OPINION

In these consolidated appeals, Sharon Hopkins, Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez, and Daniel Gonzalez-Vasquez appeal their jury convictions and resulting sentences for conspiring to use interstate financial transactions to support criminal activity, conspiring to smuggle narcotics into a federal correctional facility, and related offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2000). The Appellants raise one collective assignment of error and eight individual issues. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

The Appellants’ collective assignment of error, alleging the district court’s exercise of discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines violates Ring v. Arizona, 586 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 158 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), is without merit. In United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 2000), we held that a sentence did not implicate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), provided it did not exceed the statutory maximum for the relevant count of conviction. Although the Appellants wish to revisit this decision based on Ring, we are bound to follow the prior panel decision of this court absent contrary authority from the Supreme Court. United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999). Because Ring simply “reiterated the Apprendi principle,” United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 284 (4th Cir. 2003), and none of the Appellants received a sentence in excess of the relevant statutory maximum for any count of conviction, this assignment of error is meritless.

II.

Turning to the claims raised by Hopkins, we find there was sufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for conspiring to distribute heroin. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the United States, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we find there was ample direct and circumstantial evidence that Hopkins helped recruit Linda Reed into the conspiracy, thereby demonstrating a connection sufficient to include her in the plan. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Likewise, we find no error in the district court’s application of an offense level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2002), and refusal to depart downward to account for Hopkins’s minor role in the offense, see USSG § 5H1.7. We find the § 3C1.1 enhancement to be proper following Hopkins’s conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). See § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(i)). Further, Hopkins fails to demonstrate that the district court misapprehended its authority to depart, indicating this claim is unreviewable. See United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 230 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 29 (4th Cir. 1990). Hence, we find no error in either Hopkins’s conviction under § 846 or her 121-month custodial sentence. *

III.

Nor do we find merit in Rodriguez’s and Daniel Gonzalez-Vasquez’s joint contention *691 that the district court erred in denying their motions for acquittal as to Count 1 (charging them with conspiring to transfer the proceeds of criminal activity through interstate financial transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(h) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003)), and Count 2 (alleging a conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of § 846). This court reviews the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, the motion alleged insufficient evidence, the relevant question is whether taking the view most favorable to the government, there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457.

Applying this standard of review, we find no error. Because the connection between a defendant and a conspiracy may be demonstrated by wholly circumstantial evidence, and even a slight connection will suffice to tie the defendant to the conspiracy, we find Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s letter to Rodriguez and the telephone conversations between these Appellants and Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez adequately demonstrated their knowing and voluntary participation in both the money laundering conspiracy and the heroin conspiracy. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858. Hence we find no error in the denial of either Rodriguez’s or Daniel Gonzalez-Vasquez’s motions for acquittal.

IV.

Finally, we find no error in Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s conviction or sentence. Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez challenges his conviction as predicated on several erroneous evidentiary decisions and his sentence as reflective of three separate misapplications of the Sentencing Guidelines. Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez also presents a variation of the Appellants’ collective assignment of error addressed above. None of these contentions are persuasive, however.

With respect to the evidentiary decisions in question, we find no error in the district court’s admission of testimony regarding Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s prior drug smuggling at FCI Atlanta and his membership in a gang. That testimony demonstrated Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s ability and opportunity to continue a drug smuggling operation at FCI Edgefield following his transfer there, see Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and because this evidence was intrinsic to the conspiracy alleged in the indictment, it went beyond demonstrating only a criminal disposition. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 1997). Nor do we find abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of statements Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez made to a cooperating co-conspirator through various inmate interpreters selected by Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez, as those inmates functioned as no more than language conduits. See United States v. Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Garcia, 16 F.3d 341, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1994).

Nor do we find error in Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s sentence. Because the district court did not exceed the statutory maximum in sentencing Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez for the various offenses of which he was convicted, and his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (2000) required that his 165-month sentences be imposed consecutively, see § 1791(c), we find this claim to be indistinguishable from the Appellants’ collective claim under Ring. Further, the district court properly applied an offense level enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 based on Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez’s threats to a testifying co-conspirator, see § 3C1.1, comment. (n.4(a)), and this enhancement provides an additional basis for denying an offense level *692 reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E1.1, comment, (n.2, 4). Finally, we also find there was ample testimony presented at trial that Jorge Gonzalez-Vasquez was the organizer and leader of a conspiracy involving five or more participants.

V.

Accordingly, we affirm the Appellants’ convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.