Spence v. Cole
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Malloy v. Easley (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
- Chase v. McCain (District Court, W.D. Virginia 1963)
- Henderson v. Trailway Bus Company (District Court, E.D. Virginia 1961)
- Ostrander v. Linn (Iowa 1946)
- Grimm v. Co. Comm'rs of Wash. Co. (Md. 1969)
- Whisler v. City of West Plains (8th Cir. 1943)
- State Ex Rel. Edmisten v. Tucker (N.C. 1984)
- Jernigan v. State (N.C. 1971)
- Theodos v. Bossier City (La. 1957)
- Galfas v. City of Atlanta (5th Cir. 1952)
- Sellers v. Johnson (District Court, S.D. Iowa 1946)
- United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Baldwin (United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 1946)
- Kirkman v. Wilmington Trust Co. (United States District Court for the District of Delaware 1945)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from a decree enjoining the Chief of Police of Elizabeth City, N. C., from arresting or interfering with plaintiffs in preaching the Gospel or in distributing booklets, tracts and pamphlets used by them for the purpose of stimulating private Bible study. Plaintiffs are members of the sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were threatened with prosecution by defendant for violating an ordinance of Elizabeth City which declared it to be a nuisance for solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise to go in or upon private residences or premises, without the request or invitation of the owners or occupants, for the purpose of soliciting orders for goods, wares and merchandise or peddling, hawking or disposing of same. The evidence showed that plaintiffs had been going from house to house in the city distributing the pamphlets of their sect and seeking to collect a small sum of money therefor. The judge below held that their activities' did not constitute a violation of the ordinance, but that defendant was attempting to enforce it against them in such way as to violate their constitutional rights. The injunction granted did not enjoin the prosecution of criminal cases already pending in which plaintiffs were being prosecuted for violation of the ordinance, but restrained future prosecutions.
We may assume that the enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiffs under the circumstances here disclosed would constitute a violation of their constitutional rights. Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. -. But it does not follow that plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction granted them below. There was no showing of such irreparable injury as would warrant a court of equity in restraining criminal prosecutions; and there is no reason to think that the state courts would not protect the constitutional rights of plaintiffs upon such prosecutions being in
We are asked to hold that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment establishing their rights. The granting of a declaratory judgment, however, is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court (Ætna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 321); and it is clear that the discretion ought not be exercised in a case of this character where its only effect would be to decide matters, as pointed out in the quotation above, which could be better decided in the criminal courts of the state. This is particularly true in view of the fact that criminal actions are pending against plaintiffs in the state courts involving the identical questions as to which plaintiffs ask a declaratory judgment. See Borchard Declaratory Judgments 2d ed. pp. 312, 653, 1022; Ætna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, supra.
The decree appealed from will accordingly be reversed.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.