*149 OPINION

Appellee Project Life, Incorporated, brought this action against the Maryland Port Administration and various other defendants (collectively, “the MPA”). Project Life alleged that the MPA violated Part A of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-12134 (West 1995), by refusing to provide Project Life with a long-term lease for a berth at a pier controlled by the MPA. The MPA now appeals orders of the district court denying the MPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and granting Project Life’s request for injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In 1993, Project Life acquired the Sanctuary, a former naval hospital ship. The Sanctuary was not then, and is not now, seaworthy, and Project Life has no plans to make it so. Rather, Project Life plans to operate a drug rehabilitation clinic for women on board the Sanctuary while the vessel is berthed at a pier. Ultimately, Project Life hopes to provide rehabilitation services, including life skills and job training, for up to 300 women at a time, for rotations of 30 to 90 days. During their rehabilitation, residents would not be permitted to leave the ship, and only staff members would be allowed to have access to the ship. Project Life anticipates that approximately 300 employees, working in three shifts, would be needed to provide services to the residents. These workers would come and go from the ship as their shifts began and ended.

In order to obtain funding for its operations, Project Life needed to be able to assure potential benefactors of the stability and longevity of the program. In practical terms, potential donors required assurances that Project Life had a long-term berth for the ship. A long-term berth (of at least five years) was deemed necessary so that money spent on improvements, such as the extension of sewer and electrical lines, would not be wasted. Project Life also required that the ship be permanently moored to a pier. 1

Several years ago, Project Life approached the MPA about a long-term lay berth for the Sanctuary at a pier controlled by the MPA. The MPA is responsible for administering several shipping terminals in the Port of Baltimore; 2 its statutory mission is to increase waterborne commerce, ie., the loading and unloading of cargo, at state ports, see Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 6-102(c)(l) (2001). One of the terminals administered by the MPA is North Locust Point, which consists of ten current and former piers. For the most part, the MPA leases berth space at North Locust Point on a temporary basis (a day or two at a time) as ships come into the port to unload or load cargo. There are, however, several exceptions to this general rule. Most notably, the MPA has entered a five-year renewable lease with the Navy for “lay berths” (ie., non-cargo related berths) for ships that are part of the United States Navy Ready Reserve.

Discussions between Project Life and the MPA eventually came to focus on Pier *150 6 at North Locust Point. Pier 6 has not been used to support cargo operations for approximately 20 years, and the MPA has no plans to refurbish the pier to make it usable. Nevertheless, after initially assuring Project Life that its needs could be met, the MPA delayed making a binding commitment, apparently in response to pressure from two state legislators whose districts encompassed North Locust Point and the surrounding residential community. 3 Among other things, the MPA required Project Life to obtain the support of the surrounding community as a condition of obtaining a lease for the Sanctuary at any MPA-controlled pier. Such a requirement had never been imposed on any other potential tenant at North Locust Point.

Having failed to reach agreement with the MPA, Project Life filed this action asserting that the MPA’s failure to provide a long-term lease for a berth at Pier 6 constituted a denial of “the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132, in violation of the ADA. A jury found in favor of Project Life and awarded $12 in nominal damages. The district court subsequently conducted its own examination of the record, reached the same factual conclusions as the jury, and entered an injunction ordering the MPA to negotiate a long-term lease for Pier 6. At that time, the district court also denied the MPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 4 We review this ruling de novo. See Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1999).

II.

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability” by a public entity with respect to the provision of services, programs, or activities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132. As is relevant here, the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services ... provided by a public entity.” Id. § 12131(2). In order to establish a violation of Title II, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) disability; (2) qualification (with or without modification) for the service in question; and (3) denial of the service “due to discrimination solely on the basis of the disability.” Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 1999).

The MPA first argues that Project Life is not “qualified” because it seeks a service the MPA does not provide, namely, a long-term lay berth for a ship to be used for residential purposes. The evidence at trial, however, clearly established that the MPA does provide long-term lay berths— i.e., those leased to the Navy — on terms nearly identical to those sought by Project Life. The MPA argues that the leases to the Navy are not relevant because naval personnel do not live on those ships full-time; thus, the MPA maintains that any entity seeking a berth for a residential ship is not qualified as a matter of law. We reject this argument. At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence re *151 garding the genuineness of the MPA’s “nonresidential” qualification, and the question of whether Project Life was qualified to receive services from the MPA was submitted to the jury. Because there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the “nonresidential” qualification was not bona fide, we must affirm the denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Sales v. Grant, 158 F.3d 768, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); cf. Coupe v. Fed. Express Corp., 121 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that question of whether occupational qualification is bona fide is one of fact). 5

Next, the MPA argues that Project Life is not entitled to the protection of the ADA because an integral part of the rehabilitation program is the isolation of residents from the surrounding community. According to the MPA, Project Life’s program thus violates a central purpose of the ADA, which is to promote the integration of disabled individuals into society, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(a)(2), (8) (West 1995). This argument fails for two reasons. First, the MPA mistakes the means of Project Life’s program for its ends. The ultimate goal of the rehabilitation program is the successful reintroduction of former drug addicts into productive society; the isolation of those individuals from potentially destructive influences is a temporary measure designed to ensure that the ultimate goal is attained. Second, the MPA seeks to turn an underlying purpose of the ADA into an element of the claim. However, no authority supports such a holding. We therefore reject this contention.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court properly denied the MPA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. 6 Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.