OPINION

Anthony Jones appeals the sixty-month sentence he received after he pled guilty to aiding and abetting interstate travel to facilitate a conspiracy to distribute crack, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952(a)(3) (West 2000). He contends that, at sentencing, the district court incorrectly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining the amount of drugs attributable to the underlying offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2E1.2, 2D1.1 (2000). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Jones contends that, if the district court had found him to be a credible witness at sentencing, his,base offense level would have been twelve instead of thirty-four. Relying on United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), Jones asserts that the court should have used the clear and convincing standard because it increased his base offense level by twenty-two levels. We disagree.

This court has consistently held that “facts relevant to a sentencing determination need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (4th Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 39, 151 L.Ed.2d 12 (2001). In addition, the resolution of the disputed amount of drugs turned on the district court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses at the sentencing hearing, and we conclude that the court’s determination was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1992).

Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.