OPINION

Lewis Dean Gibson appeals from his jury conviction and resulting life sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for re-sentencing. Gibson argues on appeal that his conviction and sentence violated the principles of due process in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).

To the extent that Gibson argues that under Apprendi it was error to increase his sentence for possession of a firearm, a leadership role, and adding criminal history points for a state conviction, when those facts were not charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, his claims are without merit. Apprendi held that, other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases the statutory maximum must be charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Because the state offense, which added criminal histoiy points, is a prior conviction, it need not be charged in the indictment.

Sentencing enhancements that do not increase the statutory maximum do not implicate Apprendi. United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 199-201 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 1393, 149 L.Ed.2d 316 (2001). The firearm enhancement, role adjustment, and additional criminal history points did not increase the statutory maximum in Gibson’s case. Therefore, no error occurred, and we affirm this part of the sentence.

We find plain error in regard to Gibson’s sentence, vacate his sentence, and remand to the district court for re-sentencing. Under Apprendi, drug quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, and failure to charge a specific drug quantity in the indictment and to submit the quantity issue to the jury constitutes plain error. United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and to submit the issue to the jury also “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” such that we should exercise our discretion to recognize the error. Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

The district court sentenced Gibson to a term of imprisonment that exceeded the twenty-year maximum penalty provided *130 for a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West 1999) based upon an “ ‘identifiable but unspecified quantity’ ” of cocaine base. Cotton, 261 F.3d at 404 (quoting Promise, 255 F.3d at 156). By sentencing Gibson to a term greater than twenty years, the district court sentenced Gibson for a crime for which he was neither indicted nor convicted. See id. Under Apprendi, the “indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Drug quantity was not noted in Gibson’s indictment, the court’s jury instructions, or the jury’s verdict form. We therefore conclude that under Cotton, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing Gibson for a crime with which he was never charged or convicted. For that reason, we vacate Gibson’s sentence and remand to the district court for re-sentencing in light of Apprendi and Cotton to a sentence that does not exceed twenty years. We affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects. We grant the Appellant’s motion to add an additional volume of the trial transcript and the district court docket sheet to the joint appendix. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions of the parties are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED