PRECEDENTIAL

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            _______________

            Nos. 23-3156 & 23-3208
              _______________

            MICAYLA AUGUSTYN

                        v.

 WALL TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION


               Micayla Augustyn,
                        Appellant in No. 23-3156

       Wall Township Board of education,
                       Appellant in No. 23-3208

               _______________

 On Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the District of New Jersey
           (D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05218)
    District Judge: Honorable James B. Day
               _______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
               January 28, 2025
   Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit
                     Judges

               (Opinion filed: May 9, 2025)

John D. Rue
Krista H. Rue
John Rue & Associates
100 Overlook Center
Second Floor, Suite 9211
Princeton, NJ 08540

Donald A. Soutar
Coyle Law Group
201 Littleton Road
Suite 210
Morris Plains, NJ 07950

             Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant

Gabrielle A. Pettineo
Kenney Gross Kovats & Parton
214 Park Avenue
Manalapan, NJ 07726

             Counsel for Defendant-Appellee

                    ________________

                OPINION OF THE COURT
                   _______________




                             2
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
        We have said it before, but after Lackey v. Stinnie, 

 (2025), it bears repeating: A plaintiff who vindicates
a statutory right under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 

, is a
prevailing party entitled to collect attorneys’ fees, irrespective
of whether that right is substantive or procedural. After an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed her IDEA claim on
the ground that it could not be heard in a due process hearing,
Appellant Micayla Augustyn successfully appealed to the
District of New Jersey and prevailed at summary judgment on
her entitlement to the hearing she requested. Notwithstanding
the objections of cross-appellant, the Wall Township Board of
Education (Board), and consistent with Lackey, that procedural
victory also entitled her to an award of attorneys’ fees under
our precedent in H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership
Learning Partners Charter Sch., 

 (3d Cir. 2017).
The District Court thus properly concluded Augustyn is a
prevailing party, but because it erred in reducing her fee award,
we will vacate and remand for a recalculation of the
appropriate lodestar reductions.
I.     BACKGROUND
       For all the years Augustyn attended Wall High School,
she was eligible for and received special education services
pursuant to an individualized education plan (IEP) that
provided for a variety of accommodations, including additional
time to complete tests and homework assignments without
penalty.




                                3
       As Augustyn approached the conclusion of her fourth
year in 2018, however, her mother and the Board diverged on
the appropriate path for her secondary education: The Board
asserted that Augustyn should graduate in the ordinary course
and did not need extended schooling, while her mother,
believing that the Board had failed to implement the required
accommodations and to prepare Augustyn to transition out of
high school, sought to keep Augustyn enrolled for an
additional year.
       When mediation failed, Augustyn filed a Petition for
Due Process before an ALJ.1 That Petition elaborated on her
substantive claims, contending that by neglecting to revise her
grades in light of later completed work, provide her with
appropriate home instruction, or prepare her for post-
secondary independent living, the Board had failed to provide
Augustyn with the “free and appropriate education” (FAPE)
required by the IDEA. She sought, among other things, for her
grades to be updated consistent with her IEP, as well as
compensatory education—relief substantially similar to what
she had requested in mediation.
       In response, the Board moved for partial dismissal of
the Petition. And though the ALJ allowed one claim in the
motion to proceed, she granted the Board’s motion to dismiss
Augustyn’s grade revision claim, reasoning that a “special
education due-process hearing” was not the “proper venue” to
resolve that dispute. App. 60. Augustyn, believing that she

1
 Initially, the case was prosecuted on Augustyn’s behalf by her
mother, but once she reached the age of majority, Augustyn
proceeded on her own behalf.




                              4
was entitled to a due process hearing on that claim under the
IDEA, then appealed her right to that hearing to the District
Court.2
        There, both parties moved for summary judgment, and
the District Court ruled in Augustyn’s favor. Under the
relevant New Jersey statute, the Court explained, a due process
hearing is the appropriate venue to address disagreements
regarding the provision of a FAPE, and because the IEP is “the
core of the entitlement” to a FAPE, it is also the proper place
to resolve a grade revision claim arising under an IEP. App.
150–51 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the ALJ’s decision “was made in error” and remanded the
matter for further proceedings. App. 151.
       Augustyn then moved for attorneys’ fees, to which the
District Court held she was entitled as a prevailing party under
the IDEA attorneys’ fee provision.                  

(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). As for the amount, the Court accepted
the requested fee of $198,901.50 as the full lodestar, premised
on reasonable hours and rates. But the Court then reduced that
award by approximately 90%, to $23,079.10, on the ground
that “the extremely limited nature of the procedural relief”
Augustyn obtained rendered a full award “excessive.” App. 3–
4.


