OPINION

Sharron Debra Wendy Savoy, a native and citizen of Trinidad, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s decision and order denying her application for suspension of deportation. For the reasons discussed below, we deny the petition for review.

Savoy first challenges the immigration judge’s finding that she failed to demonstrate extreme hardship as required to qualify for suspension of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed by § 308(b)(7) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009). We find that the immigration judge’s “decision with respect to whether extreme hardship is established is a discretionary one [that the court] may not review.” Okpa v. INS, 266 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 2001); see IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(E) (providing that “there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under [INA] section ... 244”). Thus, we are without jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s discretionary decision to deny relief.

Savoy also claims that the Board erred in affirming the decision of the immigration judge without opinion, after review by a single Board member, in accordance with the procedure set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) (2003). We have reviewed Savoy’s challenges to the Board’s use of this streamlined procedure and find them to be without merit. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1009, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. United States Attorney Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez-Oropeza v. United States Attorney Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2003); Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375-79 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Khattak v. *648 Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a challenge to the Board’s summary affirmance procedure on retroactivity grounds and concluding that “allowing summary opinions in clear cases is nothing more than a procedural change that does not affect substantive rights”). We further find that summary affirmance was appropriate in this case under the factors set forth in § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED.