OPINION

The City of Charleston, South Carolina (“the City”) appeals an order of the district court holding it in contempt for violating a settlement agreement with a group of fire fighters (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”). The City contends that its actions resulting in the contempt finding were permissible under the agreement. We affirm.

I.

In 1996, the Plaintiffs sued the City, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Among other claims, the Plaintiffs contended that the City had unlawfully classified fire department captains as exempt from FLSA requirements. After the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, the parties resolved the remaining issues through a settlement agreement (“the Agreement”). As is relevant here, the Agreement provided that “[t]he positions of fire fighter, driver or engineer, and captain shall be considered non-exempt under the FLSA.” 1 J.A. 176. The district court approved this settlement and entered judgment accordingly on July 2, 1998.

On March 22, 1999, the City revised its position descriptions and reclassified all fire captains as exempt from FLSA requirements. The Plaintiffs moved for contempt sanctions, alleging that this reclassification violated the Agreement. The district court found the City in contempt and ordered it .to reinstate the fire captains’ non-exempt status, compensate the fire captains for overtime payments that had been denied since March 22, and pay the Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. This appeal followed. 2

II.

The central issue on appeal is whether the Agreement allows the City to unilaterally modify its employment rules in a manner inconsistent with the Agreement. We hold that the City may not deviate from the Agreement except with the consent of the Plaintiffs or through action of the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

*138 In interpreting a settlement agreement, we are “guided by general rules of contract construction.” Gilbert v. Monsanto Co., 216 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we “must first resort to the contract language to determine the intention of the parties.” FDIC v. Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1995). We will consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent only if the contractual language and the canons of interpretation yield an ambiguous result. See id.

Here, we find it unnecessary to look beyond the plain language of the Agreement. The Agreement expressly provides that the “position[ ] of ... captain shall be considered non-exempt under the FLSA.” J.A. 176. Thus, classifying fire captains as FLSA-exempt contravenes the Agreement.

The City contends, however, that the Agreement authorizes it to revise its employment policies, essentially without limitation. In so arguing, the City relies on the common law principle that contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at will. See Ctr. State Farms v. Campbell Soup Co., 58 F.3d 1030, 1032 (4th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); id. at 1039 (Hamilton, Circuit Judge, dissenting) (collecting cases). As the district court noted, however, it would be inequitable to allow the City to invoke this principle because the Plaintiffs have no power to terminate the Agreement; and, when the Plaintiffs entered into the Agreement they irrevocably forfeited substantial claims.

More importantly, the language of the Agreement prevents the City from withdrawing at will. The Agreement provides that the district court “will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing compliance,” J.A. 178, thereby ceding power over amendments and terminations to the district court. This is consistent with the nature of the Agreement. By submitting to the continuing jurisdiction of the district court, the parties implicitly accepted the ordinary rules governing settlement agreements and consent decrees. Under these rules, a party wishing to modify the terms of an agreement must apply to the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The district court, in turn, enjoys broad discretion to determine whether the proposed modification is warranted. See Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 768-69 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Under the Agreement, these procedures must be followed in order for the City to modify its classification of the fire captains. 3

III.

Because the City violated the Agreement by reclassifying the fire captains without approval from the district court, the district court properly held the City in contempt. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.