OPINION

Jimmy Joe Justice appeals his ten-month sentence imposed following the revocation of his supervised release. Justice argues the district court mischaracterized the most serious violation of his supervised release as a Class B violation rather than a Class C violation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Justice was convicted in 1998 following his guilty plea to distributing cocaine, see *720 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000), for which he received a twenty-seven month prison term followed by a three-year term of supervised release, which commenced in July 2000. However, at a hearing in April 2003, Justice essentially admitted to violating his supervision in several respects, 1 including a positive test for methamphetamine. Rather than challenging the majority of the charged violations, Justice argued only that his positive drug test amounted to a Class C violation rather than a Class B violation for sentencing purposes, 2 as the base statutory maximum for the possession that could be inferred from his positive test is one year. See United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000)); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7Bl.l(a)(3) (2002). Finding Justice’s § 841 conviction qualified him for the higher, two-year maximum term of imprisonment under § 844, the district court concluded the violation constituted a Class B violation, see § 7Bl.l(a)(2), and imposed a ten-month sentence followed by twenty-six months of supervised release.

We find no error in the district court’s imposition of a ten-month custodial sentence, for two reasons. First, Justice’s arguments are premised on the policy statements of Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines, which are advisory and nonbinding. See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). Second, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Justice’s positive urine screen amounted to a Class B felony. See Trotter, 270 F.3d at 1155.

Accordingly, we affirm revocation of Justice’s supervised release and his ten-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.