2
  Ultimately, Augustyn sought a due process hearing only on
grade revision. She voluntarily dismissed her other remaining
claims after completing her fifth year of school through
operation of the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C
§ 1415(j).




                               5
       Augustyn now appeals the District Court’s reduction of
the fee award, while the Board cross appeals, claiming that
there should have been no award in the first place because
Augustyn was not a prevailing party.
II.    DISCUSSION3
       We first address the question of Augustyn’s prevailing
party status before turning to the propriety of the District
Court’s fee reduction.
       A.     Prevailing Party Status4
       The Board contends that Augustyn is not a prevailing
party on the grounds that she “did not ‘succeed on a significant
issue’” and “has never[] been denied the right to a hearing”
under the IDEA. Answering Br. 11, 14. As the District Court
correctly determined, the record proves otherwise.
        The procedural safeguards that allow parents to
challenge “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the[ir] child, or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child,” are a
significant feature of the IDEA. 

(b)(6)(A).
They entitle parents to “an impartial due process hearing” and
allow for the award of attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party” in

3
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 

and 

(i)(3)(A), and it had authority to award
attorneys’ fees under 

(i)(3)(B)(i). We have
jurisdiction under 

.
4
  Our review of a prevailing party status determination is
plenary. See H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning
Partners Charter Sch., 

 (3d Cir. 2017).




                               6
“any action or proceeding brought under” the statute. 

(f)(1)(A), (i)(3)(B)(i). At least in the context of
the IDEA, success on the merits of entitlement to that statutory
right, albeit a “purely procedural” right, “can confer prevailing
party status.” H.E., 

.
        There are, of course, limits to the types of relief that can
confer prevailing party status. The Supreme Court recently
observed as much in Lackey, where it addressed whether the
term “prevailing party” includes a party who had been awarded
a preliminary injunction but whose case became moot before
the entry of a permanent injunction. 

. As the
Court explained, conferral of prevailing party status requires
that a court has “conclusively resolve[d] a claim by granting
enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties.” 

. Thus, “[a]
plaintiff who wins a transient victory on a preliminary
injunction does not become a ‘prevailing party’ simply because
external events convert the transient victory into a lasting one.”

 We reached a similar conclusion in H.E., where we held
that vindication of a procedural right confers prevailing party
status under the IDEA, so long as the relief obtained “is not
‘temporary forward-looking injunctive relief.’” 

 (quoting M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 

 (3d
Cir. 2017)).
       Here, that category of relief is not at issue. See
Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 2. The ALJ held she was not entitled
to any hearing on her grade revision claim; the District Court
on appeal conclusively resolved that claim by reversing the
ALJ, granting summary judgment on Augustyn’s entitlement
to a due process hearing, and remanding for further




                                 7
proceedings. So, just as in H.E., Augustyn “vindicated [her]
right” to a due process hearing, winning relief on the merits of
her statutory claim that is “permanent” and “cannot be nullified
later,” and compels the Board to proceed in that statutorily
prescribed forum. 

; see also 

 at 407–08
(“[S]uccess on a claim for procedural relief can constitute a
victory on the merits.” (cleaned up)); Lackey, 

-
71 (noting that prevailing party success includes “relief on the
merits pendente lite”). Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in Lackey,
the relief awarded here resulted in a “change in the legal
relationship between the parties” that is both “enduring” and
“judicially sanctioned.” 

 (citations omitted).
That makes Augustyn a “prevailing party” under the IDEA.
H.E., 

.
       B.     Fee Award Reduction
        We turn next to the District Court’s treatment of the fee
award. In determining whether an award is reasonable, a court
first calculates the lodestar by multiplying the reasonable hours
worked by a reasonable hourly rate. See City of Burlington v.
Dague, 

 (1992). The District Court’s role is
“not merely a passive” one, it has a “positive and affirmative
function in the fee fixing process.” Loughner v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 

, 178 (3d Cir. 2001). When
calculating the lodestar, “[i]t should reduce the hours claimed
by the number of hours spent litigating claims on which the
party did not succeed.” Id. Once calculated, the lodestar
“carries a ‘strong presumption’ of ‘reasonable[ness]’ and
‘includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors constituting a
reasonable attorney’s fee.’” Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty.,

 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original)




                                8
(quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 

, 553–
54 (2010)).
       To be sure, the “court can adjust a fee award upward or
downward” after this point, McKenna v. City of Philadelphia,

