Parks v. Lens Crafters Inc
Parks v. Lens Crafters Inc
Opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
DIANNE G. PARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-1551
LENS CRAFTERS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-97-3668-1-6-BD)
Submitted: April 10, 2000
Decided: September 13, 2000
Before MURNAGHAN,* NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
John D. Watkins, WATKINS & WATKINS, P.C., Augusta, Georgia, for Appellant. Deborah S. Adams, FROST & JACOBS, L.L.P., Cin- cinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________
*Judge Murnaghan was assigned to the panel in this case but died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to
28 U.S.C. S 46(d). Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Dianne G. Parks sued her employer alleging that she was denied promotions and pay raises because of her race in violation of
42 U.S.C. S 1981(1994). The district court, accepting the magistrate judge's recommendation, granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Parks could not proceed under S 1981 because she was an at-will employee.
After the magistrate judge's recommendation, upon which the dis- trict court relied, this court held that an at-will employee could prevail on a S 1981 claim. See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass,
165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that at-will employment rela- tionship is sufficiently contractual to serve as a predicate contract for purposes of a S 1981 action). Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court's opinion because it is inconsistent with this court's opinion in Spriggs. We do not, however, express any opinion regard- ing alternative grounds for either granting or denying the employer's motion for summary judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten- tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
2
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished