OPINION

Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. (M & D) appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Duck Head Footwear (Duck Head), on Duck Head’s claim for damages resulting from *694 the loss of several thousand pairs of shoes that Duck Head had hired M & D to ship from Norfolk, Virginia to Lynchburg, Virginia. The district court found that M & D was liable to Duck Head under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(a)(1) (West 1997), which creates presumptions relating to carrier liability for goods damaged or lost during interstate shipment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

This appeal concerns a container of shoes that Duck Head arranged to have shipped from Santos, Brazil, to Norfolk, Virginia in January of 1999. Duck Head, a footwear distributor, purchased 644 cartons, containing 7,773 pairs of shoes, from suppliers in Brazil and had them collected by Capital Corporation 1 at Capital’s warehouse in Brazil. Capital placed the shoes in a shipping container, which it then inspected and weighed, determining that its total loaded weight was 12,928 kg. The shoes and cartons weighed 9,128 kg and the container itself 3,800 kg. Capital then sealed the container with two seals bearing individualized numbers. 2 The container was shipped by truck from Capital’s warehouse to Santos, Brazil, where it was loaded onto a ship, the M/V ZIM SAO PAULO (the Zim Sao Paulo), for transport to the United States. (J.A. at 137.)

Brazilian customs officials inspected the container when it was loaded onto the ship. They found that the seals were intact and confirmed that the container weighed 12,-928 kg. Capital issued a series of bills of lading 3 on January 4, 1999, indicating the weight of the shipment and its contents.

The Zim Sao Paulo, operated by DSR Senator Lines (DSR), arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, on February 1,1999. M & D, the trucking company hired to transport the shoes from the port in Norfolk to Duck Head’s warehouse in Lynchburg, Virginia, picked up the shoes on that date, issuing a bill of lading. This bill of lading noted the weight of the container’s contents (the shoes) as 20,124 pounds, 4 but M & D did not actually weigh the container or the shoes to arrive at this figure. An M & D driver picked up the shipment in Norfolk on February 1 and drove it to an M & D storage facility for the night. This driver noted that the container still had two intact seals.

The next day, a second M & D driver picked up the container for transport to Lynchburg, Virginia. The second driver delivered the container to Duck Head’s Lynchburg facility on February 2. Upon its arrival in Lynchburg, a Duck Head employee, Tyrone Morton, opened the container, breaking both seals (which, the parties agree, appeared intact). According to his signed affidavit, Morton noticed imme *695 diately upon opening the container that three cartons of shoes were damaged, and noted that fact on the bill of lading when accepting delivery. Morton stated in his affidavit that he did not, however, inspect the container’s entire contents until after accepting delivery. Morton further stated that upon completing an inspection of the container’s contents, he found that 264 cartons, containing 3,180 pairs of shoes, or nearly half the total of pairs of shoes that were supposed to be in the container, were missing. 5

Duck Head instituted this lawsuit on January 21, 2000, seeking $93,000 in damages as compensation for the lost shoes. Duck Head initially sued Capital, DSR, and M & D. DSR was dismissed from the suit. Thereafter, all three remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Duck Head against M & D and to Capital against Duck Head, and denied M & D’s motion for summary judgment. M & D noted this appeal.

II.

We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Duck Head de novo, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to M & D, the non-moving party. See American Legion Post 7 of Durham, N.C. v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601, 605 (4th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A mere scintilla of proof is not sufficient to prevent summary judgment, however; the question is “not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party” resisting summary judgment. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505. M & D advances two principal arguments before us, which we address in turn. 6

*696 A.

First, M & D argues that the district court erred in applying the Carmack Amendment to Duck Head’s motion for summary judgment. The Carmack Amendment states in relevant part that

A carrier providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under sub-chapter I or III of chapter 135 shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this part. That carrier and any other carrier that delivers the property and is providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I or III of chapter 135 or chapter 105 are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United States or from a place in the United States to a place in an adjacent foreign country when transported under a through bill of lading.... Failure to issue a receipt or bill of lading does not affect the liability of a carrier. A delivering carrier is deemed to be the carrier performing the line-haul transportation nearest the destination but does not include a carrier providing only a switching service at the destination.

49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(a)(1). This section “makes a carrier hable for the actual loss or injury to the property it transports.” Ward v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 231 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Amendment preempts a shipper’s state and common law claims against a carrier for loss or damage to goods during shipment. See id. at 705.

The Carmack Amendment states that it governs transactions covered by “subchapter I or III of chapter 135” of Title 49. Section 13501 of Title 49, which appears in subchapter I, covers “transportation by motor carrier ... between a place in ... the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 13501(1)(E) (West 1997). Where a separate bill of lading is issued to cover the domestic leg of a shipment of foreign goods to a place in the United States, the Amendment covers that domestic leg. Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 799 F.2d 697, 701 (11th Cir. 1986) (“when a shipment of foreign goods is sent to the United States with the intention that it come to final rest at a specific destination beyond its port of discharge, then the domestic leg of the journey (from the port of discharge to the intended destination) will be subject to the Carmack Amendment as long as the domestic leg is covered by separate bill or bills of lading”); see also Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 703-04 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that applicability of the Carmack Amendment could not be determined because “[n]o evidence appeared] in the record to show whether any domestic bill of lading was issued to cover the domestic segment of the shipment” from Taiwan to Baltimore).