 (3d Cir. 2009), but its “discretion is not
unlimited,” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558. To the contrary, the
lodestar “cabins the discretion of trial judges, permits
meaningful judicial review, and produces reasonably
predictable results.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. So, “[a]fter
calculating the lodestar, the court may deviate from it, but only
in the ‘rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not
adequately take into account a factor that may properly be
considered in determining a reasonable fee.’”5 Souryavong,

 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554). And if the


5
  There are twelve such factors: (1) requisite time and labor,
(2) novelty and difficulty of the issues, (3) skill needed to
perform the service properly, (4) preclusion of other
employment due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary
fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the
“undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in
similar cases. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 

, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974); see Souryavong, 

 (“[C]onsideration of Johnson ‘factors’ is permissible on
the back end of a lodestar’s calculation, as long as they are not
already ‘subsumed in the lodestar calculation.’” (quoting
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 

 (2010)).




                               9
court does deviate, it must give “a reasonably specific
explanation for all aspects” of its decision to do so. Perdue,

.
       In this case, Augustyn proposed a lodestar amount of
$198,901.50, which encompassed four phases of litigation.
Phase I accounted for fees accumulated in mediation; Phase II
covered the Board’s motion to dismiss before the ALJ; Phase
III addressed the appeal in federal court; and Phase IV dealt
with the fee application. The District Court accepted the
proposed lodestar in full, finding that there was no basis to
question the reasonableness of the hourly rate or the time spent
on the litigation. But it then reduced the fee award from
$198,901.50 to $23,079.10 based on its belief that Augustyn
had achieved only “extremely limited success.” App. 21.
        There is no doubt that “the results obtained” is a
legitimate factor for a court consider in its fee award
calculation. Souryavong, 

 (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 

 (1983)). But in reaching its
conclusion, the District Court relied on impermissible factors
in its assessment of Phases II, III, and IV. We address each
below.
       Phase II. The District Court reduced the lodestar “by all
fees incurred” in both mediation at Phase I and before the ALJ
in Phase II on the grounds that (1) those were administrative
proceedings not before it, App. 25, (2) that Augustyn was
unsuccessful in those proceedings, and (3) that the proceedings
“ha[d] nothing to do with the limited procedural success”




                              10
Augustyn achieved in federal court, App. 22. As to Phase II,
these three conclusions were each mistaken.6
        First, the District Court highlighted that Augustyn’s
prevailing party status was based only “on her procedural
success in this Court.” App. 21 (emphasis in original). But the
fact that fees were incurred in related administrative
proceedings, and that success was not ultimately won in those
proceedings, is not dispositive: Courts may “award attorney’s
fees for time spent on administrative proceedings” to enforce
or advance a right prior to litigation in federal court. N.C.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 

 (1986). Second, before the ALJ, Augustyn was seeking to
exercise a procedural statutory right—a due process hearing—
as a necessary precursor to the vindication of her substantive
statutory right—grade revision consistent with her IEP. And
third, Augustyn’s efforts to avoid dismissal of the claim in the
first instance and then to reverse the ALJ’s determination that
she was not entitled to a due process hearing had everything to
do with the relief she sought and successfully obtained on
appeal: The District Court held she was entitled to exercise
that procedural right and reversed and remanded so that she
could do so. In short, because Augustyn’s arguments against
dismissal of the grade revision claim were later vindicated, the
legal work required to make those arguments is compensable.



6
  As to Phase I fees, Augustyn “expressly concede[s] that these
fees should only be considered” after remand because their
accrual was unrelated to her right to a due process hearing.
Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 3.




                              11
Accordingly, the fact that she was unsuccessful before the ALJ
was not a proper basis for entirely denying the Phase II fees.
        Phase III. The District Court’s 80% reduction in the
fees incurred in its own proceeding also relied on mistaken
premises. The District Court found that Augustyn’s counsel
“contribut[ed] to the ALJ’s legal error” through the “confusing
manner” in which counsel pleaded the grade revision claim.
App. 30–31. Yet Augustyn’s due process petition clearly and
unambiguously alleges that “grading inaccuracies resulted
from the District’s failure to . . . properly and fully implement
[Augustyn’s] IEP[],” App. 110, and seeks “[a]n Order that the
District review and revise grades in academic classes based on
completed work that was not previously graded and included
in the calculation of [Augustyn’s] final grades,” App. 120. In
any event, “[t]he quality of an attorney’s performance
generally should not be used to adjust the lodestar” because
quality considerations “normally are reflected in the reasonable
hourly rate,” Perdue, 

