NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

No. 25-1438 _____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JAMIR M. CERUTI, Appellant _____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 4:20-cr-00021-001) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann _____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 12, 2025 _____________

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Filed December 19, 2025) _____________

OPINION* _____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. MATEY, Circuit Judge.

One month after he was released from prison and began a three-year term of

supervised release, Ceruti was arrested for possessing narcotics. Later, Ceruti told his

probation officer that he used narcotics on two separate occasions. The Government

sought revocation of Ceruti’s supervised release based only on his admitted use of

narcotics to his probation officer, and the District Court revoked Ceruti’s supervised

release and sentenced him to twelve months in prison followed by six months in a

residential re-entry center and another two years of supervised release. Ceruti argues that

his sentence was procedurally unreasonable1 because the court improperly found that he

used narcotics one month after his release from prison by relying on the substances that

police claimed he possessed when he was stopped, which Ceruti disputes.

We disagree. Even if the District Court erroneously inferred that Ceruti possessed

drugs when the police stopped him, and even assuming such an error was plain, it did not

impact Ceruti’s substantial rights. See United States v. Dragon,

(3d

Cir. 2006) (“[A]n error affects substantial rights when it is prejudicial, i.e., it ‘affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.’” (quoting United States v. Olano,

(1993))). The advisory guideline range of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment

remained the same. And Ceruti’s sentence was unaffected because the District Court

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under

, and we have jurisdiction under

(a) and

. Ceruti waived any challenge to the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. Because Ceruti did not raise his procedural objection below, we review his claim for plain error. United States v. Flores- Mejia,

(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 2 considered numerous factors including Ceruti’s background, his “continued lack of

respect for the law” as demonstrated by his failure to comply with his conditions of

release and “repeated failure to appear for mandatory court proceedings,” and his

acknowledged drug use, all leading the court to conclude that incarceration would

“provide Mr. Ceruti with yet another opportunity to purge his system of the substances to

which he is addicted.” App. 46. For those reasons, we will affirm Ceruti’s sentence.

3