Achilles Curbison v. United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2893 __________

ACHILLES CEDRIC CURBISON,

Appellant v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; PHILLIP L. BUVIA, Special Agent; EDWARD R. DAVIS, Agent; MICHAEL T. POULTON, Agent; ANDREW SCHIFF, AUSA; ROBERT J. CLEARY, Former U.S. Attorney ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-15408) District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 17, 2026

Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed March 20, 2026) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Achilles Curbison, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

This case is Curbison’s second attempt to sue federal agents who he claims illegally seized and destroyed his property. In 2005, Curbison filed a lawsuit in the District Court against the United States and federal agents, alleging constitutional violations and violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) stemming from the seizure of his real property. See Curbison v. United States, D.N.J. Civ. No. 05-cv-05280 (“Case 1”). After the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgement, Curbison appealed and this Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment. See Curbison v. U.S. Gov’t of N.J., 242 F. App’x 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).1

In September 2025, Curbison brought the instant case against the same defendants he sued in Case 1, alleging violations under the constitution and the FTCA, stemming from the same seizure he complained of in Case 1. The District Court granted Curbison leave to proceed IFP, and dismissed his complaint with prejudice because it determined that his claims were barred by res judicata. Curbison filed a timely notice of appeal and has filed a pro se brief in support of his appeal in this Court.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

III.

We agree with the judgment of the District Court, because Curbison’s claims are barred by res judicata.2 In order for the doctrine to apply, there must be “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Duhaney v. Att'y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).

Each of those requirements was satisfied here. Each of the parties Curbison named in his complaint was previously named in Case 1. Curbison’s current suit arises from the same cause of action—the purportedly illegal seizure of his property—as did the first suit. Lastly, there was a final judgment on the merits in Curbison’s previous suit because a dismissal for failure to state a claim constitutes a final judgment on the merits, see Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981), as does a grant of summary judgment, see generally Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, his complaint is barred by res judicata. See Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 347.

The District Court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, and did not abuse its discretion in determining that granting leave to amend would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.