Paul Reinhardt appeals from the district court’s order granting the motion of the defendants, Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company (“Benefit Trust”) and Seaboard Systems Railroad, Inc. (“Seaboard”) to dismiss Reinhardt’s suit brought pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 60 and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985. We affirm.

*495 On November 3 1981 Reinhardt was hired by Benefit Trust to sell insurance policies to members of various unions in cluding employees of Seaboard. While per forming these duties Reinhardt distributed a pamphlet entitled "How to Protect your Rights When Injured on the Job to Sea board employees. The pamphlet contained advice regarding employee rights under FELA. Learning of his actions Seaboard demanded that Benefit Trust discharge Re inhardt. Benefit Trust complied.

On July 3 1986 Reinhardt filed suit against Benefit Trust and Seaboard con tending that both companies had violated � 60 of FELA 1 and � 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed the suit concluding inter alia that the conduct which prompted Reinhardt's dis missal was not protected activity under � 60. The district court also found that neither Benefit Trust nor Seaboard was a proper defendant in a � 60 violation suit involving the conduct of an employee of an insurance company.

In this appeal Reinhardt argues that the district court erred in concluding that only common carriers violate � 60 of FELA and that � 60 is violated only where (a) the defendant common carrier disciplines its own employee and (b) such employee was engaged in distributing factual information relating to a specific common carrier acci dent. Reinhardt also contends that the court erred in dismissing his � 1985 claim for lack of racial animus.

We cannot agree that the district court erred in dismissing the FELA claim. This claim was dismissed in part because the activity that prompted Reinhardt's dis charge was not activity that was protected by � 60. Section 60 prohibits the discipline of an individual who engages in "furnish ing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the inju ry or death of any employee." Rather than furnishing facts related to a specific acci dent Reinhardt had distributed information describing general legal rights. 2

We also find no error in the district court's dismissal of appellant's claim brought pursuant to � 1985 of the Civil Rights Act. Reinhardt asserts that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to deny him his freedom of speech rights un der the First Amendment. Although the Supreme Court.held in Griffin v. Breckenridge 403 U.S. 88 91 S.Ct. 1790 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) that § can be used to reach conspiracies of private individuals it may do so only where there are allega tions of racial or class-based discriminatory animus. There were no such allegations in this case.

For the foregoing reasons we according ly affirm.

AFFIRMED.