Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons
Cases that cite this one
10 later published cases cite this decision.
- Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Association, Inc. (District Court, D. Massachusetts 1976)
- United Artists Records, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp. (N.C. Ct. App. 1973)
- Tempo Music, Inc., Robbins Music Corporation, Remick Music Corporation, and Mills Music, Inc. v. James D. Myers (4th Cir. 1969)
- First Financial Marketing Services Group, Inc. v. Field Promotions, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1968)
- Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1966)
- Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. H. L. Green Company, Inc., and Third Party Jalen Amusement Company, Inc., and Third Party (2d Cir. 1963)
- American League Baseball Club of New York, Inc. v. Pasquel (New York Supreme Court 1946)
- Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Nebraska (United States District Court, Nebraska 1944)
- Eliot v. Geare-Marston, Inc. (District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 1939)
- Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp. (8th Cir. 1939)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
The appellant was defendant 'below, and the appellee was plaintiff, and they will be so styled here. The facts in the case are fully set forth in the opinion of the learned District Judge in 298 F. 470, and need not be repeated. The defendant contends that (1) the plaintiff was not the proper party to maintain the suit; (2) that it had abandoned its right to obtain a copyright; (3) that the infringement was committed by an independent contractor for whose actions the defendant was not responsible; (4) that the part of the copyrighted composition actually played in appellant’s place of amusement did not amount to a performance of it; (5) that it was not performed for profit; (6) that the plaintiff could not sue because, with reference to the copyright in question, it had made itself a party to a conspiracy to violate the Clayton and Sherman Anti-Trust Acts; (7) that under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for $250 in lieu of actual damages; and (8) that defendant could not be required to pay plaintiff’s attorney a counsel fee. It may be said in passing that, if the court below was justified in awarding any counsel fee at all, it is not contended that an excessive allowance was made. Every one of these contentions was fully considered in the opinion below. We are satisfied with the disposition of them there made, and further discussion of any of them is unnecessary. Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.