OPINION

Clarence Edward Cyrus appeals his convictions for distribution of cocaine base and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2000). Cyrus claims that the district court erred by accepting his guilty plea because it was not knowingly made in accordance with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. He also claims that the district court erred in its application of the sentencing „ guidelines. 1

Cyrus claims that the district court’s acceptance of his plea prior to the completion of the presentence investigation report (“PSR”) rendered it impossible for him to enter a knowing and intelligent plea. 2 He also claims that given his state of malingering, it was a virtual certainty that he would face an enhanced sentence for obstruction of justice, and would not receive credit for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG §§ 3C1.1, 3El.l(a). We disagree. As late as June 5, 2001, the Assistant United States Attorney was willing to honor the stipulations in the plea agreement despite Cyrus’ ongoing efforts at obstructing the judicial process. Moreover, like the district court, we conclude that the determination of whether Cyrus received the benefit of the bargain contained in the plea agreement ultimately fell on Cyrus and his decision not to cooperate with the Government. Accordingly, we do not accept Cyrus’ contention that the stipulations as laid out in the plea agreement were an unobtainable sham.

We likewise reject Cyrus’ claim that Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 necessarily requires the district court to review the PSR and the sentencing guidelines prior to acceptance of the plea. Rule 11 requires the district court to inform the defendant of the applicable mandatory minimum and maximum sentences relevant to his case, as well as the requirement that the court consider the sentencing guidelines. Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). Any attempt to read further into the rule, such as Cyrus sug *980 gests, .is not supported in the plain language of the rule or any controlling case-law. Accordingly, we reject this claim. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1991).

Because we conclude that Cyrus’ plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, it follows that the waiver of his appellate rights contained in the plea agreement is effective. See United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). This waiver precludes review of his two remaining claims regarding the application of the sentencing guidelines.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 3 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.