Folks v. Catoe

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Folks v. Catoe

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6820

RODERICK DENNIS FOLKS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM D. CATOE, Deputy Commissioner of Operations, South Carolina Department of Cor- rections; C. J. CEPAK, Warden, Broad River Correctional Institution, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-96-594-2-20AJ)

Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 25, 1997

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roderick Dennis Folks, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Frederick Lindemann, ELLIS, LAWHORNE, DAVIDSON & SIMS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on

his

42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994) complaint. Appellant claims that he was

denied due process when he was placed in maximum security following

a prison riot, and that his placement in maximum security consti-

tuted cruel and unusual punishment. We find that Appellant failed to establish a liberty interest in remaining in the general pop-

ulation because he did not show that the conditions in maximum

security are atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472

, 484- 86 (1995); Beverati v. Smith,

120 F.3d 500, 504

(4th Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, he was not entitled to a hearing or other process

prior to his placement in maximum security. Furthermore, Appel-

lant's second claim fails because the mere fact of segregated confinement, without more, does not amount to cruel and unusual

punishment. See Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections,

529 F.2d 854, 861

(4th Cir. 1975). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-

sional process.

AFFIRMED

2

Reference

Status
Unpublished