United States v. Corey Thomas, Jr.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

United States v. Corey Thomas, Jr.

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 25-1171 ____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v.

COREY L. THOMAS, JR., Appellant ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 3:23-cr-00062-001) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 5, 2025

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, FREEMAN and BOVE, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: December 11, 2025) _______________

OPINION * * _______________

** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. BOVE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Corey Thomas entered a conditional guilty plea to a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922

(g)(l). The District Court sentenced Defendant principally to 42 months’

imprisonment. Defendant’s plea agreement reserved his right to bring this appeal

challenging the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress cash seized from his pants

and a gun seized from his car. We will affirm.

I.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and

issues on appeal. The District Court had jurisdiction under

18 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have

jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291

. Legal conclusions in a district court’s denial of a

suppression motion are subject to de novo review, and fact-findings are reviewed for clear

error. See United States v. Curry,

158 F.4th 153

, 158 n.3 (3d Cir. 2025). 1

II.

Defendant argues that a Detective violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

(1) stopping his car, (2) patting him down and seizing cash from his pants pocket,

(3) conducting a probable-cause arrest without a warrant, and (4) searching his car pursuant

to a warrant. The District Court rejected these arguments following a suppression hearing

that included testimony from the Detective. We likewise find Defendant’s arguments to

be without merit.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.

2 A.

The Detective conducted a lawful Terry stop of Defendant’s car. See Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 30

(1968); United States v. Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 417-18

(1981).

Prior to the Terry stop, the Detective watched Defendant engage in what the

Detective reasonably believed to have been a drug deal. This started when Defendant

parked his car in the driveway of a man known to be “dealing drugs out of the house.”

App. 106. A man exited the house, got into Defendant’s parked car for approximately two

minutes, and then returned to the house. After seeing those things, the Detective reasonably

concluded that the interaction involved “narcotics activity.” App. 107. These “specific

and articulable facts” gave the Detective reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle.

Terry,

392 U.S. at 21

.

B.

The Detective conducted a lawful Terry pat-down of Defendant after the stop, which

led to a lawful seizure of suspected drug proceeds under the “plain-feel doctrine.” United

States v. Greene,

927 F.3d 723, 726

(3d Cir. 2019).

In order to perform a pat-down during a traffic stop, an officer “must harbor

reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.”

Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323, 327

(2009). The Detective’s reasonable suspicion was

based on his observation of what appeared to be drug activity involving Defendant, the

Detective’s extensive experience investigating “gun crimes and narcotics,” and his concern

that “guns and narcotics go together all the time.” App. 104, 124. These circumstances

3 were sufficient to warrant the pat-down. See United States v. Yamba,

506 F.3d 251, 256

(3d Cir. 2007).

Under the plain-feel doctrine, the Detective lawfully seized a wad of suspected drug

proceeds that he discovered in Defendant’s pants pocket during the pat-down. The

Detective testified that, prior to determining whether Defendant was armed, he felt a

“bulge” or “wad” in Defendant’s pocket, which he suspected related to drug activity. App.

125, 108. At that point, the Detective could “lawfully perform a more intrusive search” of

Defendant’s pocket. Yamba,

506 F.3d at 259

. The District Court concluded that the

Detective credibly testified that he seized the cash in connection with that search because

he suspected that the funds related to a drug transaction. See id.; see also Greene,

927 F.3d at 726-27

. We detect no error in that conclusion.

C.

The Detective conducted a lawful warrantless arrest of Defendant based on probable

cause. See United States v. Outlaw,

138 F.4th 725, 728

(3d Cir. 2025). The Detective’s

probable-cause determination was supported by his observations of the Defendant up to

the point of the arrest, as well as information from other officers about admissions by

another suspect regarding jointly undertaken drug activities involving Defendant prior to

the stop.

D.

Following Defendant’s arrest, the Detective lawfully searched Defendant’s car

pursuant to a search warrant. The search revealed the gun that resulted in Defendant’s §

922(g)(1) conviction. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the temporary impoundment of

4 the vehicle while police obtained the search warrant did not offend the Constitution. See

id. at 570. Defendant’s remaining appellate challenges to the search of the car are

derivative of the arguments we have rejected regarding the stop, pat-down, and seizure of

the cash.

III.

Defendant has not demonstrated that his constitutional rights were violated at any

point during the events that led to his conviction. Accordingly, we will affirm.

5

Reference

Status
Unpublished