OPINION

Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest Virginia, Incorporated and Hugh F. O’Donnell, its executive director (collectively, “CCLS”), appeal an order of the district court granting judgment in favor of the Legal Services Corporation and two of its officers (collectively, “the LSC”) on CCLS’s claims that various actions by the LSC exceeded its statutory and regulatory authority. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Congress has not authorized judicial review of these claims. We therefore vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss.

I.

In 1974, Congress enacted the Legal Service Corporation Act (“LSCA”), which created the LSC for the purpose of providing legal assistance to indigent people in civil matters. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996 (West 1994). The LSC does not itself *181 provide legal services, but rather grants federal funds to legal services programs across the country. CCLS, which provides legal services to indigent people in the coalfields region of southwestern Virginia, has been an LSC grantee since 1980.

This litigation involves CCLS’s challenge to certain actions taken by the LSC in connection with the LSC’s consolidation of services areas (undertaken as a cost-cutting measure) and implementation of a competitive bidding program for grant money. Following a bench trial, the district court rejected CCLS’s claims on the merits.

II.

In our recent decision in Regional Management Corp. v. Legal Services Corp., 186 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 1999), we concluded that a decision by the LSC regarding certain lobbying practices by grant recipients was not subject to judicial review in an action by a lender claiming injury as a result of such lobbying. See Reg’l Mgmt., 186 F.3d at 461-64. First, we concluded that the LSC is not a federal agency for purposes of judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act. See id. at 462. Second, we held that the LSCA did not explicitly authorize a private right of action against the LSC. See id. Finally, we determined that “there [was] no basis for finding that Congress intended to create an implied private right of action” against the LSC. Id.

In determining that Congress did not implicitly establish a right of action, we considered the four factors set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted): (1) whether “the plaintiff [is] one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted”; (2) whether “there [is] any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one”; (3) whether “it [is] consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy”; and (4) whether “the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.” We determined that the first Cort factor was controlling: Lenders affected by the lobbying activities of LSC grantees were not “part of any special class to be benefitted by” the LSCA. Reg’l Mgmt., 186 F.3d at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we noted that Congress specifically intended the LSCA to benefit “indigents who have legal grievances but who are unable to afford the legal means necessary to redress them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The reasoning of Regional Management is controlling here. As we held in Regional Management, the LSCA was intended by Congress for the “especial benefit” of indigent persons in need of legal services. Although legal services programs such as CCLS are an integral part of the process of delivering those services, the programs themselves are not the beneficiaries of the Act. Because CCLS is not part of the class Congress sought to benefit in enacting the LSCA, we must conclude that Congress did not intend to imply a private cause of action by CCLS to challenge the LSC’s exercise of its statutory and regulatory duties. *

*182 III.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court was without authority to review the actions of the LSC. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss.

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.