NVRA was squarely presented. While we take no position
regarding the merits of that case and the result reached by the
Fifth Circuit, we acknowledge the framework that the Scott
court employed is like our own under Kelly.

       In Scott, the district court held that the plaintiffs had
suffered a concrete and particularized harm given “the
NVRA’s public disclosure requirement[, which is] backed by
a citizen suit provision and . . . downstream consequences,
including the lack of an opportunity for [the plaintiffs] to
identify eligible voters improperly flagged,” by the state’s
program. 49 F.4th at 935 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).

        On appeal, the plaintiffs urged the Fifth Circuit to
uphold the district court’s standing analysis and decision. Id.
They contended that as “civic engagement organizations” they
had standing to access the records they requested under the
NVRA and the Secretary’s refusals resulted in “downstream
injury” because without such access, they could not “identify
eligible voters improperly flagged” by the state’s voter roll
maintenance program, id. at 935-36, thereby thwarting their
ability to scrutinize “how Texas is keeping its voter lists,” id.
at 936. Moreover, the organizations argued, “there is [a]
downstream injury with respect to the public not having
visibility into . . . properly registered Texans being
discriminated against and burdened in their right to vote.” Id.
(alteration in original). The Fifth Circuit disagreed.

       It concluded that the organizations “offered no
meaningful evidence regarding any downstream consequences
from an alleged injury in law under the NVRA.” Id. at 937. In
particular, the Fifth Circuit explained that while the NVRA




                               18
creates “a statutory right of the public to the ‘visibility’ of the
Secretary’s process,” nothing suggested any “concrete and
particularized harm to these Plaintiffs from not obtaining the
requested personal voter information.” Id. And while the
plaintiffs complained of a “lack of ‘opportunity’ to identify
voters incorrectly described by the Secretary’s data base,” the
Court concluded that this purported downstream consequence
was too speculative to constitute a “concrete grievance.” Id.
That “not a single Plaintiff is a Texas voter, much less a voter
wrongfully identified as ineligible, and the Plaintiffs have not
claimed organizational standing on behalf of any Texas voter
members,” the Court further reasoned, belied the plaintiffs’
claim to standing. Id.

        In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs’ reliance on Public Citizen and Akins “for the
proposition that ‘the violation of a procedural right granted by
statute can be sufficient . . . to constitute injury in fact . . .
[without] alleg[ing] any additional harm beyond the one
Congress has identified.” Id. at 938. The Fifth Circuit
observed, as we did in Kelly, that while the Supreme Court in
TransUnion cited to Public Citizen and Akins “involv[ing]
[the] denial of information subject to public-disclosure or
sunshine laws that entitle all members of the public to certain
information,” it nevertheless required the plaintiff in
TransUnion to “identif[y] . . . ‘downstream consequences’
from failing to receive the required information” to establish
standing. Id. (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442). Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit continued, the plaintiffs “in both Akins and in
Public Citizen . . . had actually asserted ‘downstream
consequences’ since they needed the information in order to
participate directly and actively in . . . the electoral . . .
process[].” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Trichell, 964 F.3d at




                                19
1004). That is, as we said in Kelly, the harms suffered by the
plaintiffs in those cases bore a nexus to the harms that the
statutes were designed to prevent. The Fifth Circuit concluded
“even in public disclosure-based cases, plaintiffs must and can
assert ‘downstream consequences,’ which is another way of
identifying concrete harm from governmental failures to
disclose.” Id. The Fifth Circuit believed that on the facts
before it, the “civic engagement organizations” did “not allege
that identification of voter names and identification numbers
w[ould] directly lead to action relevant to the NVRA . . . nor
that their direct participation in the electoral process w[ould]
be hindered.” Id. at 936, 938. Thus, the plaintiffs could not
establish a nexus among any harm they purportedly suffered to
a harm that Congress sought to prevent in passing the NVRA.

        While one might question the Fifth Circuit’s
characterization of the alleged harm suffered by the plaintiffs
in Scott and its relevance to their participation in the electoral
process under the NVRA, the Fifth Circuit’s standing analysis,
like our own under Kelly, rightly focuses on whether the
plaintiff has alleged that it has suffered sufficient “adverse
effects” or other “downstream consequence” having a nexus to
an interest Congress sought to protect in passing the NVRA.
Thus, to address PILF’s standing, we must understand the
purpose of the NVRA as well as the interest PILF urges has
been harmed by the Secretary’s actions.

                               B.

