OPINION

Lisa A. Allen appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Baltimore County Police Department and the Baltimore County Government, on her claims of pregnancy discrimination, sex discrimination, retaliation and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). We affirm.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, the supplemental joint appendix and the district court’s order. We conclude the district court properly determined Allen failed to establish that she suffered from an adverse employment action and therefore could not establish a prima facie case of sex or pregnancy discrimination or retaliation. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, the district court properly concluded Allen had not established that she was constructively discharged. See Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 237 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Allen v. Baltimore County Gov’t, No. CA-01-863 (D. Md. filed Sept. 17, 2002; entered Sept. 18, 2002). *70 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.