OPINION

Melvin Antonio Burl, a Virginia prisoner, appeals his conviction and sentence for drug trafficking offenses. Burl raises three issues on appeal: whether the district court properly denied his Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), challenge to jury selection, whether the district court improperly commented on the evidence during jury instructions, and (in his pro se brief) whether his sentence was plainly erroneous under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Finding no reversible error, we now affirm.

I.

Melvin Burl was discovered to possess a loaded handgun and cocaine base pursuant to a lawful traffic stop and a lawful search. The indictment specifies that Burl possessed five grams of cocaine base. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Burl was sentenced to a total of 316 months imprisonment.

II.

A party alleging a Batson violation must make a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712; United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1989). The burden then shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The explanation need not be persuasive or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). A district court’s findings on a Batson challenge necessarily involve credibility determinations; therefore, its findings will be given great deference and will *277 be reversed only for clear error. Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 1995).

The district court provided sufficient findings to demonstrate that it believed the Batson challenge to be meritless and that it found the Government’s race-neutral reason acceptable. We defer to the district court’s determination of credibility and find no error. Accordingly, the district court’s rejection of Burl’s Batson claim is affirmed.

III.

In charging the jury, the trial judge is not limited to the rote recitation of instructions, but may “explain! ] and comment! ] upon the evidence, by drawing [the jury’s] attention to the parts of it which he thinks important, and he may express his opinion upon the facts.” Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933). This court has held it is “particularly vital that the trial judge also instruct the jurors that his comments are not binding upon them, but are only personal views expressed for the purposes of assisting them, and that they are the sole judges of the evidence.” United States v. Tello, 707 F.2d 85, 88 (4th Cir. 1983).

The district court offered both summary commentary and the required statement about the non-binding nature of his comments to the jury. We find the district court’s commentary did not render Burl’s trial unfair. Therefore, we dismiss Burl’s second claim.

IV.

Burl filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental pro se brief and a pro se brief arguing that his sentence was plainly erroneous under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). While we grant Burl’s motion to file a supplemental pro se brief and we fully consider his arguments, we conclude, under the particular facts of this case, that any error did not affect Burl’s substantial rights. See United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 252-53 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Simms v. United States, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 633, — L.Ed.3d - (2001); United States v. White, 238 F.3d 537, 543 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 2235, 150 L.Ed.2d 225 (2001). Accordingly, we affirm Burl’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.