       We have observed that Congress enacted the NVRA
principally because it “was wary of the devastating impact
[voter roll] purging efforts previously had on the electorate.”
Am. C.R. Union v. Phila. City Comm’rs, 

 (3d




                               20
Cir. 2017); see also Welker v. Clarke, 

(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[o]ne of the NVRA’s central
purposes was to dramatically expand opportunities for voter
registration”); Ortiz v. Phila. Off. of City Comm’rs Voter Regis.
Div., 

 (3d Cir. 1994) (Scirica, J., concurring)
(“For some time now, Congress and the state legislatures,
concerned by low voting rates, have commendably sought to
increase voter participation. . . . [C]iting a steady decline of
citizen participation in federal elections . . . Congress decided
to promote voter registration by passing the [NVRA].”
(emphasis added)). Indeed, “Congress noted that . . . ‘there is
a long history of such cleaning mechanisms [being] used to
violate the basic rights of citizens” to vote. Am. C.R. Union,

 (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. No.
103-6, at 18 (1993)). By its own terms, the NVRA seeks:

       (1)    to establish procedures that will increase
              the number of eligible citizens who
              register to vote in elections for Federal
              office;
       (2)    to make it possible for Federal, State, and
              local governments to implement this
              chapter in a manner that enhances the
              participation of eligible citizens as voters
              in elections for Federal office;
       (3)    to protect the integrity of the electoral
              process; and
       (4)    to ensure that accurate and current voter
              registration rolls are maintained.

(b). Thus, the statute aims at increasing
citizen participation in federal elections. While the statute
provides for public inspection of “records concerning the




                               21
implementation of programs and activities conducted for the
purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists
of eligible voters,” 

 § 20507(i), and contains a remedial
provision with a right to sue, after TransUnion and Kelly, more
in the way of concrete harm and, in particular, proof of a nexus
is required for PILF to have standing to sue under a theory of
informational injury.

        To support its position that it has standing, PILF urges
that it “has suffered three primary ‘adverse effects’ or
‘downstream consequences’ resulting from the Secretary’s
refusal to provide the required information,” which bear a
nexus with concrete interests that Congress intended to protect
under the NVRA. PILF’s Br. 26. First, it urges that it “cannot
‘study and analyze the [Secretary’s] voter list maintenance
activities.” PILF’s Br. 26 (alteration in the original) (quoting
D.C. CM/ECF No. 66 ¶ 3). This hampers its “activity . . . to
promote election integrity and compliance with federal and
state statutes.” PILF’s Br. 27 (quoting D.C. CM/ECF No. 1 ¶
135) (quotation marks omitted).                   Second, “the
Commonwealth’s actions frustrate . . . [t]he Foundation’s . . .
produc[tion] and disseminat[ion] [of] educational materials.”
PILF’s Br. 27. Third, in seeking records from the Secretary,
PILF “expended considerable time and financial resources.”
Id.

        With respect to “study and analysis,” PILF
contemplates general activity “to promote the integrity of
elections nationwide,” through the production and
dissemination of “educational materials.” Neither of these
activities is essential to a concrete interest protected by the
statute as was the case in Public Citizen and Akins.” Appx001.
That is, there is an insufficient nexus among the downstream




                              22
consequences identified by PILF and the interest that Congress
sought to protect. To “study and analyze” and “scrutinize”
records, PILF’s Br. 26, is not an enumerated purpose of the
NVRA nor do these aims advance the expansion of voter
registration and participation in federal elections. Further,
PILF offers no explanation of how its inability to study and
analyze and scrutinize the requested records has hindered its
own participation in the electoral system or the expansion of
voter participation in federal elections in Pennsylvania
generally. Indeed, that PILF has no ties to Pennsylvania or any
of its voters undercuts its position that the Secretary’s actions
as to PILF resulted in any harm to those who Congress sought
to protect in enacting the NVRA.

        Although PILF contends that without the records it
“cannot effectively evaluate the accuracy of the
Commonwealth’s voter rolls nor the effectiveness of
investigation and remedies undertaken by the Commonwealth
in response to the PennDOT” glitch, PILF’s Br. 32, nor can it
“compel compliance with state and federal voter list
maintenance laws,” PILF’s Br. 26 (quotation omitted), its
desire to have such records for these purposes does not entitle
it to sue.

       Separate and apart from whether PILF has
informational injury standing, it bears repeating that, as a
general principle of constitutional standing, as we explained in
Huber, while a statute may authorize private suits to compel
compliance with the law, private citizens are not deputized as
private attorneys general empowered to enforce any and all
violations of a statute without regard to their personal stake in
the matter. Huber, 84 F.4th at 147. (“[I]n contrast to federal
agencies empowered to enforce statutory rights, ‘[p]rivate




                               23
plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not charged
with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s
general compliance with regulatory law.’” (second alteration
in original) (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 429)). As
admirable as PILF’s mission may be, PILF is not an attorney
general with general standing to enforce the provisions of the
NVRA in the absence of proof that it maintains a personal and
constitutionally significant stake in the matter.

