PRECEDENTIAL

         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                   _____________

                        No. 23-1449
                       _____________

             UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                              v.

                  SHAKIRA MARTINEZ,
                           Appellant

                        ____________

       On Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Delaware
                (D.C. No. 1:17-cr-00047-004)
        District Judge: Honorable Stephanos Bibas *
                        ____________

     Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                     April 17, 2025
                      ___________




*
 The Honorable Stephanos Bibas, Circuit Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting
by designation pursuant to 

(b).
     Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and
               RENDELL, Circuit Judges

               (Opinion filed: May 20, 2025)


Mark E. Cedrone, Esq.
Saxton & Stump
123 S Broad Street
Suite 2800
Philadelphia, PA 19109

Counsel for Appellant

David C. Weiss
Jennifer K. Welsh
Jesse S. Wenger
Meredith C. Ruggles
Office of United States Attorney
1313 N Market Street
Hercules Building, Suite 400
Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellee

                        ____________

                OPINION OF THE COURT
                     ____________




                             2
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.

        A jury in the District of Delaware convicted Shakira
Martinez of numerous money laundering offenses related to
her involvement in a drug trafficking operation run by her
husband and co-defendant Omar Morales Colon. The District
Court sentenced Martinez to 108 months of imprisonment.
After the sentencing, the United States Sentencing
Commission enacted a retroactive amendment to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”)
allowing certain offenders with no criminal history a two-point
reduction in total offense level. Martinez argues that our
general appellate authority under 

 permits us
to vacate her sentence and remand the matter for resentencing
in light of the retroactive Guidelines amendment. We agree
and hold that when a defendant is entitled to seek the benefit
of a retroactive Guidelines provision by filing a motion for a
reduction in sentence under 

(c)(2), our Court
may, in an exercise of its discretionary authority under § 2106,
vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing
in light of the retroactive amendment. Because granting relief
in this case promotes judicial economy and serves the interest
of justice, we will vacate Martinez’s sentence and remand so
that the District Court may resentence her in a manner
consistent with the retroactive Guidelines amendment.

                                I.

      In a second superseding indictment returned on August
7, 2018, a grand jury in the District of Delaware charged
Martinez and Colon each with one count of conspiracy to
conduct a transaction involving and intended to conceal the
proceeds of a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, in




                               3
violation of 

(a)(1)(B)(i), one count of
engaging in a transaction in property derived from unlawful
activity and of a value greater than $10,000, in violation of 

, and seven counts of conducting a transaction
involving and intended to conceal the proceeds of unlawful
activity, in violation of 

(a)(1)(B)(i). 1 The
grand jury also charged Martinez with three counts of
structuring a transaction with a financial institution to avoid the
reporting requirements established by 

 and
related regulations. After a twelve-day trial, a jury convicted
Martinez and Colon of all counts charged. The evidence at trial
established that Martinez had assisted in the laundering of over
$900,000 in drug proceeds.

       Sentencing occurred on February 23, 2023. The District
Court determined that Martinez’s total offense level was 30,
that her criminal history score under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 was
zero, and that her criminal history category under U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.1 was I. Martinez’s recommended sentencing range
under the Guidelines was therefore 97 to 121 months of
imprisonment. Martinez requested that the court grant a
downward variance in light of an expert’s finding that she
suffered from several psychological disorders that may have
influenced her participation in Colon’s trafficking activities.
The court declined to grant a downward variance and
sentenced Martinez to 108 months of imprisonment.




1
  In the same indictment, the grand jury also charged Colon
with several drug trafficking offenses. The District Court
severed the drug trafficking charges from the money
laundering charges for purposes of trial.




                                4
        Martinez timely filed a notice of appeal on March 9,
2023. The Clerk consolidated Martinez’s appeal with the two
appeals taken by her co-defendant Colon. At the request of
Colon and Martinez, the Court entered an order on May 30,
2023, staying the issuance of a briefing schedule until 90 days
after trial transcripts became available to counsel. The Court
issued a briefing schedule on October 26, 2023, which directed
the appellants to file their opening briefs by November 27,
2023. Again at the appellants’ request, the Court later
modified the briefing schedule to allow the appellants until
February 26, 2024, and then April 26, 2024, to file their
opening briefs.

       During this period of abeyance, the Sentencing
Commission promulgated significant amendments to the
Guidelines and designated two of them for retroactive
application. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 

, 28281 (May 3, 2023); Sentencing
Guidelines for the United States Courts, 

,
60535 (Sept. 1, 2023). Martinez filed her opening brief on
April 26, 2024, asking us to vacate her sentence and remand so
that she could receive the benefit of one of these retroactive
provisions.
                             II. 2

        Section 4C1.1 of the Guidelines, which took effect on
November 1, 2023, provides for a two-point reduction in the
total offense level of a defendant who has “not receive[d] any
criminal history points” and who meets certain other criteria.

2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 

.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 

 and 

.




                              5
U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 4C1.1(a)(1) (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2024). By an amendment to the Guidelines that also
took effect on November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission
authorized courts to apply § 4C1.1 retroactively. See 88 Fed.
Reg. at 60535 (codified at U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§
1B1.10(a)(1), (d) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024)).              The
Government acknowledges that Martinez may seek the benefit
of § 4C1.1 by filing a motion for a reduction in sentence under

(c)(2). But the Government insists that a
motion under § 3582(c)(2) is Martinez’s only means of
demonstrating her entitlement to the reduction afforded by §
4C1.1.

        We disagree. Under the general appellate authority
provided to us by 

, we “may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a
court lawfully brought before [us] for review, and may remand
the cause and . . . require such further proceedings to be had as
may be just under the circumstances.” The text of § 2106
plainly authorizes us to vacate a sentence such as Martinez’s
and, if “just under the circumstances,” to remand the matter for
“further proceedings” such as resentencing. 

