OPINION

Larry Demetric Parker pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000), and was sentenced to 110 months imprisonment. Parker appeals his sentence, contending that the district court erred in finding that Parker’s possession of the firearm facilitated or potentially facilitated another felony offense, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2000). We affirm.

Parker was arrested after he sold heroin to an informant under surveillance. In a search of his apartment, authorities found more heroin and a firearm. Parker gave a statement in which he said he knew that, as a convicted felon, he could not possess a firearm, but that he needed the gun for protection. The government also produced evidence at the sentencing hearing that Parker had sold heroin from his home on occasion. In sentencing Parker, the district court determined that he had possessed the firearm in connection with drug trafficking, another felony, and that the sentence enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) was appropriate.

The government has the burden of showing facts necessary to establish the applicability of an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) by a preponderance of the evidence, and the district court’s fact findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Garnett, 243 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2001). This court has held that the terms “used” and “in connection with,” as used in subsection (b)(5), are analogous to the terms “used” and “in relation to” in 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000). Id. (extending holding in United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1003 & n. 3 (4th Cir. 1996) to § 2K2.1(b)(5)). A firearm may be used in connection with another felony if it “facilitates or has a tendency to facilitate the felony offense.” Garnett, 243 F.3d at 829 (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 237, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993)).

Parker argues that there was no evidence to support the court’s finding that his firearm facilitated or potentially facilitated his drug offense. However, the district court found that Parker’s drug of *158 fense was facilitated by his possession of the firearm in that he kept it to protect himself and his drugs. Parker’s statement that he needed the gun for protection provides factual support for the district court’s finding. Thus, we cannot say that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. See United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that weapons, such as firearms, are tools of the drug trade).

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.