        Returning to PILF’s claim of informational injury
standing, we further reject its argument that the “frustrat[ion]
[of] the educational aspect of its mission,” and its inability to
publish “educational materials,” PILF’s Br. 27, constitute
downstream consequences envisioned by the statute sufficient
to establish Article III standing because the publication of
educational materials bears no nexus to an interest protected by
the statute. And even if it did, PILF offered no proof that its
ability to produce and disseminate such educational materials
was actually hampered by the Commonwealth’s alleged
violation of the NVRA.

        First, as we explained above, the facilitation and
creation of educational materials is not a purpose of the NVRA.
Thus, even if we assumed that the Secretary’s actions actually
hampered PILF’s ability to publish such materials, such harm
has no “‘nexus to the concrete interest Congress intended to
protect’ by requiring disclosure of the information.” George,
114 F.4th at 236 (quoting Kelly, 47 F.4th at 214). Second, there
is no evidence in the record that, despite the Secretary’s
purported noncompliance with the NVRA, PILF was unable to
publish educational materials. Indeed, PILF touted its ability
to publish, among other things, “a report focused on noncitizen
registration and voting in Allegheny County,” which was made




                               24
possible based on records it obtained from county-level and
municipal sources. PILF’s Br. 27. On this record, the
Secretary’s actions did not appear to affect PILF’s ability to
access any resources that it had previously and successfully
used to generate its educational materials.

       We also note that PILF submitted no evidence of any
specific plans for the records it sought relating to the purpose
of the NVRA. Cf. Scott, 49 F.4th at 940 (Ho, J., concurring)
(suggesting that proof that the defendant’s hindrance of
“Plaintiffs’ mission to protect the voting rights of various
communities” might suffice as a downstream consequence
under the NVRA (emphasis added)). Without evidence that
PILF had “concrete plans to imminently pursue a desired
course of action” bearing a nexus to an interest Congress
sought to protect that was hindered only by the Secretary’s
refusal to turnover the records, PILF has no standing. Ellison
v. Am. Bd. of Orthopaedic Surgery, 

, 207 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2021). This is because such “inchoate plans for future
programs” of a general nature are insufficiently concrete for
Article III purposes. Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila. v.
Montgomery Newspapers, 

 (3d Cir. 1998). A
general desire to audit a state’s NVRA records without
concrete plans to act upon information contained in the records
in a manner consistent with the purpose of the statute does not
establish standing under TransUnion and Kelly.

       Finally, we reject PILF’s third argument, namely that it
has suffered adverse effects or downstream consequences
simply by having “expended considerable time and financial
resources” to vindicate its rights and hold the Secretary
accountable under the NVRA. PILF’s Br. 27. “An
organization that has not suffered a concrete injury caused by




                              25
a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into standing simply
by expending money to gather information . . . . An
organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that way.”
FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 

 (2024);
see also Blunt, 

 (“[O]rganizations may not
satisfy the injury in fact requirement by making expenditures
solely for the purpose of litigation . . . nor by simply choosing
to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not
affect the organization at all.” (citations omitted)). To hold
otherwise would render Article III standing meaningless. See
FDA, 

.

        In short, as an out-of-state “public interest
organization,” that has adduced insufficient evidence of a
nexus among any adverse effect or downstream consequence
and a harm it has suffered because of the Secretary’s refusal to
provide access to the requested records under TransUnion and
its progeny, PILF has no standing to sue. PILF does not
represent any Pennsylvania citizens who have been affected by
the Secretary’s purported violation of the NVRA. It has no
direct ties to Pennsylvania voters and has not alleged how
access to the records it seeks would “directly lead to action” or
that its “direct participation in the electoral process [has been]
hindered.” Scott, 49 F.4th at 938; cf. Akins, 

(concluding that the plaintiffs “as voters, have satisfied both
prudential and constitutional standing requirements”
(emphasis added)). It has not suffered any concrete harm. And
as the Supreme Court has proclaimed: “No concrete harm, no
standing.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417.




                               26
                              C.

       “Because we conclude that [PILF] lacked standing from
the very outset, we must vacate the District Court’s order[] and
remand with instructions to dismiss [PILF’s] case.” George,
114 F.4th at 230. This is because “[a] lack of jurisdiction
‘voids any decree entered in a federal court.’” Id. at 239; see
also TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 442 (reversing and remanding in
the face of a jury verdict and award of damages). Thus, the
District Court’s order awarding attorneys’ fees, which was
based upon the District Court’s void order entering judgment
in favor of PILF, is also void.

                              IV.

       For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s
orders and remand with instructions to the District Court to
dismiss the case.




                              27