Jessica Servais v. John Caccia

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 23-2565 ________________ JESSICA SERVAIS, Administrator ad prosequendum and Administrator of the Estate of Jacob Servais Appellant v. DETECTIVE JOHN CACCIA, Individually and as an agents, servants and/or employees of Cape May County Prosecutors Office, State of New Jersey and/or Lower Township; CITY OF VINELAND; LOWER TOWNSHIP; CHIEF OF DETECTIVES PAUL SKILL, Cape May County Prosecutors Office, Individually and as an agents, servants and/or employees of Cape May County Prosecutors Office, County of Cape May and/or State of NJ; CAPE MAY COUNTY; MICHAEL JEFFERSON; OFFICE OF CAPE MAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1-100; JOHN DOE DETECTIVES 1-100; JOHN DOE CAPE MAY COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE EMPLOYEES 1-100; JOHN DOE LOWER TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICERS 1-100; JOHN DOE SUPERVISORS 1-10, INDIVIDUALLY and in their official capacity, jointly, severally and/or in the alternative ________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 1:20-cv-14601) District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams ________________ Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on September 13, 2024 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed May 13, 2025) ________________ OPINION* ________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge While effectuating the arrest of Deshyamma Dalton, Cape May County Prosecutor’s Office detective John Caccia shot and killed Jacob Servais. Servais’ mother, in her individual capacity and as administrator of Servais’ estate (together, the Estate), brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state laws,1 claiming that Caccia’s use of lethal force against Servais was excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment, and we will affirm.

I.2 On October 18, 2018, Officers John Caccia and Dallas Bohn planned to apprehend armed-robbery suspect Deshyamma Dalton as she returned a rental car. Servais drove to pick up Dalton at the rental agency. When Servais arrived and backed into a parking spot on the side of the agency’s building, Caccia, Bohn, and Officer Sarah Best surrounded him while a separate cohort arrested Dalton.3 Caccia parked his unmarked SUV “nose- to-nose” with Servais’ sedan, with two-to-four feet between their front bumpers.4 Best parked perpendicular to Servais, on the driver’s side of Caccia’s SUV.

As the vehicles came to a stop, Bohn exited the SUV on the passenger’s side and began yelling commands for Servais to surrender. Caccia exited on the driver’s side— facing the passenger’s side of Servais’ sedan—and also gave commands while drawing his weapon. In response to the officers’ commands, Servais did not turn off the engine, exit his vehicle, or put his hands up. He shook his head in response to one of Bohn’s commands. He then attempted to drive out of the parking spot, first driving forward towards Bohn and bumping the passenger’s side of the SUV. Bohn moved to the right and out of the way. Servais reversed, became stuck on the parking block behind his vehicle, and accelerated forward towards Caccia, who was standing near the front driver’s side of the SUV. Caccia, fearing that he was going to be run over by Servais’ vehicle, shot Servais three times through the windshield. Servais reversed again, before succumbing to his injuries.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.5 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6 III.

As the Estate brings a claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, it “must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances.”7 We assess the reasonableness of a seizure under the totality of the circumstances, “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” and consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”8 The “assessment of the threat of injury. . . is crucial to identifying the magnitude of the governmental interests at stake.”9

It is beyond dispute that Caccia’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We have long held that “an otherwise non-threatening individual [] engaged in vehicular flight is entitled to be free from being subjected to deadly force if it is unreasonable for an officer to believe his or others’ lives are in immediate jeopardy from their actions.”10 But when the driver’s actions threaten imminent death or critical injuries, deadly force is permissible.11 Here, Servais posed a serious threat to Caccia’s life and limb. Caccia stood directly in front of an accelerating vehicle when he discharged his weapon, only a few feet and moments away from a potentially life-threatening collision. The Estate’s analogy to our holding in Abraham v. Raso fails for this reason.12 As the Estate acknowledges, our decision in Abraham turned on material disputes of fact regarding the officer’s position vis-à-vis the threatening vehicle, which we properly left to the jury.13 There is no such dispute here.14 Moreover, Servais had failed to comply with the officers’ commands and, seconds earlier, had nearly struck Bohn with his vehicle. When Servais turned and drove at Caccia, it was reasonable for Caccia to believe that he was about to be struck as well. In light of Servais’ noncompliance, continuously threatening behavior, violent criminal record, and the immediate threat of a deadly collision, Caccia’s use of force falls within the “narrow set of circumstances” where use of deadly force is permissible against a moving vehicle.15 The Estate’s remaining arguments rest on its assertion that Caccia had alternatives to deadly force (i.e., he should not have placed himself in front of a moving vehicle, and should have moved out of the way instead of discharging his weapon). But even viewed in the light most favorable to the Estate, the record shows that Servais turned to drive towards Caccia, and the Estate’s contention that Caccia should have stood elsewhere is pure speculation, as it does not identify where Caccia could have moved while sandwiched between multiple vehicles and a wall.16 Accordingly, as the Estate has not shown that Caccia’s use of force was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.17

The Estate also argues that the District Court ignored the testimony of the Estate’s expert, Mickie McComb, which established that Caccia’s choice of location and failure to move violated generally acceptable police policy, training, and procedures, as well as the New Jersey Attorney General’s use-of-force policy. As relevant here, the state attorney general’s policy prohibits firing at a moving vehicle absent imminent serious or deadly injury and no viable alternatives. We have underscored the general consensus that using deadly force against a moving vehicle is a prohibited, dangerous, and ineffective method of stopping it. See Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 89–91 (McKee, J., concurring) (“[P]olice departments across this country have essentially come to a consensus that shooting at fleeing suspects in vehicles is never reasonable and will always be very reckless, except for the rarest of circumstances specifically noted in those policies.”). However, where, as here, there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury and no viable alternative actions, Caccia’s actions are permissible under these policies.

As we find no constitutional violation, we do not reach whether Caccia was entitled to qualified immunity.