Laboratory Charter School v. M. S.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 25-2173 LABORATORY CHARTER SCHOOL, Appellant v. M.R.S., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENT SHARONA SMITH; SHARON SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY _____________________________ Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa. Judge Juan R. Sánchez, No. 2:21-cv-05538

Before: PORTER, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and BOVE, Circuit Judges Submitted Apr. 8, 2026; Decided Apr. 21, 2026 _____________________________

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION *

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge. In this appeal under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), Laboratory Charter School (“Lab Charter”) seeks reversal of a District Court’s order holding that Lab Charter denied M.R.S., a disabled minor, a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) for her sixth-grade year, and award- ing M.R.S. partial compensatory education. We agree with the District Court’s conclu- sions, so we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 1

First, the District Court did not commit reversible error in finding that Lab Charter denied a FAPE to M.R.S. in her sixth-grade year. 2 The District Court found that Lab Char- ter failed to reevaluate M.R.S. for a new Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) by April 4, 2020—even though the IDEA mandated this reevaluation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring, at minimum, triennial reevaluations); Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The IEP is . . . the primary mechanism for deliv- ering a FAPE.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). What is more, the District Court noted that an independent evaluation of M.R.S. revealed that the IEP Lab Charter eventu- ally put in place was insufficient. 3 Our own review of that evaluation reveals that M.R.S. suffered from several mental-health issues, including “[s]ignificant symptoms of depres- sion,” “[s]ignificant variability on cognitive ability testing,” “[s]ignificant problems on tasks of executive functioning,” and “[s]ignificant academic weaknesses across reading, writing and math.” Joint Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 710. And if those difficulties did not put Lab Charter on notice of the need for a new IEP, M.R.S.’s “lack of progress in school” should have. Lab’y Charter Sch. v. M.R.S. ex rel. S.S., No. 21-cv-5538, 2025 WL 1508020, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2025) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i)). Still, Lab Charter did not reevaluate M.R.S.’s IEP. See Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017) (“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).

Lab Charter counters that the District Court overlooked the school’s “reasonable efforts to educate M.R.S.” and “develop a new IEP.” Opening Br. 20. Even accepting Lab Charter’s view of the record, we cannot reverse just because we “would have weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that challengers must “provide[] evidence that overcomes the deference that we must give to . . . factual findings”). But also, the District Court did not overlook Lab Charter’s efforts to educate M.R.S. To the contrary, the District Court considered that Lab Charter made “significant efforts to ad- dress” M.R.S.’s sixth-grade academic challenges. Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020, at *3. It found those efforts insufficient for the reasons discussed above. And we see no reversible error in those findings.

Second, we also see no reversible error in the District Court’s award of partial com- pensatory education to M.R.S. 4 The District Court awarded compensatory education for M.R.S.’s sixth-grade year, less two months for “the time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the problem.” Lab’y Charter Sch., 2025 WL 1508020, at *5 (quoting D.F v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 499 (3d Cir. 2012)).

Lab Charter argues that the District Court abused its discretion because it awarded M.R.S. compensatory education for 81.5 days that she was absent. The school attributes those absences to M.R.S.’s struggles with remote education during the COVID-19 pan- demic, not its denial of a FAPE. We disagree. Lab Charter is correct that the IDEA gen- erally does not contemplate compensatory education for factors beyond the school’s con- trol. See Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 251 (3d Cir. 2009) (refusing to award compensatory education for a period in which a student suffered an acute medical condition). But we also hold schools liable for periods “accru[ing] from the point that the school district knows or should know of the IEP’s failure.” M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Ferren C., 612 F.3d at 717 (reasoning that compensatory education is “a remedy to compensate the student for rights the district already denied because the School District violated the statutory rights while the student was still entitled to them” (citation modified)). As the District Court found, Lab Charter was on notice that its IEP failed M.R.S. at least as early as the beginning of her sixth-grade year—thus at least partially explaining M.R.S.’s absenteeism. Because the District Court

“An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court’s decision rests upon a clearly errone- ous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (citing P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006)). plausibly found that fact, we discern no abuse of discretion in its award of compensatory education.

For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.