M & D concedes that the relevant transportation of the shoes was between Brazil and Virginia. (Appellant’s Br. at 5 (stating that “truck transportation [of the shoes by M & D] was the transportation of a shipment in foreign commerce not intrastate commerce because trucking was an integral part of a shipment from Santos, Brazil to Lynchburg, Virginia”)); see also Project Hope v. M/V IBN SINA, 250 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “whether *697 ... § 13501(1)(A) or (E) is satisfied to trigger application of the Carmack Amendment is determined by reference to the intended final destination of the shipment as that intent existed when the shipment commenced” and that “[t]his intent fixes the character of the shipment for all the legs of the transport within the United States”). M & D further concedes that it issued a separate bill of lading covering the domestic leg of this shipment. Thus, we conclude that M & D’s transportation of the container from Norfolk to Lynch-burg was within the scope of the Carmack Amendment, and the district court did not err in applying the Amendment to Duck Head’s claim against M & D.

M & D also asserts that the district court should have applied a provision of the Pomerene Bills of Lading Act, specifically 49 U.S.C.A. § 80113(b) (West 1997), 7 which, it contends, would afford M & D protection from liability in these circumstances. 8 M & D argues that this provision protects “common carriers from liability for loss or damage in sealed containers .... ” (Appellee’s Br. at 8.) Duck Head argues in response that the Pomerene Act is inapplicable to M & D’s transportation of the shoes, because that transportation was pursuant to a bill of lading covering only an intrastate segment of the shoes’ transportation.

Section 80102 of Title 49 states that

[t]his chapter [801, of which § 80113 is a part] applies to a bill of lading when the bill is issued by a common carrier for the transportation of goods—

(1) between a place in the District of Columbia and another place in the District of Columbia;

(2) between a place in a territory or possession of the United States and another place in the same territory or possession;

(3) between a place in a State and a place in another State;

(4) between a place in a State and a place in the same State through another State or a foreign country; or

(5) from a place in a State to a place in a foreign country.

49 U.S.C.A. § 80102 (West 1997). Two aspects of this section are noteworthy here. First, unlike the Carmack Amendment, which applies to “transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under sub-chapter I or III of chapter 135 or chapter 105,” 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(a)(1), the Pomerene Act applies “to a bill of lading.” Thus, the bill of lading, rather than the transportation service provided, is the relevant object of inquiry in determining whether the Act applies. The bill of lading M & D issued here was for transportation from Norfolk to Lynchburg — entirely intrastate — and thus the Pomerene Act is *698 not implicated. Second, and equally fatal to M & D’s claim that the Pomerene Act applies, is the use of the words “from” and “to” in § 80102(5) (“from a place in a State to a place in a foreign country”). The Pomerene Act, then, by its terms, does not apply to shipments from a place in a foreign country to a place in a state in this country. Further support is lent to this conclusion by the four subsections that precede § 80102(5), all of which use the word “between” in describing the bills of lading to which the Act applies; Congress, we may presume, did not lightly select the construction “from one place to another,” but instead meant to cover only bills of lading issued for the transportation of goods from a state to a foreign country, and not the reverse. In sum, M & D’s argument that the district court should have applied the Pomerene Act is ill-founded.

B.

M & D next asserts that it adduced evidence sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of Duck Head, specifically evidence suggesting that the seals on the container in question were (or appeared) intact at the time M & D delivered it to Duck Head in Lynchburg and that M & D “accepted this container as subject to shipper load and count.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) Neither of these factual “issues” identified by M & D, however, supports its contention that summary judgment should not have been granted to Duck Head.

Under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must show “delivery [of the goods] in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages.” Oak Hall Cap & Gown Co., Inc. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 899 F.2d 291, 294 (4th Cir. 1990). Once the plaintiff establishes such a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the carrier to show that one of the following caused the loss: “(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; or (d) the inherent vice or nature of the goods”. Missouri Pac. Railroad v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137-38, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964).

In support of its prima facie case, Duck Head demonstrated that M & D took delivery of the container and asserted on its own bill of lading that its contents weighed 9,128 kg, the asserted weight of the complete shipment. See Westway Coffee Corp. v. M.V. Netuno, 675 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1982) (when a carrier issues a bill of lading declaring the gross weight of the container, regardless of whether the carrier actually weighs the container, the carrier is presumed to have received that gross weight absent an evidentiary showing rebutting the presumption); see also National Transp., Inc. v. Inn Foods, Inc., 827 F.2d 351, 354 (8th Cir. 1987) (when a carrier issues a clean bill of lading for cargo open to inspection, whether or not the carrier does in fact inspect the cargo, it will be held liable for delivery of the cargo in good condition) (citations omitted). Duck Head further demonstrated, and M & D does not dispute, that the container as delivered to Duck Head was missing a substantial amount of the cargo that comprised the shipment, and offered proof of the amount of its damages. 9 The district court thus did not err in finding that Duck Head had established a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment.

Neither of M & D’s asserted defenses could relieve it of liability under the Car-mack Amendment. M & D’s argument *699 that the seals on the container were intact would not constitute a defense to Duck Head’s claim against it because such evidence is not directed to any of the allowable defenses under the Amendment. Likewise, M & D’s argument that it received the goods “subject to shipper load and count” is unavailing both because M & D’s own bill of lading states that the container contained 9,128 kg of cargo, or exactly the weight Duck Head contends it shipped, and because M & D’s bill of lading contains no such limitation. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 211 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding, where the carrier railroad contended that the shipment was subject to shipper’s load and count, that the absence of any such notation on the carrier’s bill of lading rendered the contention meritless).

We are therefore unable to conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Duck Head. 10

III.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.