 (citation omitted), and
here, the District Court had already accepted the hourly rate as
reasonable.
        Nor does the procedural nature of Augustyn’s victory,
without certainty of success on her underlying substantive
claim on remand, justify a reduction. It is true that Augustyn
sought additional relief at other points in this dispute, but the
only claim before the District Court was Augustyn’s statutory
right to a due process hearing. This right was denied by the
ALJ and then vindicated by the District Court on appeal, and
all fees accrued in Phase III were associated with that claim,
and that claim only. Having sought and “having been afforded
a due process hearing, [Augustyn] ‘accomplished the




                               12
objective[] of her litigation’” before the District Court in its
entirety, irrespective of how the underlying claim would be
resolved.7 H.E., 

 (quoting Bagby v. Beal, 

 (3d Cir. 1979)).
        To the extent that the District Court’s reduction rested
on its consideration of the Board’s limited resources, that was
also error because “the losing party’s financial ability to pay is
not a ‘special circumstance’” justifying remittitur. Inmates of
Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 

, 180 (3d Cir.
1983) (quoting Ent. Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 

 (7th Cir. 1980)). So too for any consideration
given to Augustyn’s ability to raise other alleged violations of
her IEP at a due process hearing. The right initially denied and,
as a result of counsel’s efforts, restored, was Augustyn’s right
to exercise her statutory entitlement to a due process hearing
on her grade revision claim. Her ability to pursue a different
remedy for different misconduct has no bearing on the
statutory entitlement vindicated in the District Court.
      Phase IV. Finally, the District Court reduced the fee
award associated with the fee application simply by extending
the 80% reduction it applied to the other proceeding before it
at Phase III. However, “the reduction analysis for the fees

7
  The District Court also faults Augustyn for failing to avail
herself of the remand, but neither party briefed this issue in the
prior proceeding, and here Augustyn maintains that she fully
intends to pursue the claim and has been unable to do so
because of a jurisdictional issue—an argument to which the
Board offered no response. See Opening Br. at 25-26; Reply
Br. at 10 n.2.




                               13
generated from litigating the fee petition is independent from
the reduction analysis applied to the underlying litigation.”
United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs., Inc., 

 (3d Cir. 2018). So, now that Augustyn has been required
to appeal the reduction in her fee application before this
Court—and has prevailed—the District Court must reassess its
“fees on fees” award considering not only the fees incurred
litigating the petition in the District Court, but also the
additional costs incurred in this appeal, as well as the
reevaluation of Phase II and Phase III fees.
                              ***
       In sum, the District Court properly concluded that
Augustyn is a prevailing party and accepted her proposed
lodestar, but it reduced the lodestar based on improper
considerations. Certainly, a court can make reductions in light
of “the results obtained” if this factor was for some reason “not
already subsumed” in its calculation of the lodestar.
Souryavong, 

. But it may not use “the
results obtained” as a shroud for the consideration of
impermissible factors. Because that constitutes an abuse of
discretion, the District Court’s fee award cannot stand.
III.   CONCLUSION
      For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District
Court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.




                               14
PORTER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.

       I agree that Augustyn is a prevailing party under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. I also agree that,
when reducing Augustyn’s attorneys’ fees, the District Court
incorrectly blamed Augustyn for pleading her grade-revision
claim in a confusing manner that protracted litigation, and
considered impermissible factors.

        I write separately, however, because the majority goes
too far in its criticism of the District Court’s reasoning and
strips the District Court’s discretion to reduce attorneys’ fees
based on the limited results Augustyn obtained in litigation—
a remand order for a due process hearing to consider a single
claim.

                               I

       The starting point for determining an award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees is the calculation of the “lodestar”
amount, which is “the product of the attorney’s appropriate
hourly rate and the number of hours the attorney reasonably
expended on the action.” McCutcheon v. Am.’s Servicing Co.,

 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Interfaith Cmty. Org.
v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 

, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005)).
The District Court did not question Augustyn’s attorneys’ rates
or hours and accepted the lodestar amount.

       After calculating the lodestar, district courts may
consider other appropriate factors “not subsumed in the
lodestar,” including “the amount involved and the results
obtained.” Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 

 (3d. Cir. 2017) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

, 430 n.3 (1983)). Indeed, when considering attorneys’ fees
for a petitioner who “has achieved only partial or limited
success,” the “most critical factor is the degree of success
obtained.” Hensley, 

.

