OPINION

Saray Mom appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (2000). Mom asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress drugs found on his person. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review the factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error, while reviewing legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998).

Mom contends the arresting officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify seizing him. We have reviewed the circumstances surrounding the stop of the vehicle in which Mom was a passenger and the seizure of Mom and find that reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed. *200 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Mom contends the district court erred in determining his consent to search his person was voluntary. We review the district court’s factual findings on consent under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Government must establish knowing and voluntary consent by a pre-ponderance of the evidence, which is assessed under a totality of the circumstances test. Id. With these standards in mind, we find no error in the district court’s determination that Mom voluntarily consented to a search of his person.

Accordingly, we affirm Mom’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.