UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PETER COBURGER,  Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee,  No. 00-1449

and CENTRAL ATLANTIC TOYOTA DISTRIBUTORS, INCORPORATED, Defendant.  Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge. (CA-99-1405-JFM)

Submitted: October 5, 2000

Decided: October 23, 2000

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Daniel Leonard Shea, BRAULT, GRAHAM, SCOTT & BRAULT, L.L.C., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Emmett F. McGee, Jr., 2 COBURGER v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A.

PIPER, MARBURY, RUDNICK & WOLFE, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland; S. Keith Hutto, Steven A. McKelvey, Jr., NELSON, MUL- LINS, RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, L.L.P., Columbia, South Caro- lina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Peter Coburger appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg- ment to Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Incorporated, and the dismissal of his complaint alleging abusive discharge under Maryland law. Coburger contends that his termination from employment violated a clear mandate of public policy. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Higgins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

(4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986).

We agree with the district court that Coburger failed to "‘demon- strate the [public] policy in question with clarity, specificity and authority.’" (J.A. at 319) (quoting Adler v. American Standard Corp.,

(Md. 1981)) (alteration added). We also agree that Coburger failed to demonstrate that he was terminated because he refused to engage in conduct violating a clear mandate of public pol- icy or because he intended to comply with a statutorily prescribed duty to report the unlawful activity.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately COBURGER v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A. 3

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED