Randall Winslow v. Extra Space Storage

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-2249 __________ RANDALL WINSLOW, Appellant v. EXTRA STORAGE SPACE; LOGAN HARMAN ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-04930) District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 10, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: April 24, 2026) ___________ OPINION* PER CURIAM Randall Winslow appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment against him in this civil action stemming from his rental of storage units. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment.

I.

For many years, Winslow rented, pursuant to a written agreement, two storage units at an Extra Space Storage (“ESS”) facility in Malvern, Pennsylvania, to store “valuable family heirlooms, antiques, and documents.” Dist. Ct. Op. entered June 5, 2025, at 3 [hereinafter Dist. Ct. Op.] (quoting defendants’ statement of material undisputed facts).1 In February 2022, he visited the units and found his property damaged — damage that, according to him, resulted from large temperature fluctuations at the facility.2 In December 2023, Winslow sued ESS and the district manager of the Malvern facility (Logan Harmon) in the District Court, raising claims for negligence, breach of contract, unfair trade practices, fraud, fraud by deception, and negligent misrepresentation. After discovery, the defendants jointly moved the District Court for summary judgment, and Winslow opposed that motion. On June 5, 2025, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.

II.

Winslow brought this case pursuant to the diversity-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and the District Court predicated its jurisdiction on that basis. “In order to meet the strictures of the diversity statute, complete diversity is required, meaning that at the time the complaint is filed, no party can be a citizen of the same state as any opposing party.” Peace Church Risk Retention Grp. v. Johnson Controls Fire Prot. LP, 49 F.4th 866, 870 (3d Cir. 2022).3 “The burden of demonstrating that a case falls within the jurisdiction of the federal court rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” In re Cmty.

Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Pracs. Litig., 911 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 2018).

Winslow’s pleadings in the District Court did not establish that there is complete diversity of citizenship in this case. Furthermore, although “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the . . . appellate courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1653, the allegations of jurisdiction that Winslow has made on appeal also fail to establish complete diversity of citizenship. Indeed, while his allegations on appeal show that he and ESS are diverse, those allegations do not show diversity between himself and Harmon. However, it does not follow that we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, we may dismiss a dispensable, diversity-destroying party from the case and proceed with the appeal as to the diverse parties. See Zambelli v. Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 421 (3d Cir. 2010). A party is indispensable if he or she has “an interest [in the controversy] of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest[] or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” Id. (quoting Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987)). All parties here agree (and so do we) that Harmon is dispensable.4 Accordingly, we dismiss Harmon from this appeal, and we will proceed to the merits of Winslow’s challenge to the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of ESS.5 III.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although the non-movant’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor in determining whether a genuine factual question exists,” summary judgment should be granted “unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant.” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Winslow raised several causes of action against ESS, and the District Court concluded that ESS was entitled to summary judgment on each of them. Regarding Winslow’s negligence claim, the District Court concluded that this claim was barred by (1) an exculpatory clause in the rental agreement, and (2) the one-year limitations period set forth in that agreement. See Dist. Ct. Op. 5-11.6 As for Winslow’s breach-of-contract claim, the District Court determined that this claim, too, was barred by the rental agreement’s one-year limitations period, and that this claim also failed because “no reasonable juror could find that the [rental agreement] was breached by [ESS’s] alleged failure to provide climate control.” Id. at 11.7 And regarding Winslow’s claims for unfair trade practices, fraud, fraud by deception, and negligent misrepresentation, the District Court explained that “no reasonable juror could find that [Winslow] reasonably relied on any statement by [ESS], as the [rental agreement] states explicitly that Extra Space did not guarantee temperature or humidity ranges.” Id. at 12.

We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision. For substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough and cogent opinion, we will affirm its judgment.8