Marquitta Regaolo v. Target Corp

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-2514 __________ MARQUITTA REGAOLO, Appellant v. TARGET CORPORATION ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-01445) District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 20, 2026 Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: February 3, 2026) ___________ OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

Marquitta Regaolo appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint. We will vacate and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Regaolo filed a pro se civil complaint against her former employer, Target, in the United States District for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), raising claims of race and disability discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. Regaolo also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. Target moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that Regaolo had failed to sufficiently state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Regaolo did not file a brief in opposition to the motion, as is required by Rule 7.1(c) of the District Court’s Local Civil Rules. For that reason alone, and without notice, the District Court granted Target’s 12(b)(6) motion as uncontested and, with no further analysis, dismissed Regaolo’s complaint. Regaolo timely appealed. 1 II.

We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Regaolo’s complaint for failing to oppose Target’s motion. We have previously held that a district court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as unopposed and dismiss a complaint “solely on the basis of [a] local rule” where, as here, the District Court did not engage in “any analysis of whether the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991). A dismissal of this kind is “a sanction for failure to comply with the local court rule,” id., and before a district court takes the drastic step of dismissing a complaint as a sanction, it generally must consider the relevant factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). 2 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2013). The District Court failed to do so, and therefore remand is warranted.

See, e.g., Livera v. First Nat’l State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989).

We realize that “we could make our own analysis of the complaint” and, if we concluded that it failed to state a claim, we could affirm the District Court’s order on that basis. See Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30. But the District Court denied Regaolo the opportunity to amend her complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”). Thus, we decline to adjudicate Regaolo’s claims in the first instance.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal and remand for further proceedings.