Weinstein v. University of SC

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Weinstein v. University of SC

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1584

RAYMOND M. WEINSTEIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA; WILLIAM J. HOUSE, individually and in his official capacity as Dean of the College of Social Sciences and Professions with USC- Aiken; TRUDY K. HENSON, individually and in her official capacity as Chair of the Depart- ment of Sociology with USC-Aiken; BLANCHE L. PREMO-HOPKINS, individually and in her offi- cial capacity as Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs with USC-Aiken; ROBERT E. ALEXANDER, individually and in his official capacity as Chancellor with USC-Aiken; JOHN M. PALMS, individually and in his official capacity as President of the University of South Carolina,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge. (CA-94-321-3-23BC)

Submitted: October 17, 1996 Decided: October 23, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Raymond M. Weinstein, Appellant Pro Se. Vance J. Bettis, GIGNIL- LIAT, SAVITZ & BETTIS, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting sum-

mary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the grounds that Appel-

lant's claims are barred by the principles of res judicata. We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinion adopting the

report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. Weinstein v. University of South Carolina, No.

CA-94-321-3-23BC (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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Reference

Status
Unpublished