        Consideration of the results obtained is especially
relevant to Augustyn’s case. Augustyn sought four forms of
relief before the Administrative Law Judge:1 (1) compensatory
education because of Wall Township School District’s failure
to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”), (2)
an appropriate transition plan to prepare Augustyn for post-
graduate education, employment, and independent living, (3)
an order compelling Wall School District to review and revise
her grades based on completed work that it had not graded and
included when calculating her final grades, and
(4) compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages for
infliction of emotional distress. All of Augustyn’s claims
before the ALJ were ultimately dismissed.

       At the District Court, Augustyn appealed, and
ultimately succeeded on, only her grade-revision claim. Even
then, she obtained only procedural relief—an order to remand
her grade-revision claim to an ALJ for a due process hearing
to determine whether she had received a FAPE. At the time of
the District Court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees,
Augustyn had not availed herself of that hearing.

                               II


1
  Augustyn also remained at Wall High School for a fifth year
of high school, under the IDEA’s automatic “stay-put”
provision. See 

(j). The parties did not litigate
this relief before the ALJ or District Court.




                               2
       Despite acknowledging that district courts may consider
the results obtained when awarding attorneys’ fees, the
majority undermines the District Court’s ability to do so.

                               A

       The majority holds that “the fact that [Augustyn] was
unsuccessful before the ALJ was not a proper basis” for
reducing fees incurred during the administrative proceeding
because her arguments before the ALJ were a necessary
precursor to obtaining a due process hearing for her grade-
revision claim. Maj. Op. at 12.

       But the District Court acknowledged that fees incurred
during administrative proceedings are appropriate in some
cases and did “not hold that as a matter of law, fees incurred
during administrative proceedings are never recoverable where
success is only achieved on appeal in federal court.” App. 25
n.5. The District Court reduced Augustyn’s fees because she
obtained “circumscribed” relief in the District Court and the
“legal work performed during those early phases did not
contribute to [Augustyn’s] success.” App. 24. The District
Court considered “the specific context and nature of the
success that [Augustyn] achieved in [the District
Court] . . . relative to the context and nature of the
administrative proceedings.” App. at 25 n.5. Indeed, Augustyn
sought four forms of relief before the ALJ but ultimately
obtained one limited form of relief at the District Court.

       To be sure, as the majority notes, the District Court
erred by inaccurately characterizing Augustyn’s due process
petition and then finding that Augustyn’s “confusing” petition
contributed to the ALJ’s mistake and protracted litigation.
App. 30. But the District Court still had discretion to consider




                               3
“the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff
in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”
Hensley, 

.

                               B

        I also agree with the majority that the District Court
improperly considered Wall School District’s financial
resources and speculated on Augustyn’s likelihood of success
at her due process hearing when reducing fees incurred before
the District Court.

       But the majority separately concludes that, by obtaining
a due process hearing, Augustyn “‘accomplished the
objective[] of her litigation’ before the District Court in its
entirety, irrespective of how the underlying claim would be
resolved.” Maj. Op. at 12–13 (quoting H.E. v. Walter D.
Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter Sch., 

 (3d Cir. 2017)).

        Though the majority quotes this Court’s decision in
H.E., it reads that case for more than it says. In H.E., we held
that when a plaintiff vindicates her right to an IDEA procedural
due process hearing, like Augustyn here, “she is a ‘prevailing
party’” eligible for attorneys’ fees. H.E., 

. The
H.E. Court’s mention of a plaintiff “accomplish[ing] the
objectives of her litigation,” 

 (quoting Bagby v. Beal, 

 (3d Cir. 1979)), was in the context of deciding
prevailing party status—not, as the majority implies, the
district court’s discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to those
prevailing parties.

       Furthermore, the student in H.E. pursued and obtained
substantive relief following the district court’s remand order.




                               4
Id. at 410. By contrast, Augustyn never availed herself of her
due process hearing, let alone obtained substantive relief.

       The majority fashions a rule that every procedural
victory would constitute complete success for awarding
attorneys’ fees, collapsing the “prevailing party” inquiry and
the “reasonable attorneys’ fees” inquiry into one inquiry. But
success is a matter of degree in light of all relief sought by the
petitioner, not an all or nothing proposition. We afford district
courts discretion to weigh “the degree of success obtained”
when awarding attorneys’ fees. Hensley, 

. The
majority’s rule downplays that discretion.

                                C

        The District Court was within its discretion to reduce
Augustyn’s fees based on the limited procedural relief she
obtained. Because the majority’s reasoning would unduly limit
that discretion, I respectfully concur in the judgment.




                                5