OPINION

Leon Ballentine appeals the eighteen-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his supervised release. We affirm.

Ballentine conceded at his revocation proceeding that he had committed the charged Grade C supervised release violations. The district court then revoked his release. The court acknowledged that Ballentine’s guideline range under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 7B1.3, p.s., 7B1.4, p.s. (2000) was seven to thirteen months. However, the court imposed an eighteen-month sentence, less than the statutory maximum of twenty-four months to which Ballentine was subject. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000). The court imposed the sentence because of Bal-lentine’s prior criminal history, prior conduct, and conduct on supervised release.

Ballentine’s argument on appeal is that the district court gave insufficient reasons for the sentence imposed. Because Bal-lentine did not raise this claim at the revocation proceeding, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

We have held that “Chapter 7’s policy statements are ... non-binding, advisory guides to district courts in supervised release proceedings.” United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). A district court therefore may exercise its discretion and sentence a defendant, whose release has been revoked and who is subject to incarceration, to a prison term outside the recommended guideline range set forth in USSG § 7B1.4, p.s., up to the applicable statutory maximum. Id. Further, a sentence outside the recommended range does not constitute a departure that might warrant a detailed explanation for the sentence imposed. Id. at 642 n. 15. *161 Here, the district court committed no error under the guidelines when sentencing Ballentine.

See generally id. at 642 (stating “court need not engage in ritualistic incantation in order to establish its consideration of a legal issue”).

We are also satisfied that the district court adequately addressed the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000). When imposing a sentence, the district court is not obligated “to make specific findings with respect to any or all of the factors listed in ... § 3553(a).” United States v. Velasquez, 136 F.3d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1998).

We therefore affirm Ballentine’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not significantly aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.