Robert Allen v. Foxway Transportation Inc

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 24-1340 _____________

ROBERT C. ALLEN as Co-Administrator of the ESTATES OF T.G.A. and Z.D.A.,

Appellant, v.

FOXWAY TRANSPORTATION, INC., TEMPEL STEEL, GATEWAY FREIGHT SYSTEMS INC., and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

COMPANY GATEWAY FREIGHT SYSTEMS INC. v.

DARELENE L. ALLEN ______________

On Appeal from United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D. C. No. 4:21-cv-00156)

District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann

______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

September 19, 2025 Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 26, 2026)

____________________ OPINION* ____________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Robert C. Allen appeals the District Court’s grant of Gateway Freight Systems, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment on Allen’s claims of vicarious liability, negligent selection, and negligent entrustment.1 Allen also challenges the District Court’s exclusion of substantial parts of his expert’s testimony.2

This appeal arises from the tragic loss of Allen’s two children, T.G.A. and Z.D.A., who were killed when a tractor-trailer collided with their mother’s disabled vehicle. We are deeply sympathetic to the loss of two young lives, and we have no reason to doubt that the District Judge shared our concern, despite several inappropriate attempted witticisms, which we discuss in the margin.3 Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we must affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Gateway and the exclusion of Allen’s expert testimony.4

I.

“We review de novo the District Court’s resolution of cross-motions for summary judgment.”5 “Summary judgment is appropriate when, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,’ and thus the movant ‘is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”6

A. Vicarious Liability

Allen argues that the District Court erred in concluding that Gateway was a broker, not a carrier, and thus not a statutory employer of Foxway Transportation, Inc.’s tractor-trailer driver, Volodymyr Frolyak. Gateway could be vicariously liable for Frolyak’s negligence if it was a carrier. Allen contends that the District Court “focus[ed] almost exclusively on Gateway’s self-identification as a broker while disregarding objections they have raised in their briefing, seeking to exclude their opponent’s proffered expert testimony.” Id. at 314.

These attempts at wit are inappropriate given the circumstances of this dispute. We do not doubt that the jurist who decided this case gave it the serious attention that it deserved. But such misguided and ill-conceived attempts at levity could be misinterpreted by others—especially by those in the general public—and lead them to conclude that the opinion is something other than the thorough and well-reasoned opinion we consider it to be. substantial evidence of Gateway’s carrier-like conduct and responsibilities.”7 We disagree.

Motor carrier status is warranted where “an entity accepts responsibility for ensuring the delivery of goods . . . regardless of whether it conducted the physical transportation.”8 Here, Gateway “merely agree[d] to locate and hire [Foxway] to transport the goods,” and was thus “acting as a broker.”9 As the District Court explained, the record does not support a finding that Gateway promised to physically transport the shipment nor that it was otherwise responsible for handling the shipping process, determining the route, or packing the product. Therefore, Gateway was not vicariously liable for Frolyak’s negligence.

B. Negligent Selection

Allen argues that the District Court erred by requiring an employment relationship to sustain a claim for negligent selection. “[W]ith regard to vicarious liability, negligent selection, and retention claims, typically Pennsylvania law limits those claims to a master-servant setting where the defendant directly controls and oversees the activities of the tortfeasor.”10 An employer-employee relationship is a “clear feature” of these three theories of liability.11 Accordingly, a party’s “position as a non-employer renders these negligence claims inviable.”12 Because Gateway did not stand in an employment relationship with Frolyak or Foxway, we must affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to Allen’s negligent selection claim.

C. Negligent Entrustment

Prior to ruling on Allen’s negligent entrustment claim, the District Court assessed the admissibility of the testimony of Allen’s expert, Kenneth Lacey.13 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a substantial portion of Lacey’s expert testimony after concluding that his report was based on an unreliable methodology.14 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.15 and its progeny instruct district court judges to act as “gatekeepers” to ensure that expert testimony satisfies a “trilogy of restrictions”: “qualification, reliability, and fit.”16 Here, the District Court properly concluded that certain of Lacey’s opinions were too speculative to be reliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.17

The District Court then turned to the merits of Allen’s negligent entrustment claim.18 We agree that nothing in the record suggests that Gateway would have known that Foxway was “likely . . . to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others” as required for negligent entrustment under Pennsylvania law, even if Gateway had conducted ongoing safety and compliance data reviews.19 Thus, we must affirm the District Court’s grant of Gateway’s summary judgment motion as to negligent entrustment.

II.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s December 7, 2023 and February 1, 2024 Orders.