UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5090

ALBERT DELON REED, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge. (CR-94-383)

Submitted: October 8, 1996

Decided: November 1, 1996

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Domenick J. Porco, Scarsdale, New York, for Appellant. Margaret Seymour, United States Attorney, Alfred W. Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina; Thomas E. Booth, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Albert Delon Reed, Jr., appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of 193 grams of cocaine base and 441 grams of mari- juana with intent to distribute. We affirm.

Reed raises three issues in his appeal. First he asserts that the dis- trict court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence found in his van during a police search. In support of this claim, Reed argues that the officers lacked probable cause to conduct their search. We find that, when viewing the totality of the circumstances sur- rounding the search, there was a "fair probability" that drugs would be found in Reed's van. Illinois v. Gates,

(1983). Accordingly, we find that the search was supported by probable cause. See

Reed next claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the district court's refusal to grant him a continuance to secure alternative counsel denied him a fair trial. To the extent that Reed seeks to attack the effectiveness of his counsel, we find that ineffectiveness is not clear from the record. Accordingly, the proper forum for such a claim would be through a motion brought under

(1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,

Stat. 1214. To the extent that Reed seeks to use this claim to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant him a continuance, we find no abuse of discretion.

Reed's final claim is that his sentence--life imprisonment without parole under

(b)(1)(A) (1994)--was so disproportion- ate to his offense--a third drug felony involving 193 grams of cocaine base and 441 grams of marijuana--that it constitutes a viola- tion of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment

2 Clause. We have reviewed this claim under the guidelines set forth in Solem v. Helm,

(1983), and find that the sentence is not so disproportionate to the offense to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Accordingly we affirm Reed's conviction and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten- tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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