The sole issue in this appeal is whether there is an implied right of action available under § 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (as amended by Pub.L. 95-602, Title I, § 122(d), November 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2987). The district court held that there was not.

In agreement with all of the circuits which have considered the issue, we affirm. See Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3 Cir. 1982); Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861 (9 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 178, 74 L.Ed.2d 146 (1982); Davis v. United Airlines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2045, 72 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 1226 (7 Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6 Cir. 1979).

AFFIRMED.