OPINION

Oliver M. Armstrong appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release. In 1999, Armstrong was released from incarceration and began serving a term of supervised release imposed pursuant to his 1995 conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). In 2000, Armstrong’s probation officer moved to revoke Armstrong’s supervised release based on criminal conduct that included driving while his license was revoked and for the threat, assault, and false imprisonment of his girlfriend, Margaret McClease.

At the revocation hearing, the district court heard testimony that revealed the stormy and violent relationship between Armstrong and McClease. The district court disbelieved Armstrong’s version of events and sentenced him to thirty months incarceration. On appeal, Armstrong asserts the district court abused its discretion by limiting Armstrong’s questioning of McClease and hindering his efforts to show her bias.

We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion. District court judges have wide discretion to determine the relevance of offered testimony, and these determinations are not disrupted save in extraordinary circumstances. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n. 2 (4th Cir. 1984)). We will not review the district court’s findings regarding the witnesses’ credibility. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Armstrong’s supervised release. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.