Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
The dispositive issue presented in this case is whether the district court, 650 F.Supp. 1378 correctly concluded that appellants’ general partnership interests in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited are not securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws. We hold that these interests are not securities, and affirm.
The appellate record indicates that the Virginia general partnership, Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited (“RTU”), was formed in August 1982 when twenty-three parties executed an agreement for the purpose of forming a general partnership, “which will acquire, own, lease and operate multi-pur-pose fishing vessels and otherwise engage in the commercial fishing business....” (App. at 1535). At some point, not disclosed by the record, Joseph W. May, M.D. also joined the partnership.
The district court treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. It found that the plaintiffs’ general partnership interests were not securities and therefore it dismissed their federal claims.
I
The language of the district court, in dismissing the appellants’ complaint, was somewhat ambiguous. Therefore we consider first the legal basis for the action taken by the district court. The Supreme Court has held that when the contested basis for jurisdiction is also an element of the plaintiff’s federal claim, the claim should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). When the claim is neither immaterial nor insubstantial, the proper course of action is for the district court to accept jurisdiction and address the objection as an attack on the merits. Id. Whether a particular interest is a “security” is both a question of subject matter jurisdiction and an element of appellants’ asserted claims under the federal securities laws. See Futura Development Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 38 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 121 (1985); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1984); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981). Moreover, the federal claims asserted by appellants are neither immaterial nor insubstantial. Despite its technically incorrect statement that “the case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction,” the court considered the security issue as though it were the basis of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim that had been converted into a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly accepted jurisdiction over these claims and considered them on the merits.
II
A
In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d
B
We address first appellants’ claim that their interests in the RTU partnership were investment contracts, and therefore were securities within the meaning of the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has defined an investment contract as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party....” Securities & Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 1102-03, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946). The critical issue on this appeal is whether appellants’ general partnership interests in RTU meet the third prong of the Howey test — that is, the expectation of profits derived solely from the efforts of others.
... a partnership can be an investment contract only when the partners are so dependent on a particular manager that they cannot replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate control.
Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
We agree with the Fifth Circuit, as well as the other circuits that appear to have embraced the Williamson reasoning,
C
The RTU Partnership Agreement confers broad authority on the partners to manage and control the business. It provides that the partnership can be dissolved by a concurrence of 60% in interest of the partners. (App. at 1536). It also states that, “Concurrence of sixty percent (60%) in interest of the partners should be required with respect to policy and management decisions on [sic] the partnership business_” (App. at 1538). Policy and management decisions include: (i) the power to sell and convey, lease, mortgage, or encumber partnership assets; (ii) the power to borrow or lend sums on behalf of the partnership when in excess of $5000; (iii) the power to hire agents to manage or operate the business of the partnership; (iv) and the power to appoint a successor to the managing partner named in the agreement. Id. Moreover, at all times, each partner has reasonable access to the partnership’s books of account and has the right to demand an audit of the partnership. (App. at 1540). Unanimous consent of the partners is required to transfer legal ownership of partnership interests, id., and additional partners can be added only with the unanimous consent of the partners.
As the district court found, the express powers granted to the partners are sufficient, on their face, to give them the authority to manage their investments. Normally, such authority renders unnecessary the protection of the federal securities laws. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that, “[a]n investor who has the ability to control the profitability of his investment, either by his own efforts or by majority vote in group ventures, is not dependent upon the managerial skills of others.” Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 1188, 75 L.Ed.2d 434 (1983). In this case, the partners not only had the authority under the agreement to manage the business, they exercised this authority and demonstrated that they were not dependent on the irreplaceable skills of others.
The real gravamen of appellants’ complaint lies in common law fraud. As previously mentioned, the securities laws were not intended to be a substitute for state fraud actions. We affirm the district court’s finding that appellants’ partnership interests are not securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
The final issue we address
IV
The decision of the district court granting summary judgment on the federal claims and dismissing the state law claims is—
AFFIRMED.
. Appellees’ brief states that there were 25 partners in RTU. The Partnership Agreement exhibited at pages 1535-46 of the Joint Appendix contains the names of only 23 partners, including the GMS partnership. The Mutual Release Agreement signed by all the partners contains only 24 partners (Joseph May’s name was added). It may be that appellees have included the individual partners of the GMS partnership in the total number of partners in the RTU partnership. This discrepancy is immaterial to the outcome of the case.
. Use of the phrase “external managers” refers to the employment of individuals who were not necessarily members of the partnership to manage and maintain the partnership’s fishing boats. “Internal manager” or "managing partner” refers to the partner or partners responsible for carrying out policy and management decisions made by the partners.
. In an alternative holding, the district court found that the "Mutual Release Agreement” signed by the plaintiffs was dispositive of all plaintiffs’ asserted claims.
. In SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S.Ct. 117, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973) the Ninth Circuit held that the term "solely" should not be given a literal construction. A more liberal interpretation of the term solely, as used in Howey, has been adopted by eight additional circuits. See, e.g., SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 61 (1984); SECv. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 568, 74 L.Ed.2d 931 (1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1982); Baurer v. Planning Group Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 779 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976). In light of the Supreme Court’s statements that economic reality is to govern over form in determining what is a "security,” we agree that the term solely—used in Howey—must not be given a literal construction in all circumstances. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2058, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975).
. Appellants argue that Williamson would characterize a general partnership interest as a security when the partners cannot replace a particular manager with themselves. This is incorrect. The court in Williamson was careful to qualify its language by stating that a manager is irreplaceable only when the partners are, "incapable, within reasonable limits, of finding a replacement manager." 645 F.2d at 425.
. See, e.g., Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567 (9th Cir. 1987); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1983); Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203, 103 S.Ct. 1188, 75 L.Ed.2d 434 (1983). But see, Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir.) (Opinion of Garth, J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 61 (1984). Judge Garth, in an interesting opinion, concluded that in view of the powers expressly conferred on general partners by New Jersey law, he would hold that a partnership interest could not be considered a security as a matter of law. In view of the broad powers conferred by the RTU partnership agreement, we have no occasion to consider the effect of Virginia law. See infra note 8.
. If and to the extent that Williamson and other cases may be read to require a court to look to the actual knowledge and business expertise of each partner in order to assess his or her individual ability intelligently to exercise the power of a general partner, we do not agree. Such an inquiry would undercut the strong presumption that an interest in a general partnership is not a security. It also would unduly broaden the scope of the Supreme Court’s instruction that courts must examine the economic reality of partnership interests. See infra note 10. We note that no such specific argument is made in this case. Appellants’ complaint and briefs properly speak only in terms of the rights and authority of the partners as a group.
. In addition to the terms of the partnership agreement, Virginia law provides that, subject to any agreement between the parties, all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership, Va.Code Ann. § 50-18(e) (1986); no persons can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all partners; id. at § 50 — 18(g); and that no act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without consent of all the partners, id. at § 50-18(h). Moreover, section 50-19 of the Virginia Code provides that "every partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of [the partnership's books],” and section 50-24 of the Virginia Code provides that included among the property rights of a partner are, “his right to participate in the management.” See supra note 6.
. This is not a case like SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. where the, "individual development of the plots of land that [were] offered and sold would seldom be economically feasible due to their small size," and therefore investors were, in reality, unable to exercise individual management and control over their plots of land. 328 U.S. at 300, 66 S.Ct. at 1103. The general partners of RTU all had a realistic opportunity to manage, control and supervise the operation of the partnership through the exercise of substantial partnership powers. In fact, the record indicates that many of the partners, to a varying extent, have done just that. See, e.g., App. at 509-514, 1316— 17, 1553-54, 1555, 1564-65, 1570 for examples of partner participation.
. The fact that some of the general partners may have remained passive or lacked financial sophistication or business expertise does not affect the result. General partners who are capable of exercising significant managerial powers cannot convert their partnership interests into a security merely by remaining passive. See supra p. 240-41. Moreover, members of a general partnership who lack financial sophistication or business expertise nevertheless may exercise intelligently the powers conferred on them by the partnership agreement and state law. They are entitled to receive financial reports and have the right to inspect and obtain copies of partnership books and records. See supra note 8. To the extent a partner needs advice or assistance in the exercise of his powers, he is of course free to consult with more knowledgeable partners or third persons, or to employ accountants and lawyers. In a word, a general partner is not dependent only on the degree of his own business sophistication in order to exercise intelligently his partnership powers.
. Appellants argue that because the court limited discovery on the issue of whether their interests were securities, they could not address such questions as to what representations were made to them with respect to their expected level of involvement, the character of their investment, and the expertise of the managers. Therefore, they argue it was improper to grant summary judgment based on the present record. This argument is not persuasive. The representations made to the appellants about their invest
. Because our holding with respect to the proper characterization of appellants’ general partnership interests is dispositive of the court’s dismissal of the federal claims, it is unnecessary to consider the validity of the Mutual Release Agreement.
. See supra p. 239.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- RIVANNA TRAWLERS UNLIMITED, a Virginia general partnership Bruce H. Cabell Waldemar G. Dahl Joseph W. May Charles W. Miller John R. Morris, Jr. Mary M. Riviere Colin Rosse Eleanor K. Spaar Phil Speasmaker Thomas L. Schildwachter Wesley A. Volk Joan Volk Benjamin H. Word, Jr. John K. Youel, Jr. Donald T. Zimmerman, and Charles R. Borchardt David F. Cooke John R. Morris, III GMS Partnership Joe H. Gieck Frank C. McCue, III v. THOMPSON TRAWLERS, INC. T-Craft Boat Company Thompson Management, Inc. Beeline Seafoods, Inc. Worrell Newspapers, Inc. Vessel Sales Corporation Thomas E. Worrell, Jr. Walter B. Salley Walter B. Salley, Jr. Salley, Weissinger & Co. Joseph C. Palumbo
- Cited By
- 53 cases
- Status
- Published