United States v. Alan Womack

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________ No. 24-2263 ______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ALAN WOMACK, a/k/a “Mal,” a/k/a “Jamal,” a/k/a “Kevin Smaller,” Appellant ______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:16-cr-00218-13) U.S. District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick ______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) July 7, 2025 ______________ Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: July 8, 2025) ______________ OPINION ______________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Alan Womack appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress and his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I1 Womack was a member of a drug trafficking organization that transported and sold marijuana from 2005 to 2016. Among other things, the organization stored marijuana at a home in Philadelphia. On one occasion, police received a 911 call reporting that five men were moving items through the home’s basement window.

Officers arrived at the house, saw Dalion Baskerville and Womack standing near the property, and detained them.2 Police entered the house, conducted a sweep, and saw what appeared to be drugs in the basement. Police thereafter obtained a search warrant and seized over two thousand pounds of marijuana from the basement.

The drug trafficking organization used several methods for transporting drug sale proceeds to pay for marijuana and other expenses. First, associates flew across the country carrying large amounts of hidden cash. Second, tractor trailer drivers transported large amounts of cash and marijuana to conspirators. In fact, Womack himself traveled to Arizona to monitor tractor trailer shipments of drugs and cash and to Virginia to deliver cash to a driver. Third, the organization recruited people to open bank accounts and funneled drug sale proceeds through those accounts. Associates around Philadelphia would deposit the proceeds into these accounts and other associates in Arizona would withdraw the cash from them. One such account reflected several deposits and withdrawals of $8,000 or less. Phone records showed that Womack communicated with conspirators who managed these account transfers. These records showed that Womack spoke with one of these conspirators over 200 times during a several week period.

Womack and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Before trial, Womack moved to suppress the drugs seized from the Philadelphia residence, claiming that the initial, warrantless entry into and sweep of the premises violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Womack lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search, and that even if he had standing, the entry and sweep were justified.

After trial, a jury found Womack guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Womack appeals.

II3 A

We first address Womack’s challenge to the District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of the Philadelphia residence.4 To challenge a search, a defendant must have Fourth Amendment standing, that is the search must have violated “his own Fourth Amendment rights.” United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010). To do so, he must demonstrate that he had both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the area searched. United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 2015). In certain circumstances, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy within another’s home. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). For example, an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where he is staying, but a visitor “who is merely present with the consent of the householder” has no such expectation and hence no Fourth Amendment standing.

Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).

Womack fails to show that he had a subjective expectation of privacy within the searched home or that any such expectation was objectively reasonable.5 The suppression hearing record does not show (1) Womack’s relationship with the property owner or with someone with a possessory interest in the property, (2) how long he had been at the home, or (3) whether he had previously visited or stayed overnight at the home before the search—factors that may have shown he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises.6 Instead, the evidence revealed that Womack was merely present at the home for drug-related activities, which is insufficient to establish Fourth Amendment standing.7 See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91 (holding respondents lacked a privacy interest in an apartment where they were present for a few hours for business purposes); see also United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 337-38 (3d Cir. 2002) (similar).8 The District Court therefore properly held that Womack lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search.

B We next consider Womack’s claim that the Government constructively amended the money laundering conspiracy charge in the indictment by presenting evidence and argument about bank transactions not mentioned in the indictment.9 An indictment is constructively amended when evidence or argument modifies “essential terms of the charged offense in such a way that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment . . . actually charged.” United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2006)).

There was no constructive amendment here. Womack was charged with and convicted of the same offense: conspiring to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). To prove such a conspiracy, the Government had to establish: (1) “an agreement between two or more persons to launder money;” and (2) that Womack “knowingly became a member of the conspiracy.” United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, (3d Cir. 2023). “The agreement must be one that, if completed, would satisfy the elements of the underlying substantive offense”—here, promotional and concealment money laundering.10 Id. Proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is not an element of the crime.11 Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 219 (2005). Accordingly, the Government did “not modify ‘the elements of the crime charged,’” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 534 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), where it offered proof at trial of a specific money laundering method (e.g., depositing proceeds in third party bank accounts) that was not alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Rosario-Pérez, 957 F.3d 277, 289 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that offering “proof of an overt act relevant to the [drug] conspiracy” did not constructively amend the indictment as an overt act was not an element of the conspiracy offense). Thus, there was no constructive amendment. See Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 532.

C12 The evidence adduced at trial proved that Womack conspired to commit both promotional and concealment money laundering and so his assertion that the evidence was insufficient fails.13 Turning first to promotional money laundering, the evidence showed that Womack’s coconspirators agreed to engage in transactions with “an intent to promote the carrying on” of drug trafficking. United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir.

2001); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The “intent to promote” element is satisfied if transactions were intended to advance drug trafficking.14 See United States v. Conley, 37 F.3d 970, 979 (3d Cir. 1994). The evidence demonstrated that conspirators used drug proceeds to pay for marijuana and other expenses. See United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 646 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding the promotional element proven where defendants used proceeds from selling prescription-less drugs to buy controlled substances). The evidence also established that Womack was aware that the funds involved were derived from drug sales as he monitored cash payments and drug shipments and delivered cash to a tractor trailer driver associated with the organization.

As for concealment money laundering, the evidence showed that Womack’s coconspirators agreed to and in fact engaged in transactions that were “designed in whole or in part to conceal” the nature and source of the drug trafficking proceeds. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d at 294-95; see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). The evidence revealed that the organization took various steps to disguise the nature and source of its proceeds.

Conspirators recruited third parties to open bank accounts, deposited funds in these accounts, rather than in accounts held under the conspirators’ names, and withdrew or deposited no more than $8,000 cash at a time, likely to avoid bank reporting requirements, and to conceal the nature and source of the funds. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 787 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding concealment money laundering proven where “transactions were in cash” and “deposits were below ten thousand dollars so as to avoid” bank reporting requirements that may “lead to unwanted attention”).

Using third parties’ bank accounts and “structuring the transaction[s] in a way to avoid attention” provided the jury a basis to infer an intent to conceal. Fallon, 61 F.4th at 117 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the jury could reasonably infer that Womack knew about these transactions from phone records showing that he frequently contacted conspirators who managed the account transfers.

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Womack conspired to commit both promotional and concealment money laundering.

III For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.