;
see also United States v. Gregg, 

 (3d Cir.
2000) (noting that a court must enforce a statute’s plain
meaning). Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the
availability of relief under § 3582(c)(2) limits our ability to
provide the same relief pursuant to our general appellate
authority under § 2106.

      We hold, therefore, that when a defendant such as
Martinez is entitled to seek the benefit of a retroactive
Guidelines provision by filing a motion under § 3582(c)(2), our
Court may, on direct appeal, exercise its discretion under §




                               6
2106 to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing in light of the retroactive Guidelines provision.
We note that our holding regarding the scope of possible relief
under § 2106 accords with that of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Claybron, 

 (7th Cir. 2023); cf. United States v. Brewer, 

 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a court “need not
remand for resentencing” in light of a retroactive Guidelines
amendment, given the availability of a motion under
§ 3582(c)(2)).

       The Government suggests that this holding is
inconsistent with our recognition in previous opinions that we
may consider an amendment to the Guidelines only if it is
“clarifying” rather than “substantive.” United States v.
Flemming, 

 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S.
Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2003)); see also United States v. Spinello, 

 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Marmolejos, 

 (3d Cir. 1998). We see no such inconsistency. The
Sentencing Commission has, to be sure, advised courts as a
general matter to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the
date that the defendant is sentenced.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
Manual § 1B1.11(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024). But the
Commission has also advised courts entertaining a request for
a reduction in sentence to apply “the amended guideline range
that would have been applicable to the defendant if the
amendment(s) to the guidelines [that the Commission
designated for retroactivity] had been in effect at the time the
defendant was sentenced.” Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1). In allowing
remand for resentencing according to a retroactive amendment
to the Guidelines, we do no more than heed the advice the
Commission provided in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).




                               7
        We are also unmoved by the Government’s contention
that a remand under § 2106, unlike a motion for a reduction in
sentence under § 3582(c)(2), would allow Martinez to receive
plenary review of her sentence by the District Court. When, as
here, a district court has not committed sentencing error 3 and
the only basis for an adjustment in sentence is the retroactive
application of a subsequent Guidelines amendment, we may
instruct the district court that, on remand, the defendant’s
sentence is to be adjusted to no greater extent than it would be
were the court applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) when ruling on
a motion under § 3582(c)(2). Such an instruction will ensure
that, on remand just as on motion under § 3582(c)(2), a court
“shall substitute only the [retroactive] amendments . . . for the
corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the
defendant was sentenced” but otherwise leave “[a]ll other

3
  Martinez argues that the District Court committed procedural
error by failing to consider meaningfully a forensic report
stating that Martinez’s participation in Colon’s drug trafficking
operation could be attributed in part to the fact that she suffers
from several psychological disorders. Martinez forfeited this
claim of procedural error by neglecting to bring it to the
District Court’s attention when her counsel was asked, after the
court had pronounced the sentence, to note any item that the
court might have “overlooked.” Joint Appendix 1431; see
United States v. Flores-Mejia, 

 (3d Cir. 2014)
(en banc). Our review is therefore for plain error. Flores-
Mejia, 

. Because the record indicates that the
District Court thoroughly considered the forensic report, we
see no basis for concluding that the District Court committed
procedural error, plain or otherwise, in its treatment of the
report.




                                8
guideline application decisions . . . unaffected.” U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt. n.2 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n
2024). Even a court subject to such an instruction may,
however, account for nonretroactive changes to the Guidelines,
as well as any other intervening changes to the law or the
defendant’s circumstances, when discharging its duty to
consider the sentencing factors set forth in 

(a).
See 

(c)(2) (providing that “the court may
reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the
factors set forth in section 3553(a)”); Concepcion v. United
States, 

, 498 n.6 (2022) (recognizing that, under
the First Step Act, “[a] district court cannot . . . recalculate a
movant’s benchmark Guidelines in any way other than to
reflect the retroactive application” of the relevant provisions,
but “may . . . consider postsentencing conduct or
nonretroactive changes in selecting or rejecting an appropriate
sentence”); U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 cmt.
n.1(B)(i), (iii) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2024); Claybron, 

.

       Our authority under § 2106 to vacate a sentence and
order a remand is discretionary. See 

(providing that a “court of appellate jurisdiction may . . . vacate
[a sentence] . . . and may remand the cause” (emphases
added)). Vacating Martinez’s sentence and ordering a remand
serves the interest of justice in this case by ensuring that she is
sentenced expeditiously under the Guidelines applicable to her.
And granting this relief promotes “judicial efficiency” by
eliminating “the necessity of . . . a motion pursuant to 

(c).” United States v. Ralston, 

, 924 (6th
Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Jackson, 

 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also United
States v. Marcello, 

, 756 n.3 (3d Cir. 1994) (seeing




                                9
“no need to force [the defendant] to take th[e] additional step”
of filing a motion under § 3582(c)(2) when the defendant
sought the benefit of a retroactive Guidelines amendment on
direct appeal), superseded on other grounds by U.S. Sent’g
Guidelines Manual § 5K2.20 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2000), as
recognized in Spinello, 

; United States v. Jones,

 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (observing that remand for
resentencing promotes “administrative efficiency” because it
“save[s] the defendant the ‘additional step’ of petitioning the
district court for a sentencing modification.” (quoting United
States v. Wales, 

, 1328 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992))). We
therefore exercise our discretion to vacate Martinez’s sentence
and remand the matter for resentencing.

                            III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Martinez’s
sentence and remand with instructions that she be resentenced
in a manner consistent with U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(b).




                              10